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Forthcoming articles
  1. John Danaher (forthcoming). The Normativity of Linguistic Originalism: A Speech Act Analysis. Law and Philosophy:1-35.
    The debate over the merits of originalism has advanced considerably in recent years, both in terms of its intellectual sophistication and its practical significance. In the process, some prominent originalists — Lawrence Solum and Jeffrey Goldsworthy being the two discussed here — have been at pains to separate out the linguistic and normative components of the theory. For these authors, while it is true that judges and other legal decision-makers ought to be originalists, it is also true that the communicated (...)
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  2. William T. Braithwaite (forthcoming). The Common Law and the Judicial Power: An Introduction to Swift-Erie and the Problem of Transcendental Versus Positive Law. Law and Philosophy.
     
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  3. Benjamin Ewing (forthcoming). The Political Legitimacy of Retribution: Two Reasons for Skepticism. Law and Philosophy:1-28.
    Retributivism is often portrayed as a rights-respecting alternative to consequentialist justifications of punishment. However, I argue that the political legitimacy of retribution is doubtful precisely because retribution privileges a controversial conception of the good over citizens’ rights and more widely shared, publicly accessible interests. First, even if retribution is valuable, the best accounts of its value fail to show that it can override or partially nullify offenders’ rights to the fundamental forms of liberty of which criminal punishment paradigmatically deprives them. (...)
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  4. Phillip Montague (forthcoming). Specification and Moral Rights. Law and Philosophy:1-16.
    In this paper, I offer objections to an approach to formulating principles referring to moral rights that has come to known as “specification.” These objections focus on rights-principles in their role as premises of inferences to conclusions regarding the moral rights of individuals in particular situations. I argue on practical grounds that specified principles have no useful role to play in such inferences, and on theoretical grounds that the specificationist position is self-defeating. This latter argument also suggests an interpretation of (...)
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  5. Anthony R. Reeves (forthcoming). Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion. Law and Philosophy:1-42.
    In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...)
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  6. Sarah Sorial (forthcoming). Hate Speech and Distorted Communication: Rethinking the Limits of Incitement. Law and Philosophy:1-26.
    Hate speech is commonly defined with reference to the legal category of incitement. Laws targeting incitement typically focus on how the speech is expressed rather than its actual content. This has a number of unintended consequences: first, law tends to capture overt or obvious forms of hate speech and not hate speech that takes the form of ‘reasoned’ argument, but which nevertheless, causes as much, if not more harm. Second, the focus on form rather than content leads to categorization errors. (...)
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  7. Kevin Toh (forthcoming). Erratum To: Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy:1-36.
    This paper seeks to uncover and rationally reconstruct four theoretical prescriptions that H. L. A. Hart urged philosophers to observe and follow when investigating and theorizing about the nature of law. The four prescriptions may appear meager and insignificant when each is seen in isolation, but together as an inter-connected set they have substantial implications. In effect, they constitute a central part of Hart’s campaign to put philosophical investigations about the nature of law onto a path to a genuine research (...)
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