9 found

Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  34
    Lilly M. Russow (forthcoming). Merleau-Ponty and the Myth Of Bodily Intentionality. Noûs 22:35-47.
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  2.  23
    Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow (forthcoming). Transparency and the KK Principle. Noûs.
    An important question in contemporary epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of introspection, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that the transparency account of self­-knowledge allows us to (...)
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  3.  87
    Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Practical Know-Wh. Noûs.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...)
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  4. Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics. Noûs.
    When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (``X is wrong"/``X is not wrong"), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case (...)
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  5.  1
    Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Imagining Experiences. Noûs.
    It is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take for (...)
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  6.  60
    Martin Lin (forthcoming). Leibniz on the Modal Status of Absolute Space. Noûs.
  7.  24
    John Pittard (forthcoming). Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle. Noûs.
    I show that Kavka’s toxin puzzle raises a problem for the “Responsibility Theodicy,” which holds that the reason God typically does not intervene to stop the evil effects of our actions is that such intervention would undermine the possibility of our being significantly responsible for overcoming and averting evil. This prominent theodicy seems to require that God be able to do what the agent in Kavka’s toxin story cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a future (...)
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  8. R. J. Gómez (forthcoming). Review of the Second Edition of Scientific Progress. [REVIEW] Noûs.
     
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  9. C. Kelp (forthcoming). Assertion: A Function First Account. Noûs.
     
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