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Forthcoming articles
  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (forthcoming). Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don’t know it, and people who echolocate, but don’t know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton’s syndrome, human echolocation, and “facial vision” suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.
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  2. Patrick Bondy (forthcoming). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation which obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this paper aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The second is to (...)
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  3. Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (forthcoming). Utility Monsters for the Fission Age. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  4. Roger Clarke (forthcoming). Preface Writers Are Consistent. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer’s beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief—-sensitivism—-which allows such a solution. (...)
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  5. Karolina Hübner (forthcoming). Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  6. Stephen Ingram (forthcoming). I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi! Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond (...)
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  7. Catherine Legg & James Franklin (forthcoming). Perceiving Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume’s maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...)
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  8. Luke Manning (forthcoming). No Identity Without an Entity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Peter Geach's puzzle of intentional identity is to explain how the claim 'Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow' is compatible with there being no such witch. I clarify the puzzle and reduce it to the familiar problem of negative existentials. That problem is a paradox, of representations that seem to include denials of commitment (implicitly, here), to carry commitment to what they deny commitment to, and to be (...)
     
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  9. Andrew Naylor (forthcoming). Justification and Forgetting. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a notion of memorial justification. But it is not the traditional notion according to which something in the present—some memory impression, ostensible recollection, or memory experience—makes one’s belief that p prima facie justified. Instead, what makes one’s present belief that p prima facie justified, according to MJP, is that which provided one (...)
     
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  10. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the `right' kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the `wrong' kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the `right' (...)
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  11. Paul Silva Jr (forthcoming). The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it's for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems for they fail to capture some intuitively compelling aspect of justification and other very plausible epistemic theses. After drawing attention to these problems a new view of justification is (...)
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  12. Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Advantages of Propositionalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Propositionalism is the view that the contents of intentional attitudes have a propositional structure. Objectualism opposes propositionalism in allowing the contents of these attitudes to be ordinary objects or properties. Philosophers including Talbot Brewer, Paul Thagard, Michelle Montague, and Alex Grzankowski attack propositionalism about such attitudes as desire, liking, and fearing. This paper defends propositionalism, mainly on grounds that it better supports psychological explanations.
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  13. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). On Whether We Can See Intentions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others’ mental states, i.e., that we perceive others’ mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  14. Paula Sweeney (forthcoming). Future Contingents, Indeterminacy and Context. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In Facing the future, Belnap et al reject bivalence and propose double time reference semantics to give a pragmatic response to the following assertion problem: how can we make sense of assertions about future events made at a time when the outcomes of those events are not yet determined? MacFarlane (2003, 2008) employs the same semantics, now bolstered with a relative-truth predicate, to accommodate the following apparently conflicting intuitions regarding the truth-value of an uttered future contingent: at the moment of (...)
     
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  15. Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  16. Ariela Tubert (forthcoming). Sound Advice and Internal Reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Reasons internalism holds that reasons for action contain an essential connection with motivation. I defend an account of reasons internalism based on the advisor model. The advisor model provides an account of reasons for action in terms of the advice of a more rational version of the agent. Contrary to Pettit and Smith's proposal and responding to Sobel and Johnson's objections, I argue that the advisor model can provide an account of internal reasons and that it is too caught up (...)
     
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  17. Lee Walters (forthcoming). Possible Worlds Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be (...)
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  18. Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that normative reasons are premises of good reasoning – that for some consideration to be a normative reason to φ is for it to be the premise of good reasoning towards φ-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this paper, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful, and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns (...)
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  19. Isaac Wiegman (forthcoming). The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Recent empirical work suggests that certain psychological processes produce deontological (or anti-consequentialist) intuitions. For instance, anger places value on actions of revenge and retribution, value that does not derive from the consequences of these actions. As a result, it contributes to the development of retributive intuitions (which are an instance of the broader category of deontological intuitions). If anger produces retributive intuitions because of their biological consequences (e.g. increased fitness), then these intuitions are not a good indicator that punishment has (...)
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  20. Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Two Kinds of Stakes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes (world) track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakes (attitude) track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes or relies on the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W-stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about (...)
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  21. Jiafeng Zhu (forthcoming). Farewell to Political Obligation: In Defense of a Permissive Conception of Legitimacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In the recent debate on political legitimacy, we have seen the emergence of a revisionist camp, advocating the idea of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ as opposed to the traditional view that political obligation is necessary for state legitimacy. The revisionist idea of legitimacy is appealing because if it stands, the widespread skepticism about the existence of political obligation will not lead us to conclude that the state is illegitimate. Unfortunately, existing conceptions of ‘legitimacy without political obligation’ are subject to serious (...)
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  22. Lilian O'Brien (forthcoming). Causalism and Deviance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
  23. Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar (forthcoming). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  24. Stephen Foster (forthcoming). On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  25. Joseph Grange (forthcoming). Moore, the Skeptic, and the Philosophical Context. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  26. Kate Nolfi & Unc Chapel Hill (forthcoming). How to Be a Normativist About the Nature of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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