Online research in philosophy

In this paper, I will discuss a certain conception of matter that Aristotle introduces in Metaphysics Z3. It is often assumed that Aristotle came to distinguish between matter and form only in his physical writings, and that this lead to a conflict with the doctrine of primary substances in the Categories that he tries to resolve in Z3. I will argue that there is no such conflict. In Z3, Aristotle seems to suggest that matter is what is left over when (...) we strip a thing of all its properties. I take it that he does not want us to strip away these properties by physical means or in our imagination. Rather, we are asked to strip a referring noun phrase of all its predicative parts. We are thus not supposed to be able to refer to something that has no qualities whatsoever, but to construct a phrase that refers to something that has properties without referring to its having them, and without implying which properties it has. The idea that there might be a way of referring to something definite without mentioning any of its qualities is platonic and it still underlies modern predicate logic. In Z3, Aristotle argues against this conception and thus against the basic idea of predicate logic. According to him, matter is at best an inseparable aspect of a primary substance, which substance is best referred to as a compound τóδε τι (“this such”). Matter is what the τóδε refers to as part of this phrase. But it cannot exist in separation from form, and we cannot refer to it by a separated term, without also referring to the substantial form of the substance of which it is an aspect. (shrink)

Technology has a history structured by discontinuities. The first important philosophical expression of such a conception of technology was advanced by Walter Benjamin when he defined art works in relation to specific techniques of production. At the present art and architecture occur within an age defined by the move from ’technical reproducibility’ to digital reproducibility. The move has an impact on how technology is understood and its relation to architecture conceived. Adapting Walter Benjamin’s work in this area provides the basis (...) for a response to Soren Riis’ important treatment of the relationship between architecture and technology in his paper “Dwelling in-between walls: the architectural surround”. (shrink)

General metaphysical arguments have been proposed in favour of the thesis that all dispositions have categorical bases (Armstrong; Prior, Pargetter, Jackson). These arguments have been countered by equally general arguments in support of ungrounded dispositions (Molnar, Mumford). I believe that this controversy cannot be settled purely on the level of abstract metaphysical considerations. Instead, I propose to look for ungrounded dispositions in specific physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. I explain why non-classical properties such as spin are best interpreted as (...) irreducible dispositional properties, and I give reasons why even seemingly classical properties, for instance position or momentum, should receive a similar treatment when interpreted in the quantum realm. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that quantum dispositions should not be limited to probabilistic dispositions (propensities) by showing reasons why even possession of well-defined values of parameters should qualify as a dispositional property. I finally discuss the issue of the actuality of quantum dispositions, arguing that it may be justified to treat them as potentialities whose being has a lesser degree of reality than that of classical categorical properties, due to the incompatibility relations between non-commuting observables. (shrink)

Cauchy’s contribution to the foundations of analysis is often viewed through the lens of developments that occurred some decades later, namely the formalisation of analysis on the basis of the epsilon-delta doctrine in the context of an Archimedean continuum. What does one see if one refrains from viewing Cauchy as if he had read Weierstrass already? One sees, with Felix Klein, a parallel thread for the development of analysis, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. One sees, with Emile Borel, (...) the seeds of the theory of rates of growth of functions as developed by Paul du Bois-Reymond. One sees, with E. G. Björling, an infinitesimal definition of the criterion of uniform convergence. Cauchy’s foundational stance is hereby reconsidered. (shrink)

This paper is a commentary to a paper by Erik Paredis (2011). It is firstly argued that the theories of technology, as distinguished by Feenberg, cannot adequately explain the different interpretations of the role of technology in the transition towards sustainability, as Paredis argues. Secondly, the basic argument of Paredis is countered that transition research is fundamentally handicapped by its constructivists roots to discriminate between options. Finally it is argued that a third strand of transition research exists that is explicitly (...) interventionist, and that nurtures specific technology in context. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the major development of mathematical analysis during the mid-nineteenth century. On the basis of Jahnke’s (Hist Math 20(3):265–284, 1993 ) distinction between considering mathematics as an empirical science based on time and space and considering mathematics as a purely conceptual science we discuss the Swedish nineteenth century mathematician E.G. Björling’s general view of real- and complexvalued functions. We argue that Björling had a tendency to sometimes consider mathematical objects in a naturalistic way. One example is (...) how Björling interprets Cauchy’s definition of the logarithm function with respect to complex variables, which is investigated in the paper. Furthermore, in view of an article written by Björling (Kongl Vetens Akad Förh Stockholm 166–228, 1852 ) we consider Cauchy’s theorem on power series expansions of complex valued functions. We investigate Björling’s, Cauchy’s and the Belgian mathematician Lamarle’s different conditions for expanding a complex function of a complex variable in a power series. We argue that one reason why Cauchy’s theorem was controversial could be the ambiguities of fundamental concepts in analysis that existed during the mid-nineteenth century. This problem is demonstrated with examples from Björling, Cauchy and Lamarle. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics of the last few decades is usually distinguished into mainstream and maverick.1 The mainstream philosophy of mathematics considers mathematics as a static body of knowledge; it is mainly concerned with the question of the justification of mathematical knowledge; it holds that there is an absolutely certain, or at least fairly reliable, foundation for mathematics; it considers mathematical logic as a canon for the philosophy of mathematics; it assumes that a detailed account of mathematical practice would be (...) desirable but not really essential; it generally sets itself within the framework of analytic philosophy. The maverick philosophy of mathematics considers mathematics as a dynamic body of knowledge; it is mainly concerned with the question of the growth of mathematical knowledge, including the dynamics of mathematical discovery; it holds that there is no absolutely certain foundation for mathematics; it considers mathematical logic very useful to show the limitations of the mainstream philosophy of mathematics by means of the limitative results, but inadequate to deal with the question of the growth of mathematical knowledge; it assumes that only a detailed analysis of mathematical practice could lead to a philosophy of mathematics worth its name; it generally sets itself outside the framework of analytic philosophy. The mainstream philosophy of mathematics consists of the three big foundational schools of the first few decades of the twentieth century, namely logicism (Frege, Russell), formalism (Hilbert), intuitionism (Brouwer, Heyting), and the positions which ensued from them in the second half of the twentieth.. (shrink)

The main suggestions and objections raised by Don Ihde and Charles Lenay to my ‘Technology and the body: the (im)possibilities of re-embodiment’ are summarized and discussed. On the one hand, I agree that we should pay more attention to whole body experience and to further resisting Cartesian assumptions in the field of cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of cognition. On the other hand, I explain that my account in no way presupposes the myth of ‘natural man’ or of a natural, delineated (...) body from before the fall into technology. (shrink)

In this comment I want to clarify five topics. The first topic concerns the importance of looking back at the very principles of the foundations of Western society. The second comment argues for the original position of Latour within the field of (social) constructivism. In the third comment, I argue that Haraway adds to the science-politics discussion by elaborating her philosophy beyond dichotomy. In the fourth comment, I argue that the terms ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ are central philosophical concepts which should (...) be retained. Finally I will make the connection between ‘what’ is represented and ‘how’ to represent it. (shrink)

In this commentary on Don Ihde’s paper “Stretching the in-between: embodiment and beyond” I argue that perceptions and observations are based on tacit frames and these frames are expressed through pre-reflexive intuitions thus giving meaning to the perceived content of observations. However, if the objective or given information in perception is incomplete or missing our brain and nervous system will intuitively and unconsciously fill in the missing information in order to act—these particular pieces of added information may not be relevant (...) to the decoding of the given content of perception at all. (shrink)

This essay is dominated by three themes that recur contrapuntally in Heisenberg’s writings: observation, description , and ontology —prompted always by a concern about the role played by the subjective inquirer in scientific meaning-making, and by the ontology of scientific claims. Among the related themes are; the tension between paradigmatic concerns with structure and philosophical concerns with reality, the possibility of scientific revolutions, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, that can overthrow the classical traditions of natural science and the inadequacy (...) of a psychophysical parallelism for an epistemology of reason . The influence of Husserl and Heidegger is in his neokantian concern about the role of subjectivity. Heisenberg was a long-time friend of Heidegger and familiar with Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and its critique of Greek philosophy; he also contributed an essay to a Festschrift in Heidegger’s honor in 1959. (shrink)

In this reply to Robrecht Vanderbeeken’s essay ‘The Screen as an In-Between’ questions are raised concerning the three distinctive effects the authors attributes to contemporary audiovisual media—eclipsing, interpassivity and truth procedure—and argued that they fail to highlight the specificity of the new media referred to.

Postphenomenology, in a complementary role with other science studies disciplines, remains within the trajectory of those theories which reject early modern epistemology and metaphysics, including rejection of ‘subject’–‘object’ distinctions, and holds, instead, to an inter-relational, co-constitutive ontology. Here the critiques which sometimes echo vestiges of such early modern epistemology are counter-challenged.

The phenomenological tradition has had a long interest in embodiment, and bodily experience beyond the confines of the “skinbag” body. Here I respond to Helena De Preester’s analysis of different types of protheses: limb, perceptual, cognitive. In her paper “Technology and the body: the (im)possibilities of re-embodiment”, she wants to make finer distinctions between extensions and incorporations . Today’s hi-tech developments make this refinement necessary and possible. I respond to the three levels or types of prostheses taking note of the (...) increasing difficulty at each level and express certain worries about cognitively framed notions of bodily experience. (shrink)

What follows from the suggestion to pay attention to what is in-between science and politics? Karen François’s paper “In-between science and politics” follows Latour in arguing for the need for political theory to get out of the Platonic cave that it still inhabits. Political theory needs to be brought into the wild through empirical studies of how science and politics in fact intermix. And the Latourian proposition needs to be strengthened by focusing on the embodied knowledges that enable situated objectivities (...) to emerge. Though worthwhile, these arguments are weakened by a superficial treatment of political theory and by a lack of attention to the difficulties involved in combining Latourian actor-network theory with the “strong objectivity” of standpoint theory. Most problematically the paper purports to define as an agenda (exploring the in-between of science and politics) what whole fields of inquiry have already been in full swing exploring for quite a while. The ‘turn to ontology’ in STS and social anthropology and the development of ‘empirical philosophy’ suggests what might be at stake in such explorations. (shrink)

J. Macgregor Wise and R. van de Vall kindly reviewed my analysis of the potential of webcams on nature conservation sites for developing networks of care. I am indebted to them for their subtle and intelligent deliberation and their valuable suggestions for further elaboration of the project. My focus, as stated in the article, is on the study of users, technology and animals as assemblages, bound together by physical, visual and affective bonds in the process of ‘doing something’.

It is hypothesized that de Broglie’s ‘matter waves’ provide a dynamical basis for Minkowski spacetime in an antisubstantivalist or relational account. The relativity of simultaneity is seen as an effect of the de Broglie oscillation together with a basic relativity postulate, while the dispersion relation from finite rest mass gives rise to the differentiation of spatial and temporal axes. Thus spacetime is seen as not fundamental, but rather as emergent from the quantum level. A result by Solov’ev which demonstrates that (...) time is not an applicable concept at the quantum level is adduced in support of this claim. Finally, it is noted that de Broglie waves can be seen as the “bridge of becoming” discussed by ( 2005 ). (shrink)

Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies that (...) the principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available. (shrink)

The question of the status and the mode of functioning of technologies which participate in our cognitive activity (action, perception, reasoning) is inseparable from the question of the bodily inscription of these faculties. One can adopt the principle that a tool is fully appropriate when it functions as a component of the organs of our lived body. However, these technical entities can be differentiated along a scale according to the role played by their separability. The possibility of picking up and (...) putting down a hammer, a pair of spectacles, an agenda is part of the meaning of these tools. When they are “in hand”, they become transparent for the subject and serve in the constitution of his lived experience. Put down, they can be transmitted, modified, received. According to the frequency of the transition picking up/putting down, the tool can be picked up while anticipating that it can just as quickly put down again (the mouse of a computer, cutlery at table, an agenda, …). At the other extreme, another sort of tool functions rather as a prosthetic device that is taken up with the prospect of remaining attached to the body for a long time (an artificial leg, spectacles, clothes, …). This differentiation of technologies along a continuum which depends on forms of use seems to us sufficient to distinguish extension and embodiment. (shrink)

Yoni Van Den Eede’s assessment of the concept of remedial media as “implying” that technological shortcomings can be remedied by technology understates the evolution of media, which shows that improvement of technological flaws via new technology is intrinsic, actual, and central to media development, not implied. The use of mobile media and their applications in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti is a current, prime example, and also speaks to the capacity of technology to remedy the natural disasters that (...) strike the world. (shrink)

This commentary on Kurt Vanhoutte and Nele Wynants’s of ‘Performing phenomenology: negotiating presence in intermedial theatre’ focuses on the implications of staging phenomenological research. In my opinion the authors missed an opportunity to stress more what W (Double U) , a performance of CREW has to offer postphenomenology and what it actually means to ‘perform’ phenomenology. I will not only argue that W (Double U) because of its performative nature offers a reflection on postphenomenology, but also that the performance must (...) be understood as a specific kind of research, conducted simultaneously from a theoretical and aesthetic orientation, leading to a complex interaction between perception and reflection, and offering a valuable, different perspective on postphenomenological research issues. W (Double U) in this respect functions as a ‘theoretical object’, producing a specific kind of embodied knowledge. Finally I will emphasize the possible radical potential in W (Double U) , because I do believe that the performance, although it might not lead explicitly to social change, does have an important social and political relevance that the authors do not really delve into. (shrink)

Don Ihde’s paper “Stretching the in-between: Embodiment and beyond” appears to me as a stimulating, topical text with a number of important arguments about human embodiment as a dynamic and epistemically relevant dimension to scientific knowledge production. But, indirectly, the text also raises some basic questions about how to describe the (current) scope of technoscientific knowledge, and the potentials of postphenomenology to deal with this complicated, multi-stable issue.

One of the most pressing issues in understanding abduction is whether it is an instinct or an inference. For many commentators find it paradoxical that new ideas are products of an instinct and products of an inference at the same time. Fortunately, Lorenzo Magnani’s recent discussion of animal abduction sheds light on both instinctual and inferential character of Peircean abduction. But, exactly for what reasons are Peirce and Magnani so convinced that animal abduction can provide us with a novel perspective? (...) Inspired by Peirce’s and Magnani’s discussions of animal abduction, I propose to compare Peirce’s and Magnani’s views of animal abduction with the estimative power of non-human animals and humans, which was one of the internal senses in medieval psychology. (shrink)

This commentary to Vanhoutte and Wynants’s paper “Performing phenomenology: negotiating presence in intermedial theatre” tries to ascertain whether the dialectics between the real and the virtual in CREW’s artistic and technological experiments, which the authors call a ‘strategy,’ implies an a-priori relation that is hard to reconcile to the ethos of discovering through doing proposed by postphenomenological research, and to an ‘empirical turn’ based in case studies and descriptive concreteness suggested by a ‘pragmatic phenomenology.’ I propose that the shift from (...) live to mediated perception in CREW’s experimental productions, producing a multistable ontology, is less occasion for strategic dialectics and Benjaminian ‘illumination’ of our mediatized culture, than for an analytic perspective on what actually happens when the shift occurs and what this tells us about our relationship to digital technologies of reproduction. (shrink)

A view of evolution is presented in this paper (a two paper series), intended as a methodological infrastructure for modeling spatio-cultural systems (the design outline of such a model is presented in paper II). A motivation for the re-articulation of evolution as information dynamics is the phenomenologically discovered prerequisite of embedding a meaning-attributing apparatus in any and all models of spatio-cultural systems. An evolution is construed as the dynamics of a complex system comprised of memory devices, connected in an ordered (...) fashion (not randomly) by information-exchanges. An information-exchange transpires when the recipient system adopts a strategy (a continuum of events) that eventually changes its structure; namely, after the exchange, it contains and conveys different information. These memory devices—sub-systems—are also similarly constructed complex system. Only a part of the information is retained by a system in its physical-memory storage, which eventually loses this function too, when the ability to retrieve a common enough structure is lost. The entire amount of information is a system’s structure of connections (information exchanges); it is contained (apparently stored) dynamically when a system is observed in a temporarily stable state. This temporary permanence—robustness and resilience—is attained dynamically; namely, enabled by changes taking place in its sub-systems and in each of their sub-systems. Therefore, for modeling such a system a multi-layer/multi-scale approach is preferable. It enables the addition and subtraction of an interim scale and the consideration of such a scale as a micro or a macro (thus initiating a maneuver up or down scale) according to an ad-hoc requirement of the model, which imitates an envisaged sub system (called an ‘Inner World’), to which a certain range of decisions is relegated. This dynamics is driven (in time) by dynamically originated information growth, as defined by Shannon; i.e. by the fact that each of certain state transitions have occurred sometime in the past of the system just so and not otherwise, and by the fact that they have occurred in a certain order. Therefore, each ‘history’ and memory retrieval availability of information is unique, and thus can be used to differentiate meanings. Hence, there cannot be a comprehensive solution to the meaning attribution model-design challenge. However, the observation that at the core of each envisaged complex system, moving in time according to a rounded logic, there is an information manipulating device, operating necessarily according to a Boolean logic, can be copied into the design of a model. This observation enables, therefore, the embedding of a specific, locally fitted, meaning attributing device, which is an information manipulating mechanism (it splices/attaches one segment of information to another—its meaning). However, this is just a framework; the actual solution has still to be found locally—for each subject system. Such a solution is demonstrated for the change in location or layout in the Israeli city in paper II. (shrink)

A model of a spatio-cultural sub-context (enfolded in a wider scope context) is presented in the form of a blue print of a Complex System with a two-stage decision engine at its core. The engine first attaches a meaning to analyzable datum, and then decides whether to keep or change it. It does not alter already stored meanings but is designed to search for data to be converted into additional stored meanings and improve the accuracy of correspondence of their spatial (...) and cultural range of relevance. Meaning is reduced to the choice of a strategy—a future continuum of events; a choice dependent on a unique Evolutionary Path, a past continuum of events specific enough to lead to the current temporarily stable state of a spatio-cultural category. It is a blue print for a program that can emulate decisions to initiate changes in the environment in which a collective of culture partners resides; changes consisting of movements from one location to another or in the layout of its current location. The model is proposed at a low cultural resolution and is applicable, after suitable modifications, to a majority of city/period pairs. However, any such model has to be city/period specific. It is illustrated with a design for analyzing changes in the Israeli city, in particular in Tel Aviv. (shrink)

This commentary on Gert Goeminne’s paper “Postphenomenology and the politics of sustainable technology” elaborates on the subpolitics of technology as a basis for dealing with sustainability issues. It questions the “sustainable technology” phrasing of the issue and focuses on the political/post-political debate to eventually suggest that the politics of sustainable technology is a possible post-political question. Minor disagreements on some philosophy of science references are briefly expressed.

This commentary on Søren Riis’s paper “Dwelling in-between walls” starts from a position of solidarity with its attempt to build a postphenomenological perspective on architecture and the built environment. It proposes however that a clearer view of a technological structure of experience may be obtained by finding technological-perceptual wholes that incorporate perceiver and perceived as well as the mediating apparatus. Parts and wholes may be formed as nested human-technological interiorities that have structured relations with what is outside—so that the outside (...) constitutes an interiority in its turn which contextualises and situates the first. This nested structure raises questions about the way architects and urbanists see the built environment and understand inhabitation. It is hoped that this effort continues with conceptual and empirical work to research ways to make the human places of our built environment. (shrink)

I would like to thank Prof. Stephen Read ( 2011 ) and Prof. Andrew Benjamin ( 2011 ) for both giving inspiring and elaborate comments on my article “Dwelling in-between walls: the architectural surround”. As I will try to demonstrate below, their two different responses not only supplement my article very nicely, but also augment each other’s. In the beginning of Read’s comment, as he sets the stage for his observations, he unknowingly also points in the direction of Benjamin’s remarks: (...) “I propose not to de-construct therefore, or add a point of view from an orthogonal position, but to try in the spirit of multidisciplinarity to talk in languages not well practiced—to begin to build what Bowker and Star call ‘boundary objects’ between different starting positions; points we can gather around to think further together” (Read 2011 ). Whereas Read facilitates a multidisciplinary dialogue, Benjamin focuses on how the absence of an initial distinction might threaten the endeavour of my paper. In my reply to Read and Benjamin, I will discuss their suggestions and arguments, while at the same time hopefully clarifying the postphenomenological approach to architecture. (shrink)

Lately there has been a growing interest in evolutionary studies concerning how the regularities and patterns found in the living cell could have emerged spontaneously by way of self-assembly and self-organization. It is reasonable to postulate that the chemical compounds found in the primitive Earth would have mostly been very simple in nature, and would have been immersed in the natural dynamics of the physical world, some of which would have involved self-organization. It seems likely that some molecular processes self-organized (...) spontaneously into a hierarchy of complex behaviours. Our conceptual search herein reaches back to the time when prebiotic phenomena began to take shape. This was before the origin of life, so in this paper we hope to shed new light on some of the theoretical issues that surround the ways in which cellular organization might have evolved without the aid of replicated information. (shrink)

I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought that presents no major antagonism.

The article provides an overview of the argument in Robert Scharff’s paper “Displacing epistemology: Being in the midst of technoscientific practice” (Scharff 2011 ), focusing on his central objective, to articulate a hidden ground of the current controversies in the philosophy of science and technology studies, between objectivism and constructivism, through a deeper confrontation with Heidegger’s legacy. The commentary addresses two aspects of Scharffs argument that deserve to be developed further, namely how it both criticizes and cultivates itself an ideal (...) of the meta-knower, and how the idea of thinking from the perspective of life in Dilthey’s sense can be critically reflected through Heidegger’s later criticism. By rehearsing Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia, and also his gradually increased criticism of the very concept of life, the commentary tries to show how Scharff’s intervention can in fact be strengthened against possible criticism. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is threefold. Firstly, it aims to present, in an educational and non-technical fashion, the main ideas at the basis of Aerts’ creation-discovery view and hidden measurement approach : a fundamental explanatory framework whose importance, in this author’s view, has been seriously underappreciated by the physics community, despite its success in clarifying many conceptual challenges of quantum physics. Secondly, it aims to introduce a new quantum machine—that we call the δ quantum machine —which is able to (...) reproduce the transmission and reflection probabilities of a one-dimensional quantum scattering process by a Dirac delta-function potential. The machine is used not only to demonstrate the pertinence of the above mentioned explanatory framework, in the general description of physical systems, but also to illustrate (in the spirit of Aerts’ ∊-model) the origin of classical and quantum structures, by revealing the existence of processes which are neither classical nor quantum, but irreducibly intermediate. We do this by explicitly introducing what we call the k-model and by proving that its processes cannot be modelized by a classical or quantum scattering system. The third purpose of this work is to exploit the powerful metaphor provided by our quantum machine, to investigate the intimate relation between the concept of potentiality and the notion of non-spatiality , that we characterize in precise terms, introducing for this the new concept of process-actuality. (shrink)

Gert Goeminne’s paper is primarily concerned with “the politics of sustainable technology,” but for good reasons he does not start with this topic. He knows that technology studies as he conceives it must clear a space for itself in a philosophical atmosphere that discourages its pursuit. He therefore begins with a critique of this objectivistic and technocratically defined atmosphere, before moving on to embrace a postphenomenology of technological multistabilities, and then further to introduce what he calls (in an adaptation of (...) Rudolf Boehm) the “topical measure” of technoscientific life. The problem I raise is not about Goeminne’s aims, with which I mostly agree, but with his presentation of how to achieve them. I argue that if one were actually to follow his advice—that is, start with critique, move on to postphenomenology, and end with “political” evaluation of technoscientific life, the project would be doomed to failure. For in our world, no one Understands this pluralizing vision. According to the understanding we actually live through and speak from, some of postphenomenology’s multiple disclosures already arrive in our experience with significantly greater ontological power than others, and sincerity about topical measure notwithstanding, the very identification of something as an interest or “value,” especially if it allegedly comes from a “layperson,” already condemns it to secondary status. (shrink)

Hans Ruin and Patrick Heelan join me in celebrating the rise of post-positivist and phenomenological approaches to scientific and technological practice. Yet as they both know, I am also concerned that the very presence of all the new accounts which give voice to this trend may tempt us into concluding prematurely that the traditional understanding of science and technology has already been displaced. With especially Ruin’s encouragement, I expand my original discussion of this concern by explaining why I agree with (...) him about the ontologically mistaken suppositions that one might become post-positivistic by doing philosophy “meta-philosophically,” or become phenomenological by making “life” more basic that “nature.”. (shrink)

My review of Ike Kamphof’s “Webcams to Save Nature: Online Space as Affective and Ethical Space” focuses on the question how the engagement of the spectator of the described websites is temporally structured and how the discrepancy between the instantaneity of affective response and the duration of moral engagement is solved. I propose to draw on Alexander Nehamas’ philosophy of beauty as an in-between, bringing affect and ethics closer together.

In response to Peter–Paul Verbeek’s and Paul Levinson’s reviews of my article ‘In Between Us,’ I comment on four criticisms. Firstly, my approach of ‘mediation as such’ does not endorse the view of mediation as secondary to mediata (i.e., entities), but does not exclude it either. Secondly, my concepts of “transparency of use” and of “context” are to be seen as philosophical ‘tools’ and not as mutually exclusive states. Thirdly, I agree with Levinson that technologies do indeed remediate, and mostly (...) not for the worse. However, fourthly, at the same time we should always be on guard for their nefarious effects. (shrink)

Since both responses interrogate different aspects of my article “The screen as an in-between” (Vanderbeeken 2011 ), I will address them separately. Vanhoutte rightly questions the affinities of my theses with Luddism, Orwell and Baudrillard’s theoretical terrorism. My reply discusses why these reactionary positions are currently out of joint. Hoens rightly questions my interpretation of the notion ‘passion for the real’ and whether the examples discussed delineate the specificity of new media. My reply discusses how I take this notion as (...) a starting point for an analysis that complements rather then criticises Badiou and Žižek and how the apparent resemblance between old and new media in fact entails significant differences. (shrink)

As an art theoretician, and as a father, I focus on the social and political consequences of Vanderbeeken’s postmodernist negative theology. I express doubts about the relevance of a poetics of catastrophe that conflates any possible alternative to the alleged technocracy under the sign of the simulacrum. To my opinion, the discourse about the virtual and the real are in a deadlock. Following the lead of American novelist Thomas Pynchon, I rephrase these critical doubts in Luddite terms: should we imagine (...) a counterattack as radical as the alleged dystopian nightmare dreamed up and sketched out by Vanderbeeken? I try to show that this line of thinking risks to result in a bold and speculative logic where ethical nuance collapses and, ultimately, the relationship between art, theory and the social culture is reduced to metaphorical analogy. To make this point I retake a critical, phenomenologically inspired reaction by Vivian Sobchack to Baudrillard’s account of Crash, J.G. Ballard’s controversial novel on techno-fetishism. My argument is that the scar that marks Sobchack’s ‘technobody’ might here stand for an alternative that approaches our technological condition not as a discursive machine but as a social pragmatics with deep ethical implications. (shrink)

Taken together, the commentaries by Sigrid Merx and Tom Paulus suggest a remarkable dialectical relationship with regard to our article “Performing Phenomenology: Negotiating Presence in Intermedial Theatre”. On the one side a lack of elaborated political consciousness is being detected, while on the other side an alleged surplus of political consciousness is being criticized. Although apparently contradictory, these reactions seem to originate in the same ideological stress: both are somehow haunted by the legacy of Bertolt Brecht and the ideology of (...) the image implicit in critical theory. We argue that the tension between illusion and deconstruction indeed is crucial to the history of the mediatized image, but that it should be taken to a deeper level where it not only remains unsolved but where it forms the heart of the experience. The user knows very well that she is being fooled and, moreover, generously lets herself being fooled. We historicize this fundamental ambivalence with a short excursion in pre-cinematic, pre-Brechtian times. Throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth century, periodic shifts between illusion and its suspension indicates the emergence of what we, in the digital era, might refer to as a ‘meta-realism’, an imagery that incorporates its own critique inside itself. If this analysis holds true, we eventually have to reformulate the stakes of deconstruction and push critical theory beyond its own borders. (shrink)

In his article In Between Us, Yoni van den Eede expands existing theories of mediation into the realm of the social and the political, focusing on the notions of opacity and transparency. His approach is rich and promising, but two pitfalls should be avoided. First, his concept of ‘in-between’ runs the risk to conceptualize mediation as a process ‘between’ pre-given entities. On the basis of current work in postphenomenology and actor-network theory, though, mediation should rather be seen as the origin (...) of entities, not as an intermediary between them. Second, Van den Eede’s separate discussion of transparency and opacity in ‘use’ and in ‘context’ runs the risk to make invisible the complementarity of the two dimensions. While transparency of use embodies an experiential form of the distinction between transparency and opacity, transparency of context embodies a more cognitive dimension of the distinction. Only by linking the two it becomes possible to take responsibility for the impact that technological mediations can have. Users and designers need a ‘double vision’ to simultaneously see the transparency of both use and context. (shrink)

Most protagonists of sustainable development ignore modern insights in the nature of technology, which has led to an emphasis on technological solutions. The notable exception is transition management. However, both social construction of technology and transition management have been criticized as ignoring distributions of power in society, and for not offering guidance in the choice of the most sustainable technologies. The reviewer criticizes this approach: the issue is not to choose the right technologies, but to address the root causes of (...) unsustainability in society. In addition to politization of transition management the reviewer argues that strong visions are necessary to lead the way. Technologies could help to develop those visions. (shrink)

Responding to Ike Kamphof’s “Webcams to save nature: Online space as affective and ethical space,” this essay considers the further contextualization of Kamphof’s analysis using the idea of agencement and the provocation to consider further the politics of affect.

Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the “operator” for a unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary particles to animals (...) with brains. Accordingly, this ranking is called “the operator hierarchy”. This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators and the word organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition of life. The minimum condition defining an organism is its existence as an operator, construction thus being more essential than metabolism, growth or reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be defined as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization. The generality of the operator hierarchy also offers a context to discuss “life as we do not know it”. The paper ends with testing the definition’s practical value with a range of examples. (shrink)

We have demonstrated, using the Cantor dust method, that the statistical distribution of appearance and disappearance of rodents species (Arvicolid rodent radiation in Europe) follows power laws strengthening the evidence for a fractal structure set. Self-similar laws have been used as model for the description of a huge number of biological systems. With Nottale we have shown that log-periodic behaviors of acceleration or deceleration can be applied to branching macroevolution, to the time sequences of major evolutionary leaps (global life tree, (...) sauropod and theropod dinosaurs postural structures, North American fossil equids, rodents, primates and echinoderms clades and human ontogeny). The Scale-Relativity Theory has others biological applications from linear with fractal behavior to non-linear and from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

If we assume that the constants of nature fluctuate near the singularity when a black hole forms (assuming, also, that physical black holes really do form singularities) then a process of evolution of universes becomes possible. We explore the implications of such a process for the origin of life, interstellar travel, and the human future.

In the years since I first thought of the possibility of producing artificial black holes, my focus on it has shifted from the role of life in the universe to a practical suggestion for the middle-term future, which I think of as on the order of a few centuries.

A renewed concern with Aristotle’s thought about the economic aspects of human life and society can be observed. Aristotle dealt with the economic issues in his practical philosophy. He thus considered ‘the economic’ within an ethical and political frame. This vision is coherent with a specific ontology of ‘the economic’ according to Aristotle. In a recent paper, I analysed this ontology and left its consequences, especially for Ethics and Politics, for another paper. In this article, I firstly summarise the reasoning (...) and conclusions of the aforementioned paper. Then, I extract the ethical and political “lessons” of the Aristotelian conception. I finally add a section with epistemological “lessons”, and consequences for the teaching of Economics. (shrink)

To Aristotle, spoken words are symbols, not of objects in the world, but of our mental experiences related to these objects. Presently there are two major strands of interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign. First, there is the structuralist account offered by Coseriu (Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie. Von den Anfängen bis Rousseau, 2003 [1969], pp. 65–108) whose interpretation is reminiscent of the Saussurean sign concept. A second interpretation, offered by Lieb (in: Geckeler (Ed.) Logos Semantikos: Studia Linguistica in Honorem (...) Eugenio Coseriu 1921–1981, 1981) and Weidemann (in: Schmitter (Ed.) Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 2. Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike, 1991), says that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is similar to the one presented in Ogden and Richard’s (The meaning of meaning: A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism, 1970 [1923]) semiotic triangle. This paper starts off with an introductory outline of the so-called phýsei-thései discussion which started during presocratic times and culminated in Plato’s Cratylus. Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is to be regarded as a solution to the stalemate position reached in the Cratylus. Next, a discussion is offered of both Coseriu’s and Lieb’s analysis. We submit that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign shows features of both Saussure’s and Ogden and Richards’s sign concept but that it does not exclusively predict one of the two. We argue that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is based on three different relations which together evince his teleological as well empiricist point of view: one internal (symbolic) relation and two external relations, i.e. a likeness relation and a relation katà synthéken. (shrink)

There is a central doctrine in Aristotle that usually isn’t recognized in its importance: the affirmation of the difference and the plurality. In the course of the centuries, Aristotelism lost which was perhaps its most characteristic and specific feature versus Platonism, that is, its criticism of unity and its defense of plurality. The first principle is not the One but the plurality. The horizon of thinking is not the unity but the diversity of the logos. The unity of the logos (...) presupposes the differences within reality. Heidegger attracted attention to the peculiarity of the practical philosophy of Aristotle. It was the case of dialectics, rhetoric, poetics, ethics, politics, etc. We are referring to knowledges that are art rather than science. Nothing is so differentiated as human action, as it is always performed from a new starting point. Dialectic and rhetorical speeches are always circumscribed to the individual. (shrink)

Abstract Are we to get rid with representation after all? Since World War II, political philosophy seems to have devoted itself to either the intellectual sabotage of representation, or its defence against all evidence. Nobody seems to have thought that the problem with political representation might be the fact that the way it was thought was by no means correct. Considered as a fundamental principle of Western democracies, it might be at the very level of what a principle implies that (...) representation must be reloaded. For instance, by admitting that as a principle representation is not something that precedes what for which it provides ground (the government, the State, etc.)—but something that follows, that constitutes the final product of representation itself. Content Type Journal Article Category Commentary Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10699-011-9269-0 Authors Laurent de Sutter, Brussels, Belgium Journal Foundations of Science Online ISSN 1572-8471 Print ISSN 1233-1821. (shrink)

According to Zurek, the emergence of a classical world from a quantum substrate could result from a long selection process that privileges the classical bases according to a principle of optimal information. We investigate the consequences of this principle in a simple case, when the system and the environment are two interacting scalar particles supposedly in a pure state. We show that then the classical regime corresponds to a situation for which the entanglement between the particles (the system and the (...) environment) disappears. We describe in which circumstances this factorisability condition is fulfilled, in the case that the particles interact via position-dependent potentials, and also describe in appendix the tools necessary for understanding our results (entanglement, Bell inequalities and so on). (shrink)

In the present paper I develop a model of the evolutionary process associated to the widespread although controversial notion of a prevailing trend of increasing complexity over time. The model builds on a coupling of evolution to individual developmental programs and introduces an integrated view of evolution implying that human culture and science form a continuous extension of organic evolution. It is formed as a mathematical model that has made possible a quantitative estimation in relative terms of the growth of (...) complexity. This estimation is accomplished by means of computer simulations the result of which indicates a strong acceleration of complexity all the way from the appearance of multicellular organisms up to modern man. (shrink)

So far, the sciences of complexity have received less attention from philosophers than from scientists. Responding to Salthe’s (Found Sci 15, 4(6):357–367, 2010a) model of evolution, I focus on its metaphysical implications, asking whether the implications of his canonical developmental trajectory (CDT) must be materialistic as his reading proposes.

The cosmological theory of the author, discussed in (Greben in Found Sci 15(2):153–176, 2010), has a number of implications for the interpretation of initial conditions and the fine-tuning problem as discussed by Vidal (Found Sci 15(4):375–393, 2010a).

We discuss a new theory of the universe in which the vacuum energy is of classical origin and dominates the energy content of the universe. As usual, the Einstein equations determine the metric of the universe. However, the scale factor is controlled by total energy conservation in contrast to the practice in the Robertson–Walker formulation. This theory naturally leads to an explanation for the Big Bang and is not plagued by the horizon and cosmological constant problem. It naturally accommodates the (...) notion of dark energy and proposes a possible explanation for dark matter. It leads to a dual description of the universe, which is reminiscent of the dual theory proposed by Milne in 1937. On the one hand one can describe the universe in terms of the original Einstein coordinates in which the universe is expanding, on the other hand one can describe it in terms of co-moving coordinates which feature in measurements. In the latter representation the universe looks stationary and the age of the universe appears constant. The paper describes the evolution of this universe. It starts out in a classical state with perfect symmetry and zero entropy. Due to the vacuum metric the effective energy density is infinite at the beginning, but diminishes rapidly. Once it reaches the Planck energy density of elementary particles, the formation of particles can commence. Because of the quantum nature of creation and annihilation processes spatial and temporal inhomogeneities appear in the matter distributions, resulting in residual proton (neutron) and electron densities. Hence, quantum uncertainty plays an essential role in the creation of a diversified complex universe with increasing entropy. It thus seems that quantum fluctuations play a role in cosmology similar to that of random mutations in biology. Other analogies to biological principles, such as recapitulation, are also discussed. (shrink)

Possibly the most fundamental scientific problem is the origin of time and causality. The inherent difficulty is that all scientific theories of origins and evolution consider the existence of time and causality as given. We tackle this problem by starting from the concept of self-organization, which is seen as the spontaneous emergence of order out of primordial chaos. Self-organization can be explained by the selective retention of invariant or consistent variations, implying a breaking of the initial symmetry exhibited by randomness. (...) In the case of time, we start from a random graph connecting primitive “events”. Selection on the basis of consistency eliminates cyclic parts of the graph, so that transitive closure can transform it into a partial order relation of precedence. Causality is assumed to be carried by causal “agents” which undergo a more traditional variation and selection, giving rise to causal laws that are partly contingent, partly necessary. (shrink)

We analyze the developments in mathematical rigor from the viewpoint of a Burgessian critique of nominalistic reconstructions. We apply such a critique to the reconstruction of infinitesimal analysis accomplished through the efforts of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass; to the reconstruction of Cauchy’s foundational work associated with the work of Boyer and Grabiner; and to Bishop’s constructivist reconstruction of classical analysis. We examine the effects of a nominalist disposition on historiography, teaching, and research.

We explore the potential of Simon Stevin’s numbers, obscured by shifting foundational biases and by 19th century developments in the arithmetisation of analysis.

Abstract Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies (...) that the principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-18 DOI 10.1007/s10699-011-9234-y Authors András Kertész, Department of German Linguistics, University of Debrecen, Pf. 47, 4010 Debrecen, Hungary Journal Foundations of Science Online ISSN 1572-8471 Print ISSN 1233-1821. (shrink)

A central point of controversy in the time of the Copernican Revolution was the motion, or not, of the earth. We now take it for granted that Copernicus and Galileo were right; the earth really does move. But to what extent is this conclusion based on observation? This paper explores the meaning and observability of the rotation of the earth and shows that the phenomenon was not observable at the time of Galileo, and it is not observable now.

In his Poetics, Aristotle articulated certain ideas on the structure of drama that dominated both dramatic literature and theatre practices for the centuries to come. In this article I show how the thorough analysis of his statements leads us to believe that he endorses causality, narrativity, and temporal linearity as primary factors in the organization of dramatic and stage texts. Tracing various modifications of causality throughout theatre history, I use the work of the two prominent contemporary directors, Eimuntas Nekrosius and (...) Anatoly Vasilyev, to demonstrate how postmodernist theatre has arrived at non-Aristotelian theatrical model based on the unity of a time–space continuum rather than temporal development. (shrink)

In spite of its success, Neo-Darwinism is faced with major conceptual barriers to further progress, deriving directly from its metaphysical foundations. Most importantly, neo-Darwinism fails to recognize a fundamental cause of evolutionary change, “niche construction”. This failure restricts the generality of evolutionary theory, and introduces inaccuracies. It also hinders the integration of evolutionary biology with neighbouring disciplines, including ecosystem ecology, developmental biology, and the human sciences. Ecology is forced to become a divided discipline, developmental biology is stubbornly difficult to reconcile (...) with evolutionary theory, and the majority of biologists and social scientists are still unhappy with evolutionary accounts of human behaviour. The incorporation of niche construction as both a cause and a product of evolution removes these disciplinary boundaries while greatly generalizing the explanatory power of evolutionary theory. (shrink)

Gödel’s incompleteness applies to any system with recursively enumerable axioms and rules of inference. Chaitin’s approach to Gödel’s incompleteness relates the incompleteness to the amount of information contained in the axioms. Zurek’s quantum Darwinism attempts the physical description of the universe using information as one of its major components. The capacity of quantum Darwinism to describe quantum measurement in great detail without requiring ad-hoc non-unitary evolution makes it a good candidate for describing the transition from quantum to classical. A baby-universe (...) diffusion model of cosmic inflation is analyzed using quantum Darwinism. In this model cosmic inflation can be approximated as Brownian motion of a quantum field, and quantum Darwinism implies that molecular interaction during Brownian motion will make the quantum field decohere. The quantum Darwinism approach to decoherence in the baby-universe cosmic-inflation model yields the decoherence times of the baby-universes. The result is the equation relating the baby-universe’s decoherence time with the Hubble parameter, and that the decoherence time is considerably shorter than the cosmic inflation period. (shrink)

This paper examines the quest for the quantification of the predicate, as discussed by W.S. Jevons, and relates it to the discussion about universals and particulars between Plato and Aristotle. We conclude that the quest for the quantification of the predicate can only be achieved by stripping the syllogism from its metaphysical heritage.

In the first part of this contribution, we review the development of the theory of scale relativity and its geometric framework constructed in terms of a fractal and nondifferentiable continuous space-time. This theory leads (i) to a generalization of possible physically relevant fractal laws, written as partial differential equation acting in the space of scales, and (ii) to a new geometric foundation of quantum mechanics and gauge field theories and their possible generalisations. In the second part, we discuss some examples (...) of application of the theory to various sciences, in particular in cases when the theoretical predictions have been validated by new or updated observational and experimental data. This includes predictions in physics and cosmology (value of the QCD coupling and of the cosmological constant), to astrophysics and gravitational structure formation (distances of extrasolar planets to their stars, of Kuiper belt objects, value of solar and solar-like star cycles), to sciences of life (log-periodic law for species punctuated evolution, human development and society evolution), to Earth sciences (log-periodic deceleration of the rate of California earthquakes and of Sichuan earthquake replicas, critical law for the arctic sea ice extent) and tentative applications to systems biology. (shrink)

This paper reviews Aristotle’s problematic relationship with modern economic theory. It argues that in terms of value and income distribution theory, Aristotle should probably be seen as a precursor to neither classical nor neoclassical economic thought. Indeed, there are strong arguments to be made that Aristotle’s views are completely at odds with all modern economic theory, since, among other things, he was not necessarily concerned with flexible market prices, opposed the use of money to acquire more money, and did not (...) think that the unintended consequences of human activity were generally beneficial. The paper argues however, that this interpretation goes too far. The Benthamite neoclassical theory of choice can be seen as a dumbing down of Aristotle’s theory, applicable to animals, not humans. Adam Smith and Karl Marx were deeply influenced by Aristotle’s work and both started their main economic works with Aristotle: Smith ultimately rejecting, and Marx ultimately developing Aristotle’s views of the use of money to acquire more money. Possibilities for the future development of a new Aristotelian Economics are explored. (shrink)

Focusing on the concept of “the moral self” this essay explores relationships between Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and John Dewey’s moral pragmatism and tries to evaluate the extent to which in his work on ethics Aristotle may be considered a pragmatist. Aristotle foreshadows pragmatism, for example, in preferring virtue-based to rule-based ethics, in contending that the moral status of a person’s actions and the nature of the person’s selfhood are interdependent, and in stressing the key role of habits in character formation. (...) Aristotle, however, may seem far from the status of pragmatist when he privileges the life of contemplation and posits a moral self that is more static than the one proposed by Dewey. This essay contends that if more attention is paid to Aristotle’s treatment of friendship and to his highlighting of the need for reciprocity then the moral self that emerges from Nicomachean Ethics becomes more dialectical and more at one with that proposed by the American pragmatist. Aristotle, then, may be regarded as setting Dewey on the path towards a model of moral self that is not only deeply concerned about the lives of others but that is also dependent on others for its own existence. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to critically examine the metaphysical presuppositions that prevail in (Stewart in Found Sci 15(4):395–409, 2010a) answer to the question are we in the midst of a developmental process? as expressed in his statement that humanity has discovered the trajectory of past evolution and can see how it is likely to continue in the future.

The canonical developmental trajectory (CDT), as represented in this paper is both conservative and emergentist. Emerging modes of existence, as new informational constraints, require the material continuation of prior modes upon which they are launched. Informational constraints are material configurations. The paper is not meant to be a direct critique of existing views within science, but an oblique one presented as an alternative, developmental model.

I distinguish Nature from the World. I also distinguish development from evolution. Development is progressive change and can be modeled as part of Nature, using a specification hierarchy. I have proposed a ‘canonical developmental trajectory’ of dissipative structures with the stages defined thermodynamically and informationally. I consider some thermodynamic aspects of the Big Bang, leading to a proposal for reviving final cause. This model imposes a ‘hylozooic’ kind of interpretation upon Nature, as all emergent features at higher levels would have (...) been vaguely and episodically present primitively in the lower integrative levels, and were stabilized materially with the developmental emergence of new levels. The specification hierarchy’s form is that of a tree, with its trunk in its lowest level, and so this hierarchy is appropriate for modeling an expanding system like the Universe. It is consistent with this model of differentiation during Big Bang development to view emerging branch tips as having been entrained by multiple finalities because of the top-down integration of the various levels of organization by the higher levels. (shrink)

Abstract We consider the classical concept of time of permanence and observe that its quantum equivalent is described by a bona fide self-adjoint operator. Its interpretation, by means of the spectral theorem, reveals that we have to abandon not only the idea that quantum entities would be characterizable in terms of spatial trajectories but, more generally, that they would possess the very attribute of spatiality . Consequently, a permanence time shouldn’t be interpreted as a “time” in quantum mechanics, but as (...) a measure of the total availability of a quantum entity in participating to a process of creation of a spatial localization. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-22 DOI 10.1007/s10699-011-9233-z Authors Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi, Laboratorio di Autoricerca di Base, 6914 Carona, Switzerland Journal Foundations of Science Online ISSN 1572-8471 Print ISSN 1233-1821. (shrink)

Carnes Lord is an eminent Aristotelian scholar who has since the mid-1970s intermittently occupied positions within the United States government. This article considers the linkages between his writings on Aristotle and the standpoints he has adopted when in government, with particular reference to the period in the early 1980s when he fulfilled an important role in developing a public diplomacy and information strategy against the Soviet Union. Attention is given to Lord’s interpretation and application, in both his writings and his (...) policy-making, of several key aspects of Aristotle’s political thought, such as rhetoric, regimes, and education. The influence of Leo Strauss on Lord’s thinking is also taken into account. (shrink)

Vidal’s (Found Sci, 2010) and Rottiers’s (Found Sci, 2010) commentaries on my (2010) paper raised a number of important issues about the possible future trajectory of evolution and its implications for humanity. My response emphasizes that despite the inherent uncertainty involved in extrapolating the trajectory of evolution into the far future, the possibilities it reveals nonetheless have significant strategic implications for what we do with our lives here and now, individually and collectively. One important implication is the replacement of postmodern (...) scepticism and relativism with an evolutionary grand narrative that can guide humanity to participate successfully in the future evolution of life in the universe. (shrink)

In this paper we will offer a few examples to illustrate the orientation of contemporary research in data analysis and we will investigate the corresponding role of mathematics. We argue that the modus operandi of data analysis is implicitly based on the belief that if we have collected enough and sufficiently diverse data, we will be able to answer most relevant questions concerning the phenomenon itself. This is a methodological paradigm strongly related, but not limited to, biology, and we label (...) it the microarray paradigm . In this new framework, mathematics provides powerful techniques and general ideas which generate new computational tools. But it is missing any explicit isomorphism between a mathematical structure and the phenomenon under consideration. This methodology used in data analysis suggests the possibility of forecasting and analyzing without a structured and general understanding. This is the perspective we propose to call agnostic science , and we argue that, rather than diminishing or flattening the role of mathematics in science, the lack of isomorphisms with phenomena liberates mathematics, paradoxically making more likely the practical use of some of its most sophisticated ideas. (shrink)

Before beginning a paper on metaphysics, it is wise to acknowledge the paper’s own “metaphysical” assumptions. In what follows, we must bear in mind that the history of philosophy is as interpretively diverse as it is long. We will begin with the premise that Metaphysics is indeed a foundational science. We will posit that Aristotle’s corpus is unified; that is, that Aristotle can be read as a “systematic” philosopher. Moreover, we will assume that the history of philosophy is itself a (...) unity. If we posit such, “philosophy” can be read as a comprehensible continuity: a certainly contestable position. We must bear in mind that similitude is decidedly not identity; however, similitude does imply a certain conceptual correlation, one which, when pressed, may yield interesting, if not unexpected, results. Thus, we will travel at lightning speed through what took a snail’s pace to develop, “mapping,” so to speak, the structure of the unmoved mover of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1941) onto the traditional historical divisions of the history of philosophy. We will begin with Aristotle himself in the Ancient period, move to Averroes (the Ibn-Rushd of this paper) in the Medieval period, focus on Descartes and Spinoza as Modern thinkers and, finally, end in Heidegger and Sartre in Contemporary philosophy. This is philosophy with a capital “P,” which may or may not be the reader’s preferred position, let alone the writer’s. But, for our purposes here, it is, nonetheless, inevitable. (shrink)

Since the Renaissance, dramatic theory has been strongly influenced, sometimes even dominated by Aristotle’s Poetics. Aristotle’s concept of tragedy has been perceived as both a descriptive and a normative concept: a description of a practice as it should be continued. This biased reading of ancient theory is not exceptional, but in the case of Aristotle’s Poetics, a particular question can be raised. Aristotle has written about tragedy, at a moment that tragedy had no meaningful political or civic function anymore. As (...) political theory—e.g. as developed in the Politics and the Art of Rhetoric—should contain the risks of transgression in political practice, so poetic theory can contain the risks of the representation of transgressions in poetic practices such as the performance of tragedy. Apart from an account on Aristotle’s Poetics as a integral part of his ethical and political theory, this article argues the (mis)readings of Aristotelian dramatic theory since the Renaissance, and especially in 17th century France are not coincidental. Aristotle’s theory itself fits neatly into a political-theoretical framework or, if one puts it more brutally, an ideology. The particular theatricality of French absolutism took clearly its advantage from this ideological (mis)readings of Aristotle. (shrink)

In the past few hundred years, science has exerted an enormous influence on the way the world appears to human observers. Despite phenomenal accomplishments of science, science nowadays faces numerous challenges that threaten its continued success. As scientific inventions become embedded within human societies, the challenges are further multiplied. In this critical review, some of the critical challenges for the field of modern chemistry are discussed, including: (a) interlinking theoretical knowledge and experimental approaches; (b) implementing the principles of sustainability at (...) the roots of the chemical design; (c) defining science from a philosophical perspective that acknowledges both pragmatic and realistic aspects thereof; (d) instigating interdisciplinary research; (e) learning to recognize and appreciate the aesthetic aspects of scientific knowledge and methodology, and promote truly inspiring education in chemistry. In the conclusion, I recapitulate that the evolution of human knowledge inherently depends upon our ability to adopt creative problem-solving attitudes, and that challenges will always be present within the scope of scientific interests. (shrink)

According to the scenario of cosmological artificial selection (CAS) and artificial cosmogenesis, our universe was created and possibly even fine-tuned by cosmic engineers in another universe. This approach shall be compared to other explanations, and some far-reaching problems of it shall be discussed.

Abstract My review of Ike Kamphof’s “Webcams to Save Nature: Online Space as Affective and Ethical Space” focuses on the question how the engagement of the spectator of the described websites is temporally structured and how the discrepancy between the instantaneity of affective response and the duration of moral engagement is solved. I propose to draw on Alexander Nehamas’ philosophy of beauty as an in-between, bringing affect and ethics closer together. Content Type Journal Article Category Commentary Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s10699-011-9265-4 (...) Authors Renée van de Vall, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, J. J. Cremerplein 46-HS, 1054 TL Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Foundations of Science Online ISSN 1572-8471 Print ISSN 1233-1821. (shrink)

This commentary addresses the question of the meaning of critique in relation to objectivism or dogmatism. Inspired by Kant’s critical philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology, it defines the first in terms of conditionality, the second in terms of oppositionality. It works out an application on the basis of Salthe’s (Found Sci 15 4(6):357–367, 2010a) paper on development and evolution, where competition is criticized in oppositional, more than in conditional terms.

In this paper I investigate the relation between physics and metaphysics in Plato’s participation theory. I show that the logic shoring up Plato’s metaphysics in paraconsistent, as had been suggested already by Graham Priest. The transformation of the paradoxical One-and-Many of the pre-Socratics into a paraconsistent Great-and-Small bridges the abyss between archaic rationality and the world of classical logic based ultimately on the principle of contradiction. Indeed, language is an organ of perception, not simply a means of communication. J. Jaynes, (...) Origin of Consciousness. (shrink)

In this philosophical paper, we explore computational and biological analogies to address the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. We first clarify what it means for physical constants or initial conditions to be fine-tuned. We review important distinctions such as the dimensionless and dimensional physical constants, and the classification of constants proposed by Lévy-Leblond. Then we explore how two great analogies, computational and biological, can give new insights into our problem. This paper includes a preliminary study to examine the two analogies. Importantly, (...) analogies are both useful and fundamental cognitive tools, but can also be misused or misinterpreted. The idea that our universe might be modelled as a computational entity is analysed, and we discuss the distinction between physical laws and initial conditions using algorithmic information theory. Smolin introduced the theory of “Cosmological Natural Selection” with a biological analogy in mind. We examine an extension of this analogy involving intelligent life. We discuss if and how this extension could be legitimated. (shrink)

Crane envisions the speculative conjecture that intelligent civilizations might want and be able to produce black holes in the very far future. He implicitly suggests two main purposes of this enterprise: (i) energy production and (ii) universe production. We discuss those two options. The commentary is obviously highly speculative and should be read accordingly.

Jan Greben criticized fine-tuning by taking seriously the idea that nature is quantum mechanical . I argue that this quantum view is limited, and that fine-tuning is real, in the sense that our current physical models require fine-tuning. Second, I examine and clarify many difficult and fundamental issues raised by Rüdiger Vaas’ comments on Cosmological Artificial Selection.

I discuss some of the speculations proposed by Stewart (2010a). These include the following propositions: the cooperation at larger and larger scales, the existence of larger scale processes, the enhancement of the tuning as the universe cycle repeats, the transmission between universes and the motivations to produce a new universe.