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Forthcoming articles
  1. Roman Altshuler (forthcoming). Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-Constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Drawing on David Velleman’s earlier work, Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value and free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is (...)
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  2. Elena Clare Cuffari, Ezequiel Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher (forthcoming). From Participatory Sense-Making to Language: There and Back Again. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-37.
    The enactive approach to cognition distinctively emphasizes autonomy, adaptivity, agency, meaning, experience, and interaction. Taken together, these principles can provide the new sciences of language with a comprehensive philosophical framework: languaging as adaptive social sense-making. This is a refinement and advancement on Maturana’s idea of languaging as a manner of living. Overcoming limitations in Maturana’s initial formulation of languaging is one of three motivations for this paper. Another is to give a response to skeptics who challenge enactivism to connect “lower-level” (...)
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  3. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (forthcoming). Three Misconceptions Concerning Strong Embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended (...)
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  4. Mirko Farina (forthcoming). Beyond the Brain - How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds is an eye-opening and thought- provoking book that sets out a much-needed contribution to the study of the relationship between animals, cognition and the environment. The volume provides remarkable new insights into how to understand animal (including human) behavior, raises interesting questions about the role of environmental affordances in the emergence of complex cognitive processes and provides the reader with a refreshing break from the wearisome excess of brain-centric (...)
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  5. Victor Loughlin (forthcoming). Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: FromExtended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. MIT Press,Bradford Books, 2010, 249 Pages, ISBN 978-0-262-01455-7, �20.24. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Andy Clark once remarked that we make the world smart so we don�t have to be (Clark, 1997). What he meant was that human beings (along with many other animals) alter and transform their environments in order to accomplish certain tasks that would prove difficult (or indeed impossible) without such transformations. This remarkable insight goes a long way towards explaining many aspects of human culture, ranging from linguistic notational systems to how we structure our cities. It also provides the basis (...)
     
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  6. Michelle Montague (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...)
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  7. Rainer Mühlhoff (forthcoming). Affective Resonance and Social Interaction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Interactive social cognition theory and approaches of developmental psychology widely agree that central aspects of emotional and social experience arise in the unfolding of processes of embodied social interaction. Bi-directional dynamical couplings of bodily displays such as facial expressions, gestures, and vocalizations have repeatedly been described in terms of coordination, synchrony, mimesis, or attunement. In this paper, I propose conceptualizing such dynamics rather as processes of affective resonance. Starting from the immediate phenomenal experience of being immersed in interaction, I develop (...)
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  8. Maxwell J. D. Ramstead (forthcoming). Naturalizing What? Varieties of Naturalism and Transcendental Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-43.
    This paper aims to address the relevance of the natural sciences for transcendental phenomenology, that is, the issue of naturalism. The first section distinguishes three varieties of naturalism and corresponding forms of naturalization: an ontological one, a methodological one (with strong and weak variants), and an epistemological one (also with strong and weak variants). In light of these distinctions, in the second section, I examine the main projects aiming to “naturalize phenomenology”: neurophenomenology, front-loaded phenomenology, and formalized approaches to phenomenology. The (...)
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  9. Sebastian Rödl (forthcoming). Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-11.
    In a series of essays, Bratman defines a concept, which we may call the concept of Bratmanian action by many. Our discussion of this concept, in section 1, reveals that it is not the one called to mind by the usual examples of joint action. Section 2 lays alongside it a different concept of doing something together. According to it, many are doing A together if and only if the principle of the actions in which they are doing A is (...)
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  10. Paulo De Jesus (forthcoming). Autopoietic Enactivism, Phenomenology and the Deep Continuity Between Life and Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism . These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which (...)
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  11. Steven DeLay (forthcoming). The Toiling Lily: Narrative Life, Responsibility, and the Ontological Ground of Self-Deception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture (...)
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  12. Daniel C. Dennett (forthcoming). Artifactual Selves: A Response to Lynne Rudder Baker. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-4.
    Baker’s critique of my view of the self as a fiction captures some of its points well but misses the possibility of a theorist’s fiction, like the Equator or a center of gravity, which is not an illusion, but rather an abstraction, like dollars, poems, and software—made of no material but dependent on material vehicles. It is an artifact of our everyday effort to make sense of our own (and others’) complex activities by postulating a single central source of meaning, (...)
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  13. Marco Fenici (forthcoming). A Simple Explanation of Apparent Early Mindreading: Infants' Sensitivity to Goals and Gaze Direction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...)
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  14. Daniel D. Hutto (forthcoming). Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Decoupling a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) from Strong Narrativism this paper attempts to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that the basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment—the (...)
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  15. Fleur Jongepier (forthcoming). Towards a Constitutive Account of Implicit Narrativity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    The standard reply to the critique that narrative theories of the self are either chauvinistic or trivial is to “go implicit”. Implicit narratives, it is argued, are necessary for diachronically structured self-experience (barring triviality), but do not require that such narratives should be wholly articulable life stories (barring chauvinism). In this paper I argue that the standard approach, which puts forward a phenomenological conception of implicit narratives, is ultimately unable to get out of the clutches of the dilemma. In its (...)
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  16. Marek Pokropski (forthcoming). Timing Together, Acting Together. Phenomenology of Intersubjective Temporality and Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-13.
    In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl’s account of intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of the other’s harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective (passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in the field of social cognition. I argue that these (...)
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  17. A. Tanesini (forthcoming). Spatial Attention and Perception: Seeing Without Paint. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Covert spatial attention alters the way things look. There is strong empirical evidence showing that objects situated at attended locations are described as appearing bigger, closer, if striped, stripier than qualitatively indiscernible counterparts whose locations are unattended. These results cannot be easily explained in terms of which properties of objects are perceived. Nor do they appear to be cases of visual illusions. Ned Block has argued that these results are best accounted for by invoking what he calls ‘mental paint’. In (...)
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  18. Jesper Aagaard (forthcoming). Media Multitasking, Attention, and Distraction: A Critical Discussion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-12.
    Students often multitask with technologies such as computers, laptops, tablets and smartphones during class. Unfortunately, numerous empirical studies firmly establish a significant drop in academic performance caused by this media multitasking. In this paper it is argued that cognitive studies may have clarified the negative consequences of this activity, yet they struggle to address the processes involved in it. A cognitive characterization of attention as a mental phenomenon neglects the interaction between bodies and technologies, and it is suggested that a (...)
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  19. Sarah LaChance Adams (forthcoming). The Child Anticipates: Review of Talia Welsh, The Child as Natural Phenomenologist: Primal and Primary Experience in Merleau-Ponty's Psychology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
    A work that takes up development as its key theme must also inherently be a work about time. Typically, developmental psychology assumes an objective, linear progression of time that moves from the past and into the future in a rather orderly fashion. We move steadily along this line in a forward motion. However, as Talia Welsh demonstrates in The Child as Natural Phenomenologist, such an assumption will over-determine our understanding of childhood development. It too will be viewed as mostly linear (...)
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  20. Bernardo Ainbinder (forthcoming). John Haugeland: Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger. Edited by Joseph Rouse. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
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  21. Rami Ali (forthcoming). Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias , Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
    Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of perceptual (...)
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  22. Alejandro Arango (forthcoming). Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  23. Valtteri Arstila (forthcoming). Theories of Apparent Motion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially presented and spatially separated stimuli give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose the shortcomings of the explanations provided for apparent (...)
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  24. Yochai Ataria (forthcoming). Dissociation During Trauma: The Ownership-Agency Tradeoff Model. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    Dissociation during trauma lacks an adequate definition. Using data obtained from interviews with 36 posttraumatic individuals conducted according to the phenomenological approach, this paper seeks to improve our understanding of this phenomenon. In particular, it suggesting a trade off model depicting the balance between the sense of agency and the sense of ownership : a reciprocal relationship appears to exist between these two, and in order to enable control of the body during trauma the sense of ownership must decrease. When (...)
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  25. Lynne Rudder Baker (forthcoming). Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers (...)
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  26. Aviva Berkovich-Ohana (forthcoming). A Case Study of a Meditation-Induced Altered State: Increased Overall Gamma Synchronization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    This study presents two case reports of altered states spontaneously occurring during meditation in two proficient practitioners. These states, known as fruition, are common within the Mahasi School of Theravada Buddhism, and are considered the culmination of contemplation-induced stages of consciousness. Here, electrophysiological measures of these experiences were measured, with the participant’s personal reports used to guide the neural analyzes. The preliminary results demonstrate an increase in global long-range gamma synchronization during the fruition states, compared to the background meditation. The (...)
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  27. Priscilla Brandon (forthcoming). Body and Self: An Entangled Narrative. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    In the past three decades a number of narrative self-concepts have appeared in the philosophical literature. A central question posed in recent literature concerns the embodiment of the narrative self. Though one of the best-known narrative self-concepts is a non-embodied one, namely Dennett’s self as ‘a center of narrative gravity’, others argue that the narrative self should include a role for embodiment. Several arguments have been made in support of the latter claim, but these can be summarized in two main (...)
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  28. Ingar Brinck (forthcoming). Understanding Social Norms and Constitutive Rules: Perspectives From Developmental Psychology and Philosophy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    An experimental paradigm that purports to test young children’s understanding of social norms is examined. The paradigm models norms on Searle’s notion of a constitutive rule. The experiments and the reasons provided for their design are discussed. It is argued that the experiments do not provide direct evidence about the development of social norms and that the concepts of a social norm and constitutive rule are distinct. The experimental data are re-interpreted, and suggestions for how to deal with the present (...)
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  29. Wilma Bucci, Bernard Maskit & Sean Murphy (forthcoming). Connecting Emotions and Words: The Referential Process. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    This paper outlines the process of verbal communication of emotion as this occurs through the phases of the referential process, including arousal of an emotion schema; detailed and specific descriptions of images and episodes that are exemplars of emotion schemas; and reflection and reorganization, which may include emotion labels and other types of categorical terms. The concepts of emotion schemas and the referential process are defined in the theoretical framework of multiple code theory which includes subsymbolic sensory, visceral and motoric (...)
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  30. Peer F. Bundgaard (forthcoming). Feeling, Meaning, and Intentionality—a Critique of the Neuroaesthetics of Beauty. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    This article addresses the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. It first, critically, considers one of the most influential approaches to the psychophysics of aesthetic perception, viz. neuroaesthetics. Hereafter, it outlines constitutive tenets of aesthetic perception in terms of a particular intentional relation to the object. The argument comes in three steps. First, I show the inadequacies of the neuroaesthetics of beauty in general and Semir Zeki’s and V.J. Ramachandran’s versions of it in particular. The neuroaesthetics of beauty falls short, because it (...)
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  31. Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Time-Series of Ephemeral Impressions: The Abhidharma-Buddhist View of Conscious Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    In the absence of continuing selves or persons, Buddhist philosophers are under pressure to provide a systematic account of phenomenological and other features of conscious experience. Any such Buddhist account of experience, however, faces further problems because of another cardinal tenet of Buddhist revisionary metaphysics: the doctrine of impermanence, which during the Abhidharma period is transformed into the doctrine of momentariness. Setting aside the problems that plague the Buddhist Abhidharma theory of experience because of lack of persons, I shall focus (...)
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  32. Radoslaw Martin Cichy (forthcoming). Achim Stephan, Sven Walter , Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
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  33. Erol Copelj (forthcoming). On Projecting and Willing: A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Intentions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    This work is best described as an endeavour to contribute to the phenomenology of intentions, the experiences of intending to do something. It finds its point of departure in the discussion of two ‘analytic philosophers’, John Searle and John McDowell, where two contrasting accounts of intentions are offered. The first task is to derive a hybrid account, according to which there are different kinds of intentions, each having the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. The (...)
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  34. Christian Coseru (forthcoming). Selves: Subpersonal, Immersed, and Participating. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
    This book marks the beginning of a new phase in the philosophical investigation of classical and contemporary accounts of the self: canonical boundaries have been crossed and doctrinal justification abandoned in favor of a cosmopolitan ideal of syncretic, theoretically perspicuous, and historically informed systematic reflection. That such reflection bears on so central a concept as the self is only fitting given its implications for a broad range of questions concerning agency, the mind-body problem, and self-knowledge that are now pursued across (...)
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  35. Leon de Bruin & Maureen Sie (forthcoming). Introduction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-3.
    The idea that human beings experience their lives as some sort of story and tend to understand themselves as authors of a narrative has become increasingly popular in philosophy. Some philosophers suggest that narratives are indispensable when it comes to answering the traditional question associated with personal (numerical) identity: what makes it the case that the person considered at time t0 is the same person as the person considered at time t1? They claim that taking a narrative approach to this (...)
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  36. Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki: Mindshaping. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
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  37. Roy Dings & Leon de Bruin (forthcoming). Situating the Self: Understanding the Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    The article proposes a theoretical model to account for changes in self due to Deep Brain Stimulation . First, we argue that most existing models postulate a very narrow conception of self, and thus fail to capture the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes. Second, building on previous work by Shaun Gallagher, we propose a modified ‘pattern-theory of self’, which provides a richer picture of the possible consequences of DBS treatment.
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  38. Anika Fiebich (forthcoming). Narratives, Culture, and Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false belief tasks. Methodologically, I (...)
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  39. Duilio Garofoli (forthcoming). Do Early Body Ornaments Prove Cognitive Modernity? A Critical Analysis From Situated Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The documented appearance of body ornaments in the archaeological record of early anatomically modern human and late Neanderthal populations has been claimed to be proof of symbolism and cognitive modernity. Recently, Henshilwood and Dubreuil (Current Anthropology 52:361–400, 2011) have supported this stance by arguing that the use of beads and body painting implies the presence of properties typical of modern cognition: high-level theory of mind and awareness of abstract social standards. In this paper I shall disagree with this position. For (...)
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  40. Joseph A. Hedger (forthcoming). Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained (...)
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  41. Simon Høffding (forthcoming). A Musical Exploration of Consciousness: Book Review of Clarke & Clarke (Eds)(2011) Music and Consciousness. Philosophical, Psychological, and Cultural Perspectiv Es. Oxford Univ Ersity Press. ISBN 978-0-19-955379-2. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
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  42. Hilla Jacobson (forthcoming). Phenomenal Consciousness, Representational Content and Cognitive Access: A Missing Link Between Two Debates. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    Two debates loom large in current discussions on phenomenal consciousness. One debate concerns the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. Representationalism affirms, whereas “content separatism” denies, that phenomenal character is exhausted by representational content. Another debate concerns the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. “Access separatism” affirms, whereas, e.g., the global workspace model denies, that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not cognitively accessed. I will argue that the two separatist views are related. Access separatism supports content (...)
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  43. J. A. Judge (forthcoming). Jonathan Berger and Gabe Turow , Music, Science, and the Rhythmic Brain: Cultural and Clinical Implications. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
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  44. Marianne E. Klinke (forthcoming). Kristin Zeiler and Lisa Folmarson Käll, Editors. Feminist Phenomenology and Medicine. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
    In Feminist Phenomenology and Medicine, the editors have assembled a collection of papers on important topics that should be addressed in the modern phenomenology of medicine - topics which do not exclusively focus on illness, disability, bodily deterioration or pathologies, as seen for instance in prior work of the philosophers S Kay Toombs, Frederik Svenaeus, and Havi Carel. The contributors met at a congress on feminist phenomenology and medicine in Sweden in 2011, and come from a variety of relevant disciplines (...)
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  45. Victor Loughlin (forthcoming). Zdravko Radman , The Hand: An Organ of the Mind, What the Manual Tells the Mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
    Hands undoubtedly matter. Few, I suspect, would disagree. Yet The Hand, an Organ of the Mind uses this commonplace to dispel what is termed the “intellectualist illusion” , the illusion that the things we do with our hands are always and everywhere guided by an in-the-head centralised planner. Radman’s spirited collection of essays makes the point that we are not the sort of “centralised knowers” that the history of cognitive science might have us believe. Rather the manual is primary: it (...)
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  46. Michelle Maiese (forthcoming). Thought Insertion as a Disownership Symptom. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    Stephens and Graham (2000) maintain that in cases of thought insertion, the sense of ownership is preserved, but there is a defect in the sense of agency (i.e. the sense that one is the author or initiator of the thought). However, these theorists overlook the possibility that subjectivity might be preserved despite a defect in the sense of ownership. The claim that schizophrenia centers upon a loss of a sense of ownership is supported by an examination of some of the (...)
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  47. Michelle Maiese (forthcoming). Giovanna Colombetti, The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind, MIT Press, 2013, 288pp, Hardcover, $40.00, ISBN: 9780262019958. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-6.
    The Feeling Body applies several ideas from the enactive approach to the field of affective science, with the aim of both developing enactivism as well as reconceptualizing various affective phenomena. The book is organized into six chapters that examine primordial affectivity (chapter 1), the nature of emotional episodes and moods (chapters 2 and 3), enactive appraisal (chapter 4), the bodily feelings associated with emotional experience (chapter 5), affective neuro-physio-phenomenology (chapter 6), and the affective dimension of intersubjectivity (chapter 7). Giovanna Colombetti’s (...)
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  48. Francesco Marchi & Albert Newen (forthcoming). The Cognitive Foundations of Visual Consciousness: Why Should We Favour a Processing Approach? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness.. Our aim, in this paper, is (...)
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  49. Hannes Rakoczy (forthcoming). Comparative Metaphysics: The Development of Representing Natural and Normative Regularities in Human and Non-Human Primates. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    How do human children come up to carve up and think of the world around them in its most general and abstract structure? And to which degree are these general forms of viewing the world shared by other animals, notably by non-human primates? In response to these questions of what could be called comparative metaphysics, this paper discusses new evidence from developmental and comparative research to argue for the following picture: human children and non-human primates share a basic framework of (...)
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  50. Mattia Riccardi (forthcoming). Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-12.
    Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and (...)
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  51. Philippe Rochat (forthcoming). Self-Conscious Roots of Human Normativity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-13.
    What are the roots of human normativity and when do children begin to behave according to standards and norms? Empirical observations demonstrate that we are born with built-in orientation toward what is predictable and of the same - henceforth what deviates from it -, what is the norm or the standard in the generic sense of the word. However, what develop in humans is self-consciousness, transforming norms from “should” to “ought” and making human normativity profoundly different from any other forms (...)
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  52. Zuzanna Rucińska (forthcoming). What Guides Pretence? Towards the Interactive and the Narrative Approaches. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    This paper will explore one aspect of the relationship between pretence and narratives. I look at proposals about how scripts play guiding roles in our pretend play practices. I then examine the views that mental representations are needed to guide pretend play, reviewing two importantly different pictures of mental guiders: the Propositional Account and the Model Account. Both accounts are individualistic and internalistic; the former makes use of language-like representations, the latter makes use of models, maps and images. The paper (...)
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  53. Anthony Rudd (forthcoming). “Strong” Narrativity—a Response to Hutto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
    This paper responds to Dan Hutto’s paper, ‘Narrative Self-Shaping: a Modest Proposal’. Hutto there attacks the “strong” narrativism defended in my recent book, ‘Self, Value and Narrative’ and in recent work by Marya Schechtman. I rebut Hutto’s argument that non-narrative forms of evaluative self-shaping can plausibly be conceived, and defend the notion of implicit narrative against his criticisms. I conclude by briefly indicating some difficulties that arise for the “modest” form of narrativism that Hutto defends.
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  54. Fredrik Svenaeus (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Empathy: A Steinian Emotional Account. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her (...)
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  55. C. Jason Throop & Alessandro Duranti (forthcoming). Attention, Ritual Glitches, and Attentional Pull: The President and the Queen. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
    This article proposes an analysis of a ritual glitch and resulting “misfire” from the standpoint of a phenomenologically informed anthropology of human interaction. Through articulating a synthesis of some of Husserl‘s insights on attention and affection with concepts and methods developed by anthropologists and other students of human interaction, a case is made for the importance of understanding the social organization of attention in ritual encounters. An analysis of a failed toast during President Obama’s 2011 State Visit to the United (...)
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  56. Richard Tieszen (forthcoming). Eidetic Results in Transcendental Phenomenology: Against Naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-27.
    In this paper I contrast Husserlian transcendental eidetic phenomenology with some other views of what phenomenology is supposed to be and argue that, as eidetic, it does not admit of being ‘naturalized’ in accordance with standard accounts of naturalization. The paper indicates what some of the eidetic results in phenomenology are and it links these to the employment of reason in philosophical investigation, as distinct from introspection, emotion or empirical observation. Eidetic phenomenology, unlike cognitive science, should issue in a ‘logic’ (...)
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  57. John Toner, Barbara Gail Montero & Aidan Moran (forthcoming). Considering the Role of Cognitive Control in Expert Performance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ influential phenomenological analysis of skill acquisition proposes that expert performance is guided by non-cognitive responses which are fast, effortless and apparently intuitive in nature. Although this model has been criticised for over-emphasising the role that intuition plays in facilitating skilled performance, it does recognise that on occasions a form of ‘detached deliberative rationality’ may be used by experts to improve their performance. However, Dreyfus and Dreyfus see no role for calculative problem solving or deliberation when performance is (...)
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  58. Zeno Van Duppen (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Hypo- and Hyperreality in Psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...)
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  59. J. H. Van Hateren (forthcoming). The Origin of Agency, Consciousness, and Free Will. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Living organisms appear to have agency, the ability to act freely, and humans appear to have free will, the ability to rationally decide what to do. However, it is not clear how such properties can be produced by naturalistic processes, and there are indeed neuroscientific measurements that cast doubt on the existence of free will. Here I present a naturalistic theory of agency, consciousness, and free will. Elementary forms of agency evolved very early in the evolution of life, utilizing an (...)
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  60. Corijn van Mazijk (forthcoming). Walter Hopp, Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
    Perception and KnowledgeUnless otherwise noted, all references are to this book is a book that sets out to enrich the vast field of contemporary debates about the justificatory relation between perception and thought with some of the goods phenomenology has to offer. Many major figures of Modern philosophy, such as Locke, Kant and Husserl regarded the nature of this relation as one of the greatest mysteries in philosophy. Its complexity results from the way it touches upon some of the most (...)
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  61. Veronica Vasterling (forthcoming). Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Account of Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Hermeneutic phenomenology is absent in 4 EAC literature . The aim of this article is to show that hermeneutic phenomenology as elaborated in the work of Heidegger is relevant to 4 EAC research. In the first part of the article I describe the hermeneutic turn Heidegger performs in tandem with his ontological turn of transcendental phenomenology, and the hermeneutic account of cognition resulting from it. I explicate the main thesis of the hermeneutic account, namely that cognition is interaction with the (...)
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  62. Neralie Wise (forthcoming). The Capgras Delusion: An Integrated Approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    Delusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an (...)
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