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Forthcoming articles
  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (forthcoming). Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don’t know it, and people who echolocate, but don’t know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton’s syndrome, human echolocation, and “facial vision” suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.
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  2. Carl Baker (forthcoming). An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
  3. Patrick Bondy (forthcoming). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation which obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this paper aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The second is to (...)
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  4. Elijah Chudnoff & David DiDomenico (forthcoming). The Epistemic Unity of Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this paper we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were (...)
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  5. Roger Clarke (forthcoming). Preface Writers Are Consistent. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer’s beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief—-sensitivism—-which allows such a solution. (...)
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  6. Karolina Hübner (forthcoming). Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  7. Stephen Ingram (forthcoming). I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi! Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond (...)
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  8. Catherine Legg & James Franklin (forthcoming). Perceiving Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume’s maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...)
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  9. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the `right' kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the `wrong' kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the `right' (...)
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  10. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). On Whether We Can See Intentions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others’ mental states, i.e., that we perceive others’ mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  11. Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  12. Ariela Tubert (forthcoming). Sound Advice and Internal Reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Reasons internalism holds that reasons for action contain an essential connection with motivation. I defend an account of reasons internalism based on the advisor model. The advisor model provides an account of reasons for action in terms of the advice of a more rational version of the agent. Contrary to Pettit and Smith's proposal and responding to Sobel and Johnson's objections, I argue that the advisor model can provide an account of internal reasons and that it is too caught up (...)
     
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  13. Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that normative reasons are premises of good reasoning – that for some consideration to be a normative reason to φ is for it to be the premise of good reasoning towards φ-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this paper, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful, and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns (...)
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  14. Jiafeng Zhu (forthcoming). Farewell to Political Obligation: In Defense of a Permissive Conception of Legitimacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In the recent debate on political legitimacy, we have seen the emergence of a revisionist camp, advocating the idea of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ as opposed to the traditional view that political obligation is necessary for state legitimacy. The revisionist idea of legitimacy is appealing because if it stands, the widespread skepticism about the existence of political obligation will not lead us to conclude that the state is illegitimate. Unfortunately, existing conceptions of ‘legitimacy without political obligation’ are subject to serious (...)
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  15. Lilian O'Brien (forthcoming). Causalism and Deviance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
  16. Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar (forthcoming). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  17. Stephen Foster (forthcoming). On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  18. Joseph Grange (forthcoming). Moore, the Skeptic, and the Philosophical Context. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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