Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  9
    Alejandro Arango (forthcoming). Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  2.  17
    Valtteri Arstila (forthcoming). Theories of Apparent Motion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially <span class='Hi'>presented</span> and spatially separated <span class='Hi'>stimuli</span> give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose the shortcomings of the explanations provided (...)
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  3.  5
    Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo (forthcoming). The Sense of Agency – a Phenomenological Consequence of Enacting Sensorimotor Schemes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-30.
    The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the <span class='Hi'>sense</span> of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the <span class='Hi'>sense</span> of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical (...)
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  4.  65
    J. Adam Carter, James Henry Collin & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With reference (...)
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  5.  4
    Tom Cochrane (forthcoming). Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve , Collective Emotions: Perspectives From Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
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  6.  13
    Erol Copelj (forthcoming). On Projecting and Willing: A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Intentions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    This work is best described as an endeavour to contribute to the phenomenology of intentions, the experiences of intending to do something. It finds its point of departure in the discussion of two ‘analytic philosophers’, John Searle and John McDowell, where two contrasting accounts of intentions are offered. The first task is to derive a hybrid account, according to which there are different kinds of intentions, each having the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. The (...)
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  7. Mirko Farina (forthcoming). Beyond the Brain - How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds is an eye-opening and thought- provoking book that sets out a much-needed contribution to the study of the relationship between animals, cognition and the environment. The volume provides remarkable new insights into how to understand animal (including human) behavior, raises interesting questions about the role of environmental affordances in the emergence of complex cognitive processes and provides the reader with a refreshing break from the wearisome excess (...)
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  8.  25
    Simon Høffding & Kristian Martiny (forthcoming). Framing a Phenomenological Interview: What, Why and How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    Research in phenomenology has benefitted from using exceptional cases from pathology and expertise. But exactly how are we to generate and apply knowledge from such cases to the phenomenological domain? As researchers of cerebral palsy and musical absorption, we together answer the how question by pointing to the resource of the qualitative interview. Using the qualitative interview is a direct response to Varela’s call for better pragmatics in the methodology of phenomenology and cognitive science and Gallagher’s suggestion for phenomenology to (...)
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  9.  58
    Michelle Montague (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...)
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  10.  13
    Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu (forthcoming). How Does It Really Feel to Act Together? Shared Emotions and the Phenomenology of We-Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie’s account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely the necessary trade-off between the sense of self- (...)
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  11.  22
    Philip J. Walsh (forthcoming). Cognitive Extension, Enhancement, and the Phenomenology of Thinking. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension. First, I explain the idea of cognitive extension, the metaphysics of mind on which it depends, and how it has figured in recent discussions of cognitive enhancement. Then, I develop ideas from Husserl that emphasize the agential character of thought and the distinctive way that conscious thoughts are related (...)
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  12.  12
    Paulo De Jesus (forthcoming). Autopoietic Enactivism, Phenomenology and the Deep Continuity Between Life and Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism . These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which (...)
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  13.  45
    Richard Heersmink (forthcoming). The Cognitive Integration of Scientific Instruments: Information, Situated Cognition and Scientific Practice. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Researchers in the biological and biomedical sciences, particularly those working in laboratories, use a variety of artifacts to help them perform their cognitive tasks. This paper analyses the relationship between researchers and cognitive artifacts in terms of integration. It first distinguishes different categories of cognitive artifacts used in biological (...) on the basis of their informational properties. This results in a novel classification of scientific instruments, conducive to an analysis of the cognitive interactions between researchers and artifacts. It then uses a multidimensional framework in line with complementarity-based extended and distributed cognition theory to conceptualize how deeply instruments in different informational categories are integrated into the cognitive systems of their users. The paper concludes that the degree of integration depends on various factors, including the amount of informational malleability, the intensity and kind of information flow between agent and artifact, the trustworthiness of the information, the procedural and informational transparency, and the degree of individualisation. (shrink)
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  14.  64
    Richard Heersmink (forthcoming). Extended Mind and Cognitive Enhancement: Moral Aspects of Cognitive Artifacts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimensions that are addressed neither by the (...) enhancement debate nor situated cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; and their relation to personal identity. (shrink)
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  15. Victor Loughlin (forthcoming). . Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Andy Clark once remarked that we make the world smart so we don�t have to be. What he meant was that human beings alter and transform their environments in order to accomplish certain tasks that would prove difficult without such transformations. This remarkable insight goes a long way towards explaining many aspects of human culture, ranging from linguistic notational systems to how we structure our cities. It also provides the basis for Mark Rowlands� thought-provoking and insightful book, The New Science (...)
     
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  16. Filip Radovic (forthcoming). The Sense of Death and Non-Existence in Nihilistic Delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
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  17.  5
    Rami Ali (forthcoming). Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias , Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
    Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of perceptual (...)
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  18.  12
    Ignacio Ávila (forthcoming). Is Bodily Awareness a Form of Perception? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    In this paper I address the question of whether bodily awareness is a form of perceptual awareness or not. I discuss José Luis Bermúdez’s and Shaun Gallagher’s proposals about this issue and find them unsatisfactory. Then I suggest an alternative view and offer some reasons for it.
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  19.  5
    Aviva Berkovich-Ohana (forthcoming). A Case Study of a Meditation-Induced Altered State: Increased Overall Gamma Synchronization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    This study presents two case reports of altered states spontaneously occurring during meditation in two proficient practitioners. These states, known as fruition, are common within the Mahasi School of Theravada Buddhism, and are considered the culmination of contemplation-induced stages of consciousness. Here, electrophysiological measures of these experiences were measured, with the participant’s personal reports used to guide the neural analyzes. The preliminary results demonstrate an increase in global long-range gamma synchronization during the fruition states, compared to the background meditation. The (...)
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  20.  4
    Anja Berninger (forthcoming). Temporal Experience, Emotions and Decision Making in Psychopathy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
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  21.  2
    Johannes L. Brandl, Frank Esken, Beate Priewasser & Eva Rafetseder (forthcoming). Erratum To: Young Children’s Protest: What It Can Tell Us About Early Normative Understanding. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-1.
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  22.  3
    Wilma Bucci, Bernard Maskit & Sean Murphy (forthcoming). Connecting Emotions and Words: The Referential Process. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    This paper outlines the process of verbal communication of emotion as this occurs through the phases of the referential process, including arousal of an emotion schema; detailed and specific descriptions of images and episodes that are exemplars of emotion schemas; and reflection and reorganization, which may include emotion labels and other types of categorical terms. The concepts of emotion schemas and the referential process are defined in the theoretical framework of multiple code theory which includes subsymbolic sensory, visceral and motoric (...)
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  23.  8
    Massimiliano Lorenzo Cappuccio (forthcoming). Mind-Upload. The Ultimate Challenge to the Embodied Mind Theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis, a radical version of the Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a whole mind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the Embodied Mind theory, which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of a mind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately incompatible is unobvious. This paper, (...)
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  24. Adam Carter, James H. Collin & Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Semantic Inferentialism as Active Externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers :7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With (...)
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  25.  19
    Monima Chadha (forthcoming). No-Self and the Phenomenology of Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. I argue that Buddhists (...)
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  26.  2
    Radoslaw Martin Cichy (forthcoming). Achim Stephan, Sven Walter , Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
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  27. Elena Clare Cuffari (forthcoming). Yanna B. Popova, Stories, Meaning, and Experience: Narrativity and Enaction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
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  28.  13
    Roy Dings & Leon de Bruin (forthcoming). Situating the Self: Understanding the Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    The article proposes a theoretical model to account for changes in self due to Deep Brain Stimulation . First, we argue that most existing models postulate a very narrow conception of self, and thus fail to capture the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes. Second, building on previous work by Shaun Gallagher, we propose a modified ‘pattern-theory of self’, which provides a richer picture of the possible consequences of DBS treatment.
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  29.  3
    Luna Dolezal (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Self-Presentation: Describing the Structures of Intercorporeality with Erving Goffman. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    Self-presentation is a term that indicates conscious and unconscious strategies for controlling or managing how one is perceived by others in terms of both appearance and comportment. In this article, I will discuss the phenomenology of self-presentation with respect to the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty regarding the visibility of the body within intercorporeal relations through ‘behaviour’ and ‘expression.’ In doing so, I will turn to the work of the Canadian sociologist and social theorist Erving Goffman. Goffman’s account (...)
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  30.  8
    James M. Dow (forthcoming). Just Doing What I Do: On the Awareness of Fluent Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    Hubert Dreyfus has argued that cases of absorbed bodily coping show that there is no room for self-awareness in flow experiences of experts. In this paper, I argue against Dreyfus’ maxim of vanishing self-awareness by suggesting that awareness of agency is present in expert bodily action. First, I discuss the phenomenon of absorbed bodily coping by discussing flow experiences involved in expert bodily action: merging into the flow; immersion in the flow; emergence out of flow. I argue against the claim (...)
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  31.  2
    Caruana Fausto & Cuccio Valentina (forthcoming). Types of Abduction in Tool Behavior. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Tool-use behavior is currently one of the most intriguing and widely debated topics in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts of our ability to use tools have been proposed. In the first part of the paper we review the most prominent interpretations and suggest that none of these accounts, considered in itself, is sufficient to explain tool use. In the second part of the paper we disentangle three different types of reasoning on tools, characterized by a different distribution of motor and cognitive (...)
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  32.  8
    Thomas Fuchs (forthcoming). Self Across Time: The Diachronic Unity of Bodily Existence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for (...)
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  33.  7
    Joseph A. Hedger (forthcoming). Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained (...)
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  34.  13
    Manuel Heras-Escribano & Manuel de Pinedo (forthcoming). Are Affordances Normative? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    In this paper we explore in what sense we can claim that affordances, the objects of perception for ecological psychology, are related to normativity. First, we offer an account of normativity and provide some examples of how it is understood in the specialized literature. Affordances, we claim, lack correctness criteria and, hence, the possibility of error is not among their necessary conditions. For this reason we will oppose Chemero’s normative theory of affordances. Finally, we will show that there is a (...)
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  35.  25
    Jakob Hohwy, Bryan Paton & Colin Palmer (forthcoming). Distrusting the Present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed (...)
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  36. Simon Høffding (forthcoming). A Musical Exploration of Consciousness: Book Review of Clarke & Clarke (Eds)(2011) Music and Consciousness. Philosophical, Psychological, and Cultural Perspectiv Es. Oxford Univ Ersity Press. ISBN 978-0-19-955379-2. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
     
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  37.  6
    Brian A. Irwin (forthcoming). An Enactivist Account of Abstract Words: Lessons From Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Enactivist accounts of language use generally treat concrete words in terms of motor intentionality systems and affordances for action. There is less consensus, though, regarding how abstract words are to be understood in enactivist terms. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy to argue, against the representationalist paradigm that has dominated the cognitive scientific and philosophical traditions, that language is fundamentally a mode of participation in our world. In particular, language orients us within our milieus in a manner that extends into (...)
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  38.  4
    J. A. Judge (forthcoming). Jonathan Berger and Gabe Turow , Music, Science, and the Rhythmic Brain: Cultural and Clinical Implications. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
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  39.  1
    Marianne E. Klinke (forthcoming). Kristin Zeiler and Lisa Folmarson Käll, Editors. Feminist Phenomenology and Medicine. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
    In Feminist Phenomenology and Medicine, the editors have assembled a collection of papers on important topics that should be addressed in the modern phenomenology of medicine - topics which do not exclusively focus on illness, disability, bodily deterioration or pathologies, as seen for instance in prior work of the philosophers S Kay Toombs, Frederik Svenaeus, and Havi Carel. The contributors met at a congress on feminist phenomenology and medicine in Sweden in 2011, and come from a variety of relevant disciplines (...)
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  40.  4
    Miriam Kyselo (forthcoming). The Enactive Approach and Disorders of the Self - the Case of Schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack an account of how 1st (...)
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  41.  13
    Victor Loughlin (forthcoming). Zdravko Radman , The Hand: An Organ of the Mind, What the Manual Tells the Mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
    Hands undoubtedly matter. Few, I suspect, would disagree. Yet The Hand, an Organ of the Mind uses this commonplace to dispel what is termed the “intellectualist illusion” , the illusion that the things we do with our hands are always and everywhere guided by an in-the-head centralised planner. Radman’s spirited collection of essays makes the point that we are not the sort of “centralised knowers” that the history of cognitive science might have us believe. Rather the manual is primary: it (...)
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  42.  9
    Francesco Marchi & Albert Newen (forthcoming). The Cognitive Foundations of Visual Consciousness: Why Should We Favour a Processing Approach? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness.. Our aim, in this paper, is (...)
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  43.  6
    Michele Merritt (forthcoming). Kristin Andrews: The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
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  44.  4
    Ken Pepper (forthcoming). Review of the Innocent Eye: Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process, by Nico Orlandi. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
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  45.  8
    Mattia Riccardi (forthcoming). Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-12.
    Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and (...)
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  46.  7
    Miguel Ángel Sebastián (forthcoming). Functions and Mental Representation: The Theoretical Role of Representations and its Real Nature. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...)
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  47.  13
    Fredrik Svenaeus (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Empathy: A Steinian Emotional Account. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her (...)
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  48.  5
    Richard Tieszen (forthcoming). Eidetic Results in Transcendental Phenomenology: Against Naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-27.
    In this paper I contrast Husserlian transcendental eidetic phenomenology with some other views of what phenomenology is supposed to be and argue that, as eidetic, it does not admit of being ‘naturalized’ in accordance with standard accounts of naturalization. The paper indicates what some of the eidetic results in phenomenology are and it links these to the employment of reason in philosophical investigation, as distinct from introspection, emotion or empirical observation. Eidetic phenomenology, unlike cognitive science, should issue in a ‘logic’ (...)
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  49.  5
    Dylan Trigg (forthcoming). On the Role of Depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    This essay considers the role of depersonalization in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. While there has been a modest amount of interest in depersonalization from a phenomenological perspective, a critical exploration of the theme of depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking itself remains overlooked ; Colombetti and Ratcliffe. This is an oddity, given that the theme of depersonalization proves instructive in Merleau-Ponty’s account of the constitution of the subject, and appears within Phenomenology of Perception at key points in his thinking. This paper serves (...)
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  50.  1
    Enrique Huelva Unternbäumen (forthcoming). The Codification of Intersubjectivity in the Diachronic Change AD Locative > A Indirect Object in Spanish. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    The principal aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between intersubjectivity and grammar. We argue that intersubjectivity represents, on the one hand, a prerequisite for the development of language as a symbolic system, and therefore also for the development of grammar. Furthermore, we attempt to show that language, and especially grammar, codify intersubjectivity. That is to say, grammatical constructions represent the intersubjective interactions that situated agents maintain in different pragmatic contects. We call this phenomenon the meta-representational capacity of (...)
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  51.  13
    Zeno Van Duppen (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Hypo- and Hyperreality in Psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...)
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    Neralie Wise (forthcoming). The Capgras Delusion: An Integrated Approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    Delusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an (...)
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