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Forthcoming articles
  1. Sam Baron & Mark Colyvan (forthcoming). Time Enough for Explanation. Journal of Philosophy.
  2. Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Persistence, Vagueness, and Location. Journal of Philosophy.
    This article discusses two arguments in favor of perdurance. The first is Sider’s argument from vagueness, “one of the most powerful” in favor of perdurantism. I make the observation that endurantists have principled grounds to claim that the argument is unsound, at least if endurance is formulated in locative rather than mereological terms. Having made this observation, I use it to emphasize a somewhat neglected difference between endurantists and perdurantists with respect to their views on material objects. These views, in (...)
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  3. Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden (forthcoming). Uniqueness and Metaepistemology. Journal of Philosophy.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in what beliefs to form in response to your evidence. We argue for Uniqueness by appealing to two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. First, rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others. Second, they help (...)
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  4.  60
    Andrea Iacona (forthcoming). Two Notions of Logical Form. Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of (...)
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  5. Sarah-Jane Leslie (forthcoming). The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization. Journal of Philosophy.
  6.  80
    Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Modalizing Mechanisms. Journal of Philosophy.
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  7.  7
    Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). The Multisensory Character of Perception. Journal of Philosophy.
    My thesis is that perceptual awareness is richly multisensory. I argue for this conclusion on the grounds that certain forms of multisensory perceptual experience are incompatible with the claim that each aspect of a perceptual experience is associated with some specific sensory modality or another. First, I explicate what it is for some feature of a conscious perceptual episode to be modality specific. Then, I argue based on philosophical and experimental evidence that some novel intermodal features are perceptible only through (...)
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  8. Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern (forthcoming). The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution. Journal of Philosophy.
    Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ (...)
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  9. Miriam Schoenfield (forthcoming). Bridging Rationality and Accuracy. Journal of Philosophy.
    Rationality and accuracy have to be connected somehow. It’s not a coincidence that rational people tend to do a better job forming accurate beliefs and navigating the world than irrational people. But how are they connected? The aim of this paper is to explore this question. I outline two ways of thinking about the connection between rationality and accuracy and I argue that what we say about higher order evidence will depend on how we think about the nature of this (...)
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  10.  76
    Knut Olav Skarsaune (forthcoming). Moral Deference and Authentic Interaction. Journal of Philosophy.
    The article defends a mild form of pessimism about moral deference, by arguing that deference is incompatible with authentic interaction, that is, acting in a way that communicates our own normative judgment. The point of such interaction is ultimately that it allows us to get to know and engage one another. This vindication of our intuitive resistance to moral deference is upheld, in a certain range of cases, against David Enoch’s recent objection to views that motivate pessimism by appealing to (...)
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  11. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). Imagination, Rationality, and Desire. Journal of Philosophy.
    We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue that (...)
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  12. Wayne Wu (forthcoming). Shaking Up the Mind's Ground Floor: The Cognitive Penetration of Visual Attention. Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, I argue that visual attention is cognitively penetrated by intention. I present a detailed account of attention and its neural basis, drawing on a recent computational model of neural modulation during attention: divisive normalization. I argue that intention shifts computations during divisive normalization. The epistemic consequences of attentional bias are discussed.
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  13. T. Bayne (forthcoming). The Unity of Consciousness and the Commissurotomy Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy.
     
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  14.  75
    Hannah Ginsborg (forthcoming). Primitive Normativity. Journal of Philosophy.
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  15. I. Hacking (forthcoming). Review of Kitcher. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy.
     
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  16. E. Henry Jr (forthcoming). Kyburg.'The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference,'. Journal of Philosophy.
  17. Thomas Hill (forthcoming). Review of John Rawls's Collected Papers. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy.
     
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  18. J. McDowell (forthcoming). The 1997 Woodbridge Lectures. Journal of Philosophy.
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  19.  29
    C. Peacocke (forthcoming). JSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5 (May, 2001), Pp. 239-264. Journal of Philosophy.
    T n he question posed in my title is one that has been vigorously debated in philosophy for almost twenty years now. In one form or another, the idea that perceptual experience has a content that is nonconceptual is found in the writings of, among others, Jose Bermuidez, ... \n.
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