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Forthcoming articles
  1.  56
    Thomas William Barrett & Hans Halvorson (forthcoming). Glymour and Quine on Theoretical Equivalence. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-17.
    Glymour and Quine propose two different formal criteria for theoretical equivalence. In this paper we examine the relationships between these criteria.
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  2.  22
    Jake Chandler & Richard Booth (forthcoming). The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one's initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...)
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  3.  29
    Paul Égré (forthcoming). Vagueness: Why Do We Believe in Tolerance? Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-17.
    The tolerance principle, the idea that vague predicates are insensitive to sufficiently small changes, remains the main bone of contention between theories of vagueness. In this paper I examine three sources behind our ordinary belief in the tolerance principle, to establish whether any of them might give us a good reason to revise classical logic. First, I compare our understanding of tolerance in the case of precise predicates and in the case of vague predicates. While tolerance in the case of (...)
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  4.  85
    Peter Fritz & Jeremy Goodman (forthcoming). Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 1: Closure and Generation. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-51.
    This paper is a study of higher-order contingentism — the view, roughly, that it is contingent what properties and propositions there are. We explore the motivations for this view and various ways in which it might be developed, synthesizing and expanding on work by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the view makes sense by its own lights, or whether articulating the view requires drawing distinctions among possibilities that, according to (...)
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  5.  52
    Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer (forthcoming). Conditionals in Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-37.
    We argue that distinct conditionalsconditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  6.  39
    Leon Horsten (forthcoming). One Hundred Years of Semantic Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
    This article contains an overview of the main problems, themes and theories relating to the semantic paradoxes in the twentieth century. From this historical overview I tentatively draw some lessons about the way in which the field may evolve in the next decade.
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  7.  40
    Andrea Iacona (forthcoming). Vagueness and Quantification. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-24.
    This paper deals with the question of what it is for a quantifier expression to be vague. First it draws a distinction between two senses in which quantifier expressions may be said to be vague, and provides an account of the distinction which rests on independently grounded assumptions. Then it suggests that, if some further assumptions are granted, the difference between the two senses considered can be represented at the formal level. Finally, it outlines some implications of the account provided (...)
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  8.  11
    Alexander W. Kocurek (forthcoming). The Problem of Cross-World Predication. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-46.
    While standard first-order modal logic is quite powerful, it cannot express even very simple sentences like “I could have been taller than I actually am” or “Everyone could have been smarter than they actually are”. These are examples of cross-world predication, whereby objects in one world are related to objects in another world. Extending first-order modal logic to allow for cross-world predication in a motivated way has proven to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, I argue that the standard accounts (...)
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  9.  95
    Nils Kürbis (forthcoming). Some Comments on Ian Rumfitt’s Bilateralism. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-22.
    Ian Rumfitt has proposed systems of bilateral logic for primitive speech acts of assertion and denial, with the purpose of ‘exploring the possibility of specifying the classically intended senses for the connectives in terms of their deductive use’ : 810f). Rumfitt formalises two systems of bilateral logic and gives two arguments for their classical nature. I assess both arguments and conclude that only one system satisfies the meaning-theoretical requirements Rumfitt imposes in his arguments. I then formalise an intuitionist system of (...)
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  10.  78
    Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern (forthcoming). Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege's Puzzle? Journal of Philosophical Logic.
    In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege's puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege's puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we (...)
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  11.  82
    Gabriel Oak Rabin & Brian Rabern (forthcoming). Well Founding Grounding Grounding. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-31.
    Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with (...)
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  12.  79
    Sean Walsh (forthcoming). Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-50.
    This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church's intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency also model other (...)
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  13.  34
    Jared Warren (forthcoming). Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-21.
    In “Truth by Convention” W.V. Quine gave an influential argument against logical conventionalism. Even today his argument is often taken to decisively refute logical conventionalism. Here I break Quine’s arguments into two— the super-task argument and the regress argument—and argue that while these arguments together refute implausible explicit versions of conventionalism, they cannot be successfully mounted against a more plausible implicit version of conventionalism. Unlike some of his modern followers, Quine himself recognized this, but argued that implicit conventionalism was explanatorily (...)
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  14.  25
    Bruno Whittle (forthcoming). Hierarchical Propositions. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
  15.  42
    Malte Willer (forthcoming). An Update on Epistemic Modals. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
    Epistemic modals are a prominent topic in the literature on natural language semantics, with wide-ranging implications for issues in philosophy of language and philosophical logic. Considerations about the role that epistemic "might" and "must" play in discourse and reasoning have led to the development of several important alternatives to classical possible worlds semantics for natural language modal expressions. This is an opinionated overview of what I take to be some of the most exciting issues and developments in the field.
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  16.  11
    Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Forthcoming). Paths to Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-40.
    This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to naïve truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A → (B → C)⊩B → (A → C) trivialize naïve truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A → B)∧ (B → C)) → (A → C) and (A → ¬A) → ¬A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann constant. An (...)
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  17.  20
    Emar Maier (forthcoming). Referential Dependencies Between Conflicting Attitudes. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-27.
    A number of puzzles about propositional attitudes in semantics and philosophy revolve around apparent referential dependencies between different attitudes within a single agent’s mental state. In a series of papers, Hans Kamp offers a general framework for describing such interconnected attitude complexes, building on DRT and dynamic semantics. I demonstrate that Kamp’s proposal cannot deal with referential dependencies between semantically conflicting attitudes, such as those in Ninan’s puzzle about de re imagination. To solve the problem I propose to replace Kamp’s (...)
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  18. H. Andréka, J. van Benthem & I. Németi (forthcoming). Modal Logics and Bounded First-Order Fragments'. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
     
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  19.  7
    Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (forthcoming). Logics of Informational Interactions. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-13.
    The pre-eminence of logical dynamics, over a static and purely propositional view of Logic, lies at the core of a new understanding of both formal epistemology and the logical foundations of quantum mechanics. Both areas appear at first sight to be based on purely static propositional formalisms, but in our view their fundamental operators are essentially dynamic in nature. Quantum logic can be best understood as the logic of physically-constrained informational interactions between subsystems of a global physical system. Similarly, epistemic (...)
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  20.  9
    Mathieu Beirlaen, Christian Strasser & Joke Meheus (forthcoming). An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
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  21.  20
    Katalin Bimbó (forthcoming). Current Trends in Substructural Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-16.
    This paper briefly overviews some of the results and research directions. In the area of substructural logics from the last couple of decades. Substructural logics are understood here to include relevance logics, linear logic, variants of Lambek calculi and some other logics that are motivated by the idea of omitting some structural rules or making other structural changes in LK, the original sequent calculus for classical logic.
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  22.  13
    Daniel Bonevac & Hans Kamp (forthcoming). Quantifiers Defined by Parametric Extensions. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-45.
    This paper develops a metaphysically flexible theory of quantification broad enough to incorporate many distinct theories of objects. Quite different, mutually incompatible conceptions of the nature of objects and of reference find representation within it. Some conceptions yield classical first-order logic; some yield weaker logics. Yet others yield notions of validity that are proper extensions of classical logic.
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  23.  80
    Rachael Briggs (forthcoming). Foundations of Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-16.
    The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.
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  24.  8
    Proietti Carlo (forthcoming). Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief: A DDL Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
  25.  16
    Bob Hale & Jessica Leech (forthcoming). Relative Necessity Reformulated. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-26.
    This paper discusses some serious difficulties for what we shall call the standard account of various kinds of relative necessity, according to which any given kind of relative necessity may be defined by a strict conditional - necessarily, if C then p - where C is a suitable constant proposition, such as a conjunction of physical laws. We argue, with the help of Humberstone, that the standard account has several unpalatable consequences. We argue that Humberstone’s alternative account has certain disadvantages, (...)
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  26.  4
    Sven Ove Hansson (forthcoming). Iterated Descriptor Revision and the Logic of Ramsey Test Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-22.
    Two of the major problems in AGM-style belief revision, namely the difficulties in accounting for iterated change and for Ramsey test conditionals, have satisfactory solutions in descriptor revision. In descriptor revision, the input is a metalinguistic sentence specifying the success condition of the operation. The choice mechanism selects one of the potential outcomes in which the success condition is satisfied. Iteration of this operation is unproblematic. Ramsey test conditionals can be introduced without giving rise to the paradoxical results that they (...)
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  27.  7
    Rosalie Iemhoff (forthcoming). On Rules. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
    This paper contains a brief overview of the area of admissible rules with an emphasis on results about intermediate and modal propositional logics. No proofs are given but many references to the literature are provided.
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  28.  10
    Rosalie Iemhoff (forthcoming). Consequence Relations and Admissible Rules. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-22.
    This paper contains a detailed account of the notion of admissibility in the setting of consequence relations. It is proved that the two notions of admissibility used in the literature coincide, and it provides an extension to multi–conclusion consequence relations that is more general than the one usually encountered in the literature on admissibility. The notion of a rule scheme is introduced to capture rules with side conditions, and it is shown that what is generally understood under the extension of (...)
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  29.  14
    Makoto Kikuchi & Taishi Kurahashi (forthcoming). Liar-Type Paradoxes and the Incompleteness Phenomena. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-18.
    We define a liar-type paradox as a consistent proposition in propositional modal logic which is obtained by attaching boxes to several subformulas of an inconsistent proposition in classical propositional logic, and show several famous paradoxes are liar-type. Then we show that we can generate a liar-type paradox from any inconsistent proposition in classical propositional logic and that undecidable sentences in arithmetic can be obtained from the existence of a liar-type paradox. We extend these results to predicate logic and discuss Yablo’s (...)
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  30.  7
    Udo Klein & Wolfgang Sternefeld (forthcoming). Same Same But Different: An Alphabetically Innocent Compositional Predicate Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-31.
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  31. Franz V. Kutschera (forthcoming). Global Supervenience and Doxastic Logic', to Appear in The. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
     
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  32. Franz V. Kutschera (forthcoming). Causation', to Appear in The. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
     
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  33.  17
    Jon Erling Litland (forthcoming). Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-47.
    A logic of grounding where what is grounded can be a collection of truths is a “many-many” logic of ground. The idea that grounding might be irreducibly many-many has recently been suggested by Dasgupta. In this paper I present a range of novel philosophical and logical reasons for being interested in many-many logics of ground. I then show how Fine’s State-Space semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground can be extended to the many-many case, giving rise to the Pure Logic (...)
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  34.  11
    Gabriella Pigozzi (forthcoming). The Logic of Group Decisions: Judgment Aggregation. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
    Judgment aggregation studies how individual opinions on a given set of propositions can be aggregated to form a consistent group judgment on the same propositions. Despite the simplicity of the problem, seemingly natural aggregation procedures fail to return consistent collective outcomes, leading to what is now known as the doctrinal paradox. The first occurrences of the paradox were discovered in the legal realm. However, the interest of judgment aggregation is much broader and extends to political philosophy, epistemology, social choice theory, (...)
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  35.  21
    Stefano Predelli (forthcoming). Russell-Names: An Introduction to Millian Descriptivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-20.
    This essay studies the semantic properties of what I call Russell-names. Russell-names bear intimate semantic relations with descriptive conditions, in consonance with the main tenets of descriptivism. Yet, they are endowed with the semantic properties attributed to ordinary proper names by Millianism: they are rigid and non-indexical devices of direct reference. This is not an essay in natural language semantics, and remains deliberately neutral with respect to the question whether any among the expressions we ordinarily classify as proper names behave (...)
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  36.  4
    Vít Punčochář (forthcoming). A Generalization of Inquisitive Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-30.
    This paper introduces a generalized version of inquisitive semantics, denoted as GIS, and concentrates especially on the role of disjunction in this general framework. Two alternative semantic conditions for disjunction are compared: the first one corresponds to the so-called tensor operator of dependence logic, and the second one is the standard condition for inquisitive disjunction. It is shown that GIS is intimately related to intuitionistic logic and its Kripke semantics. Using this framework, it is shown that the main results concerning (...)
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  37.  38
    David Ripley (forthcoming). Paraconsistent Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-10.
    In some logics, anything whatsoever follows from a contradiction; call these logics explosive. Paraconsistent logics are logics that are not explosive. Paraconsistent logics have a long and fruitful history, and no doubt a long and fruitful future. To give some sense of the situation, I’ll spend Section 1 exploring exactly what it takes for a logic to be paraconsistent. It will emerge that there is considerable open texture to the idea. In Section 2, I’ll give some examples of techniques for (...)
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  38.  7
    Lorenzo Rossi (forthcoming). Adding a Conditional to Kripke’s Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-45.
    Kripke’s theory of truth, 690–716; 1975) has been very successful but shows well-known expressive difficulties; recently, Field has proposed to overcome them by adding a new conditional connective to it. In Field’s theories, desirable conditional and truth-theoretic principles are validated that Kripke’s theory does not yield. Some authors, however, are dissatisfied with certain aspects of Field’s theories, in particular the high complexity. I analyze Field’s models and pin down some reasons for discontent with them, focusing on the meaning of the (...)
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  39. D. Samet (forthcoming). On the Triviality of High-Order Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
     
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  40. Jason Turner (forthcoming). Forthcoming.“Logic and Ontological Pluralism.”. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
     
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  41. J. van Eijck & F. J. de Vries (forthcoming). Reasoning About Update Logic', Report CS-R9312, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
     
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  42.  97
    Jonathan Weisberg (forthcoming). You’Ve Come a Long Way, Bayesians. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-18.
    Forty years ago, Bayesian philosophers were just catching a new wave of technical innovation, ushering in an era of scoring rules, imprecise credences, and infinitesimal probabilities. Meanwhile, down the hall, Gettier’s 1963 paper [28] was shaping a literature with little obvious interest in the formal programs of Reichenbach, Hempel, and Carnap, or their successors like Jeffrey, Levi, Skyrms, van Fraassen, and Lewis. And how Bayesians might accommodate the discourses of full belief and knowledge was but a glimmer in the eye (...)
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  43.  4
    Stefan Wintein & Reinhard Muskens (forthcoming). A Gentzen Calculus for Nothing but the Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
    In their paper Nothing but the Truth Andreas Pietz and Umberto Rivieccio present Exactly True Logic, an interesting variation upon the four-valued logic for first-degree entailment FDE that was given by Belnap and Dunn in the 1970s. Pietz & Rivieccio provide this logic with a Hilbert-style axiomatisation and write that finding a nice sequent calculus for the logic will presumably not be easy. But a sequent calculus can be given and in this paper we will show that a calculus for (...)
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  44.  16
    Ming Xu (forthcoming). Combinations of Stit with Ought and Know. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-27.
    This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic.
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  45.  48
    Byeong-Uk Yi (forthcoming). The Language and Logic of Plurals. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
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