26 found

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Forthcoming articles
  1. M. Oreste Fiocco (forthcoming). Intentionality and Realism. Acta Analytica.
    In this paper, I argue that how a mind can come to be about an object and how the world is independently of the workings of any mind are inextricably linked. Hence, epistemology, at its most basic, and metaphysics are systematically related. In order to demonstrate the primary thesis of the paper, I first articulate two contrary accounts of the nature of reality and then two contradictory general views of intentionality. I argue that these positions can be combined in only (...)
     
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  2. Logan Paul Gage (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject's Perspective Objection. Acta Analytica.
    For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that perhaps Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) can split the horns of Bergmann’s Dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s Dilemma and his reasons for thinking PC cannot escape it before arguing (...)
     
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  3. Dana Goswick (forthcoming). Why Being Necessary Really Is Not the Same As Being Not Possibly Not. Acta Analytica:1-8.
    In standard modal logic, □ ≡ ∼◊ ∼ and ◊ ≡ ∼□∼. I will, first, examine why in tense-logic, Arthur Prior thinks that ∼ ◊ ∼ is weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ is weaker than ◊. I will, then, examine whether there are similar motivations in modal logic to take ∼ ◊ ∼ to be weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ to be weaker than ◊. The upshot will be that, just as certain metaphysical views within the (...)
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  4. Andrea Sauchelli (forthcoming). Gendler on the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance. Acta Analytica:1-9.
    Gendler reformulated the so-called imaginability puzzle in terms of authorial breakdown. The main idea behind this move was to isolate the essential features displayed by the alleged problematic cases and to specify a puzzle general enough to be applied to a variety of different types of imaginative resistance. I offer various criticisms of Gendler’s approach to imaginative resistance that also raises some more general points on the recent literature on the topic.
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  5. Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity and Evidence. Acta Analytica:1-18.
    The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can (at least some times) constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular (...)
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  6. Elanor Taylor (forthcoming). Explanation and the Explanatory Gap. Acta Analytica:1-12.
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  7. Bartosz Kaluziński (forthcoming). Assessment, Scorekeeping and the Normativity of Meaning: A Reply to Kiesselbach. Acta Analytica:1-9.
    This paper is an attempt to examine Mattias Kiesselbach’s account of the thesis that meaning is normative that was presented in his recently published article titled “The normativity of meaning: from constitutive norms to prescriptions.” Kiesselbach’s account has three crucial points: the applicability of norms, the transtemporal character of the constitutive norms and commitments incurred by or attributed to the speaker within the scorekeeping practice. I will discuss all these crucial points, and I will argue that his account raises many (...)
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  8. Yakir Levin (forthcoming). Kant, McDowell, and the “Identity of Identity and Nonidentity”. Acta Analytica:1-16.
    The problem of the “identity of identity and nonidentity” , which haunted German idealism, has two closely related aspects. The first, epistemological aspect concerns the possibility of knowledge of an objective world. The second, transcendental aspect, concerns the question of how thoughts can be directed towards the world. Reconstructing McDowell’s Kantian account of intentionality as a purported resolution of the transcendental aspect of IINI, I pose the following dilemma for McDowell’s account: Either part ways with Kant’s purported resolution of IINI (...)
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  9. Adam C. Podlaskowski (forthcoming). Giving Up on "the Rest of the Language'. Acta Analytica:1-12.
    In this essay, the tension that Benacerraf identifies for theories of mathematical truth is used as the vehicle for arguing against a particular desideratum for semantic theories. More specifically, I place in question the desideratum that a semantic theory, provided for some area of discourse, should run in parallel with the semantic theory holding for the rest of the language. The importance of this desideratum is also made clear by means of tracing out the subtle implications of its rejection.
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  10. Vuko Andrić (forthcoming). The Ramifications of Error Theories About the Deontic. Acta Analytica:1-17.
    Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical in the sense that they concern actions, and they are deontic in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations. This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that, if so-called fitting-attitude analyses of value fail, the truth of some (...)
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  11. Christian Beyer (forthcoming). Russell's Principle Considered From Both a Neo-Fregean and a Husserlian Viewpoint. Acta Analytica.
     
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  12. Paolo Cotogno (forthcoming). Buttresses of the Turing Barrier. Acta Analytica:1-8.
    The ‘Turing barrier’ is an evocative image for 0′, the degree of the unsolvability of the halting problem for Turing machines—equivalently, of the undecidability of Peano Arithmetic . The ‘barrier’ metaphor conveys the idea that effective computability is impaired by restrictions that could be removed by infinite methods. Assuming that the undecidability of PA is essentially depending on the finite nature of its computational means, decidability would be restored by the ω-rule. Hypercomputation, the hypothetical realization of infinitary machines through relativistic (...)
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  13. Coos Engelsma (forthcoming). Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism. Acta Analytica:1-20.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. I (...)
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  14. Patrick Fleming (forthcoming). The Normativity Objection to Normative Reduction. Acta Analytica:1-9.
    Non-naturalists claim that the nature of normativity precludes the possibility of normative naturalism. In particular, they think that normative reduction amounts to normative elimination. This is because it always leaves out the normative. In this paper, I examine the force that the normativity objection has against Humean reductionism. I argue that the normativity objection has no argumentative force against reductionism. When it is presented as a bare intuition, it begs the question against reduction. A more interesting reading of the argument (...)
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  15. Brad Majors (forthcoming). What Entitlement Is. Acta Analytica:1-25.
    The paper is an examination of Tyler Burge’s notion of epistemic entitlement. It begins with consideration of a recent attempt to understand entitlement, including the ways in which it differs from the more traditional notion of justification. The paper argues that each of Casullo’s central contentions rests upon confusion. More generally, the paper shows that Casullo’s interpretation tries to force Burge’s work into a framework that is not suited for it; and that the interpretation also suffers from not being even (...)
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  16. Stephen G. Morris (forthcoming). Vargas-Style Revisionism and the Problem of Retributivism. Acta Analytica:1-12.
    Manuel Vargas advocates a revised understanding of the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” that eliminates the problematic libertarian commitments inherent to the commonsense understanding of these terms. I argue that in order to make a plausible case for why philosophers ought to adopt his recommendations, Vargas must explain why we ought to retain the retributivist elements that figure prominently in both commonsense views about morality and philosophical discussions concerning free will and moral responsibility. Furthermore, I argue that his revisionist (...)
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  17. Michele Palmira (forthcoming). Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-Conformists. Acta Analytica:1-9.
    In recent work , J. Adam Carter argues that truth-relativism should be compatible with the so-called conformist response to peer disagreement about taste to the effect that subjects should revise their opinions. However, Carter claims that truth-relativism cannot make sense of this response since it cannot make sense of the idea that when two subjects are recognised as epistemic peers, they should acknowledge that they are equally likely to be right about the targeted issue. The main aim of this paper (...)
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  18. M. Potrč (forthcoming). Intentionality and Extension. Acta Analytica.
     
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  19. Matthew Rellihan (forthcoming). Content, Consciousness, and Cambridge Change. Acta Analytica:1-21.
    Representationalism is widely thought to grease the skids of ontological reduction. If phenomenal character is just a certain sort of intentional content, representationalists argue, the hard problem of accommodating consciousness within a broadly naturalistic view of the world reduces to the much easier problem of accommodating intentionality. I argue, however, that there’s a fatal flaw in this reasoning, for if phenomenal character really is just a certain sort of intentional content, it’s not anything like the sort of intentional content described (...)
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  20. Jorn Sonderholm (forthcoming). The Moral Demands of Affluence: A Logical Problem for Cullity. Acta Analytica:1-9.
    In 2004, Garrett Cullity made a significant contribution to the literature on what the world’s relatively affluent owe to the world’s relatively poor through the publishing of The Moral Demands of Affluence. In this discussion note, I draw attention to a logical problem in Cullity’s master argument in favor of the view that affluent individuals are justified in spending monetary resources on themselves at a level that lies well above what Peter Singer finds justified. The proposition I defend is that (...)
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  21. Robin Stenwall (forthcoming). Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions. Acta Analytica:1-18.
    It is generally thought that truthmaking has to be an internal relation because if it weren’t, then, as David Armstrong argues, “everything may be a truthmaker for any truth”. Depending on whether we take an internal relation to be one that is necessitated by the mere existence of its terms or one that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its relata, the truthbearers involved in the truthmaking relation must either have their contents essentially or intrinsically. In this paper, I examine (...)
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  22. Hamid Vahid (forthcoming). The Aim of Justification and Epistemic Difference-Making Principles. Acta Analytica:1-19.
    The idea that truth is the aim of justification is one that is often defended by theorists who uphold different views about the nature of epistemic justification. Despite its prevalence, however, it is not quite clear how one is to cash out the metaphor that justification aims at truth. Some theorists, for example, have objected that the thesis would leave no room for justified false beliefs and unjustified true beliefs. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is (...)
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  23. Meg Wallace (forthcoming). Rearming the Slingshot? Acta Analytica:1-10.
    Slingshot arguments aim to show that an allegedly non-extensional sentential connective—such as “necessarily ” or “the statement that Φ corresponds to the fact that ”—is, to the contrary, an extensional sentential connective. Stephen Neale : 761-825, 1995, 2001) argues that a reformulation of Gödel’s slingshot puts pressure on us to adopt a particular view of definite descriptions. I formulate a revised version of the slingshot argument—one that relies on Kaplan’s notion of “dthat.” I aim to show that if Neale’s version (...)
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  24. Michael B. Wrigley (forthcoming). A Note on Arithmetic and Logic in the ``Tractatus''. Acta Analytica.
    The extra propositions which Wittgenstein added to Ramsey's copy of\nthe 'Tractatus' during their discussions in 1923 provide evidence,\nWrigley argues, that Wittgenstein's view of mathematics was quite\ndifferent from logicism. Contrary to this, Frascolla tries to prove\nthat the label 'no-classes logicism' tallies with the 'Tractarian'\nview of arithmetic.
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  25. Takashi Yagisawa (forthcoming). Impossibilia and Modally Tensed Predication. Acta Analytica:1-7.
    Mark Jago’s four arguments against Takashi Yagisawa’s extended modal realism are examined and shown to be ineffective. Yagisawa’s device of modal tense renders three of Jago’s arguments harmless, and the correct understanding of predications of modal properties of world stages blocks the fourth one.
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  26. Gal Yehezkel (forthcoming). The New Riddle of Induction and the New Riddle of Deduction. Acta Analytica:1-11.
    Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on the analogy between induction and deduction in (...)
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