6 found

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Forthcoming articles
  1. Lilly M. Russow (forthcoming). Merleau-Ponty and the Myth Of Bodily Intentionality. Noûs 22:35-47.
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  2. Salvatore Florio & Øystein Linnebo (forthcoming). On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification. Noûs.
    Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. It is claimed to be innocent in the sense that it incurs no ontological commitments beyond those already incurred by the first-order quantifiers. It is claimed to be determinate in the sense that it is immune to the threat of non-standard (Henkin) interpretations that confronts higher-order logics on their more traditional, set-based semantics. We challenge both claims. Our challenge is based on a Henkin-style semantics for plural (...)
     
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  3. Rory Madden (forthcoming). The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject. Noûs.
    What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a (...)
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  4. Jonathan McKeown‐Green, Glen Pettigrove & Aness Webster (forthcoming). Conjuring Ethics From Words. Noûs.
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  5. Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Conscious Action/Zombie Action. Noûs.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, (...)
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  6. R. J. Gómez (forthcoming). Review of the Second Edition of Scientific Progress. [REVIEW] Noûs.
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