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Forthcoming articles
  1.  41
    Uwe Steinhoff (forthcoming). Self-Defense as Claim Right, Liberty, and Act-Specific Agent-Relative Prerogative. Law and Philosophy:1-17.
    This paper is not so much concerned with the question under which circumstances self-defense is justified, but rather with other normative features of self-defense as well as with the source of the self-defense justification. I will argue that the aggressor’s rights-forfeiture alone – and hence the liberty-right of the defender to defend himself – cannot explain the intuitively obvious fact that a prohibition on self-defense would wrong victims of attack. This can only be explained by conceiving of self-defense also as (...)
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  2. William T. Braithwaite (forthcoming). The Common Law and the Judicial Power: An Introduction to Swift-Erie and the Problem of Transcendental Versus Positive Law. Law and Philosophy.
     
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  3.  4
    Vincent Chiao (forthcoming). What is the Criminal Law For? Law and Philosophy:1-27.
    The traditional distinction between retributive and distributive justice misconstrues the place of the criminal law in modern regulatory states. In the context of the regulatory state, the criminal law is a coercive rule-enforcing institution – regardless of whether it also serves the ends of retributive justice. As a rule-enforcing institution, the criminal law is deeply implicated in stabilizing the institutions and legal rules by means of which a state creates and allocates social advantage. As a coercive institution, the criminal law (...)
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  4.  1
    Avihay Dorfman (forthcoming). Private Law Exceptionalism? Part I: A Basic Difficulty with the Structural Arguments From Bipolarity and Civil Recourse. Law and Philosophy:1-27.
    Contemporary discussions of private law theory have sought to divine the deep structure and content of private law by reference to two key distinctions. First, the distinction between private and criminal law has been utilized to flesh out the distinctively bipolar structure of private law. Second, the distinction between formal and distributive equality has served to highlight the special terms of interaction established in private law. In these pages, I take up the former distinction, arguing that its theoretical significance is (...)
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  5.  5
    Andrea Sangiovanni (forthcoming). Is Coercion a Ground of Distributive Justice? Law and Philosophy:1-20.
    In his rich and stimulating book, Blake argues that comprehensive coercion triggers egalitarian obligations of distributive justice. I argue that coercion is not a necessary condition for egalitarian justice to apply; Blake’s use of a moralised conception of coercion is a mistake; coercion is a redundant member of any set of sufficient conditions that might explain why distributive justice applies; Blake’s emphasis on providing conditions for the exercise of autonomy might support a much more cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice.
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  6.  4
    Kok-Chor Tan (forthcoming). Justice Between Sites of Justice. Law and Philosophy:1-21.
    Michael Blake argues that states are the primary sites of justice for persons and that the function of international justice is to ensure that states interact with each other in ways that preserve the capacity of each to realize justice for their own members. This paper will argue that justice among states requires more of states than that they preserve and maintain each other's capacity as primary sites of justice. Justice among states will require some justification, as well, of the (...)
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  7. Alec Walen (forthcoming). The Restricting Claims Principle Revisited: Grounding the Means Principle on the Agent–Patient Divide. Law and Philosophy:1-37.
    In an earlier article, I introduced the “restricting claims principle” to explain what is right about the means principle: the idea that it is harder to justify causing or allowing someone to suffer harm if using him as a means than if causing or allowing harm as a side effect. The RCP appeals to the idea that claims not to be harmed as a side effect push to restrict an agent from doing what she would otherwise be free to do (...)
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