1. Gaetano Albergo (2014). The First-Person Perspective Requirement In Pretense. Phenomenology and Mind 7:224-234.
    According to Lynne Baker we need to investigate the performances to understand if someone has a first-person perspective. My claim is that language has not the main role in the formation of epistemic states and self-consciousness. In children’s performances, we have evidence for a self-consciousness without “I” thoughts. We investigate if it is possible to understand the difference between a case of false belief and one of pretense. My aim is to demonstrate that pretense is not a proto-concept but a (...)
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  2. Albergo Gaetano (2014). The First-Person Perspective Requirement in Pretense. Phenomenology and Mind 7:224-234.
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    Alejandro Arango (2014). Husserl's Concept of Position-Taking and Second Nature. Phenomenology and Mind 6:168-176.
    I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...)
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