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Forthcoming articles
  1. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Robert D. Rupert's Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines.
  2. Whit Schonbein (forthcoming). Varieties of Analog and Digital Representation. Minds and Machines:1-24.
    The ‘received view’ of the analog–digital distinction holds that analog representations are continuous while digital representations are discrete. In this paper I first provide support for the received view by showing how it (1) emerges from the theory of computation, and (2) explains engineering practices. Second, I critically assess several recently offered alternatives, arguing that to the degree they are justified they demonstrate not that the received view is incorrect, but rather that distinct senses of the terms have become entrenched (...)
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  3. Stuart Armstrong, Anders Sandberg & Nick Bostrom (forthcoming). Thinking Inside the Box: Using and Controlling an Oracle AI. Minds and Machines.
  4. Mark Jm Bishop & C. Sdrolia (forthcoming). Rethinking Construction. On Luciano Floridi's 'Against Digital Ontology. Minds and Machines.
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  5. Jamie Byrom, Christine Consell, Michael Gorman, Michael Riley & Andrew Wrenn (forthcoming). Think Through History. Minds and Machines.
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  6. Carol Cleland (forthcoming). Effective Procedures and Causal Processes. Minds and Machines.
  7. K. Dautenhahn (forthcoming). Socially Intelligent Agents-Towards a Science of Social Minds. Submitted To. Minds and Machines.
  8. K. Laskey (forthcoming). Quantum Physical Symbol Systems. Submitted to Special Issue Of. Minds and Machines.
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  9. Kourken Michaelian (forthcoming). Stanley B. Klein: The Two Selves—Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence. Minds and Machines:1-4.
    The main claim of this relatively brief but unusually ambitious book is, as the title suggests, that the self is not one but two. On the one hand, there is the epistemological self, which has a definite neurocognitive basis. On the other hand, there is the ontological self, which, in Klein’s view, is a matter of first-person subjectivity and may lack a material basis, in which case it may, in contrast to the epistemological self, not be amenable to investigation by (...)
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  10. M. I. T. OpenCourseWare (forthcoming). MIT OpenCourseWare. Minds and Machines.
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  11. Kenneth R. Paap & Derek Partridge (forthcoming). Recursion Isn't Necessary for Human Language Processing: NEAR (Non-Iterative Explicit Alternatives Rule) Grammars Are Superior. Minds and Machines:1-26.
    Language sciences have long maintained a close and supposedly necessary coupling between the infinite productivity of the human language faculty and recursive grammars. Because of the formal equivalence between recursion and non-recursive iteration; recursion, in the technical sense, is never a necessary component of a generative grammar. Contrary to some assertions this equivalence extends to both center-embedded relative clauses and hierarchical parse trees. Inspection of language usage suggests that recursive rule components in fact contribute very little, and likely nothing significant, (...)
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  12. O. Shagrir & I. Pitowsky (forthcoming). The Church-Turing Thesis and Hyper-Computation. Minds and Machines.
  13. Jacopo Tagliabue (forthcoming). Anomalous Monism in a Digital Universe. Minds and Machines:1-12.
    Bermúdez (Philosophy of psychology: a contemporary introduction, Routledge, London, 2005) identifies the “Interface Problem” as the central problem in the philosophy of psychology: how commonsensical psychological explanations can be integrated with lower-level (cognitive, biological, etc.) explanations? In particular, since folk psychology is meant to provide causal explanations on a par with, say, neurobiological explanations, the question of how to understand the relation between the two layers arises naturally. Donald Davidson claimed that the interface problem is actually ill-posed and put forward (...)
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