6 found

Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  38
    Lilly M. Russow (forthcoming). Merleau-Ponty and the Myth Of Bodily Intentionality. Noûs 22:35-47.
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  2.  67
    Matthias Jenny (forthcoming). Counterpossibles in Science: The Case of Relative Computability. Noûs.
    I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. What’s more, I (...)
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  3.  79
    Martin Lin (forthcoming). Leibniz on the Modal Status of Absolute Space. Noûs.
  4.  12
    Alex Madva & Michael Brownstein (forthcoming). Stereotypes, Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind. Noûs.
    How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit (roughly, nonconscious or involuntary). This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different (...)
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  5.  17
    Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre (forthcoming). A Puzzle About Knowing Conditionals. Noûs.
    We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a (...)
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  6. R. J. Gómez (forthcoming). Review of the Second Edition of Scientific Progress. [REVIEW] Noûs.
     
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