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Forthcoming articles
  1.  17
    Alexandre Billon (forthcoming). Making Sense of Cotard's Syndrome: Insights From the Study of Depersonalization. Mind and Language.
  2.  70
    Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded. Mind and Language.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this essay, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly (...)
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  3.  12
    Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum (forthcoming). Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes. Mind and Language.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling’s classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics’ in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual (...)
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  4. Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Grades of Multisensory Awareness. Mind and Language.
  5. Matthew Parrott (forthcoming). Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion. Mind and Language.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one’s own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one’s own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of (...)
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  6. Susan Schneider (forthcoming). The Nature of Primitive Symbols in the Language of Thought. Mind and Language.
    This paper provides a theory of the nature of symbols in the language of thought (LOT). My discussion consists in three parts. In part one, I provide three arguments for the individuation of primitive symbols in terms of total computational role. The first of these arguments claims that Classicism requires that primitive symbols be typed in this manner; no other theory of typing will suffice. The second argument contends that without this manner of symbol individuation, there will be computational processes (...)
     
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  7. N. Bonini, K. Tentori & D. Osherson (forthcoming). A New Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language.
     
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  8. N. Burton-Roberts (forthcoming). Atlas, Linguistics and Philosophy. Mind and Language.
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  9.  10
    Marc Ettlinger (forthcoming). Interpreting Deixis in Mental Spaces. Mind and Language.
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