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Forthcoming articles
  1.  23
    Jacob Beck & Keith Schneider (forthcoming). Attention and Mental Primer. Mind and Language.
    Drawing on the empirical premise that attention makes objects look more intense (bigger, faster, higher in contrast), Ned Block has argued for mental paint, a phenomenal residue that cannot be reduced to what is perceived or represented. If sound, Block’s argument would undermine direct realism and representationism, two widely held views about the nature of conscious perception. We argue that Block’s argument fails because the empirical premise it is based upon is false. Attending to an object alters its salience, but (...)
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  2.  19
    Frank Cabrera (forthcoming). Cladistic Parsimony, Historical Linguistics, and Cultural Phylogenetics. Mind and Language.
    Here, I consider the recent application of phylogenetic methods in historical linguistics. After a preliminary survey of one such method, i.e. cladistic parsimony, I respond to two common criticisms of cultural phylogenies: (1) that cultural artifacts cannot be modeled as tree-like because of borrowing across lineages, and (2) that the mechanism of cultural change differs radically from that of biological evolution. I argue that while perhaps (1) remains true for certain cultural artifacts, the nature of language may be such as (...)
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  3. Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded. Mind and Language.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this essay, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly (...)
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  4. Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum (forthcoming). Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes. Mind and Language.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling’s classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics’ in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual memory (...)
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  5.  22
    Thor Grünbaum (forthcoming). The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms. Mind and Language.
    Milner and Goodale’s Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action (a functional perception-action model, PAM for short). In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that PAM is ambiguous between a strong and a weak version. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used (...)
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  6.  56
    Susana Monsó (forthcoming). Morality Without Mindreading. Mind and Language.
    Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at least (...)
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  7. Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Grades of Multisensory Awareness. Mind and Language.
  8. Matthew Parrott (forthcoming). Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion. Mind and Language.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one’s own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one’s own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of (...)
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  9. Susan Schneider (forthcoming). The Nature of Primitive Symbols in the Language of Thought. Mind and Language.
    This paper provides a theory of the nature of symbols in the language of thought (LOT). My discussion consists in three parts. In part one, I provide three arguments for the individuation of primitive symbols in terms of total computational role. The first of these arguments claims that Classicism requires that primitive symbols be typed in this manner; no other theory of typing will suffice. The second argument contends that without this manner of symbol individuation, there will be computational processes (...)
     
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  10.  75
    Elmar Unnsteinsson (forthcoming). A Gricean Theory of Malaprops. Mind and Language.
    Gricean intentionalists hold that what a speaker says and means by a linguistic utterance is determined by the speaker's communicative intention. On this view, one cannot really say anything without meaning it as well. Conventionalists argue, however, that malapropisms provide powerful counterexamples to this claim. I present two arguments against the conventionalist and sketch a new Gricean theory of speech errors, called the misarticulation theory. On this view malapropisms are understood as a special case of mispronunciation. I argue that the (...)
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  11. N. Bonini, K. Tentori & D. Osherson (forthcoming). A New Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language.
     
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  12. N. Burton-Roberts (forthcoming). Atlas, Linguistics and Philosophy. Mind and Language.
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  13.  12
    Marc Ettlinger (forthcoming). Interpreting Deixis in Mental Spaces. Mind and Language.
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