Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1. Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden (forthcoming). Uniqueness and Metaepistemology. Journal of Philosophy.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in what beliefs to form in response to your evidence. We argue for Uniqueness by appealing to two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. First, rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others. Second, they help (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Sarah-Jane Leslie (forthcoming). The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization. Journal of Philosophy.
  3. T. Parent (forthcoming). Rule Following and Meta-Ontology. Journal of Philosophy.
    Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument indicates that linguistic understanding does not consist in knowing interpretations, whereas Kripkenstein’s version suggests that meaning cannot be metaphysically fixed by interpretations. In the present paper, rule-following considerations are used to suggest that certain ontological questions cannot be answered by interpretations. Specifically, if the aim is to specify the ontology of a language, an interpretation cannot answer what object an expression of L denotes, if the interpretations are themselves L-expressions. Briefly, that’s because the ontology of such interpretations, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Matthew Rendall (forthcoming). Mere Addition and the Separateness of Persons. Journal of Philosophy.
    How can we resist the repugnant conclusion? James Griffin has suggested that part way through the sequence we may reach a world—let us call it "J"— in which the lives are lexically superior to those that follow. If it would be better to live a single life in J than through any number of lives in the next one ("K"), we may judge the smaller world preferable, as if aggregating the lives in the larger world intrapersonally. I argue that the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Daniel J. Singer (forthcoming). Mind the Is-Ought Gap. Journal of Philosophy.
    The is-ought gap is Hume’s claim that we can’t get an ‘ought’ from just ’is’s. Prior (1960a) showed that its most straight-forward formulation, a staple of introductory philosophy classes, fails. Many authors attempt to resurrect the claim by restricting its domain syntactically or by reformulating it in terms of models of deontic logic. But, those attempts prove to be complex, incomplete, or incorrect. I provide a simple reformulation of the is-ought gap that closely fits Hume’s description of it. My formulation (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). Imagination, Rationality, and Desire. Journal of Philosophy.
    We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jennifer Wang (forthcoming). Actualist Counterpart Theory. Journal of Philosophy.
  8. Craig Warmke (forthcoming). Modal Intensionalism. Journal of Philosophy.
    I offer an alternative semantics for modal propositional logic without possible worlds, an accessibility relation, or formally similar stand-ins for either.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Possibly False Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy.
    Many epistemologists call themselves ‘fallibilists’. But many philosophers of language hold that the meaning of epistemic usages of ‘possible’ ensures a close knowledge-(epistemic) possibility link (KPL): a subject’s utterance of ‘it’s possible that not-p’ is true only if the subject does not know that p. This seems to suggest that whatever the core insight behind fallibilism is, it can’t be that a subject could have knowledge which is, for them, possibly false. I argue that, on the contrary, subjects can have (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Stephen Yablo (forthcoming). Review of Forbes's The Metaphysics of Modality. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. T. Bayne (forthcoming). The Unity of Consciousness and the Commissurotomy Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Hannah Ginsborg (forthcoming). Primitive Normativity. Journal of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. I. Hacking (forthcoming). Review of Kitcher. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. E. Henry Jr (forthcoming). Kyburg.'The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference,'. Journal of Philosophy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Thomas Hill (forthcoming). Review of John Rawls's Collected Papers. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. J. McDowell (forthcoming). The 1997 Woodbridge Lectures. Journal of Philosophy.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. C. Peacocke (forthcoming). JSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5 (May, 2001), Pp. 239-264. Journal of Philosophy.
    T n he question posed in my title is one that has been vigorously debated in philosophy for almost twenty years now. In one form or another, the idea that perceptual experience has a content that is nonconceptual is found in the writings of, among others, Jose Bermuidez, ... \n.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues