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Forthcoming articles
  1. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience (OBE) may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case is (...)
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  2. Matteo Colombo (forthcoming). Explaining Social Norm Compliance. A Plea for Neural Representations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often (...)
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  3. Jason Costanzo (forthcoming). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  4. Jan Degenaar (forthcoming). Through the Inverting Glass: First-Person Observations on Spatial Vision and Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Experience with inverting glasses reveals key factors of spatial vision. Interpretations of the literature based on the metaphor of a “visual image” have raised the question whether visual experience with inverting glasses remains inverted or whether it may turn back to normal after adaptation to the glasses. Here, I report on my experience with left/right inverting glasses and argue that a more fine-grained sensorimotor analysis can resolve the issue. Crucially, inverting glasses introduce a conflict at the very heart of spatial (...)
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  5. Mirko Farina (forthcoming). Beyond the Brain - How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences.
    Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds is an eye-opening and thought- provoking book that sets out a much-needed contribution to the study of the relationship between animals, cognition and the environment. The volume provides remarkable new insights into how to understand animal (including human) behavior, raises interesting questions about the role of environmental affordances in the emergence of complex cognitive processes and provides the reader with a refreshing break from the wearisome excess of brain-centric (...)
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  6. Victor Loughlin (forthcoming). Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: FromExtended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. MIT Press,Bradford Books, 2010, 249 Pages, ISBN 978-0-262-01455-7, £20.24. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Andy Clark once remarked that we make the world smart so we don’t have to be (Clark, 1997). What he meant was that human beings (along with many other animals) alter and transform their environments in order to accomplish certain tasks that would prove difficult (or indeed impossible) without such transformations. This remarkable insight goes a long way towards explaining many aspects of human culture, ranging from linguistic notational systems to how we structure our cities. It also provides the basis (...)
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  7. Patrick Stokes (forthcoming). Crossing the Bridge: The First-Person and Time. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the (...)
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  8. Silvano Zipoli Caiani (forthcoming). Extending the Notion of Affordance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical research, the (...)
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  9. Matteo Colombo (forthcoming). Neural Representationalism, the Hard Problem of Content and Vitiated Verdicts. A Reply to Hutto & Myin (2013). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks of (...)
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  10. Steven DeLay (forthcoming). The Toiling Lily: Narrative Life, Responsibility, and the Ontological Ground of Self-Deception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture (...)
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  11. Daniel C. Dennett (forthcoming). Artifactual Selves: A Response to Lynne Rudder Baker. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-4.
    Baker’s critique of my view of the self as a fiction captures some of its points well but misses the possibility of a theorist’s fiction, like the Equator or a center of gravity, which is not an illusion, but rather an abstraction, like dollars, poems, and software—made of no material but dependent on material vehicles. It is an artifact of our everyday effort to make sense of our own (and others’) complex activities by postulating a single central source of meaning, (...)
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  12. Marco Fenici (forthcoming). A Simple Explanation of Apparent Early Mindreading: Infants' Sensitivity to Goals and Gaze Direction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...)
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  13. Anthony Hatzimoysis (forthcoming). Passive Fear. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-11.
    “Passive fear” denotes a certain type of response to a perceived threat; what is distinctive about the state of passive fear is that its behavioral outlook appears to qualify the emotional experience. I distinguish between two cases of passive fear: one is that of freezing in fear; the other is that of fear-involved tonic immobility. I reconstruct the explanatory strategy that is commonly employed in the field of emotion science, and argue that it leaves certain questions about the nature of (...)
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  14. Daniel D. Hutto (forthcoming). Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Decoupling a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) from Strong Narrativism this paper attempts to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that the basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment—the (...)
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  15. A. Tanesini (forthcoming). Spatial Attention and Perception: Seeing Without Paint. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Covert spatial attention alters the way things look. There is strong empirical evidence showing that objects situated at attended locations are described as appearing bigger, closer, if striped, stripier than qualitatively indiscernible counterparts whose locations are unattended. These results cannot be easily explained in terms of which properties of objects are perceived. Nor do they appear to be cases of visual illusions. Ned Block has argued that these results are best accounted for by invoking what he calls ‘mental paint’. In (...)
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  16. Ramsey Affifi (forthcoming). Generativity in Biology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    The behavior of an organism, according to Merleau-Ponty, lays out a milieu through which significant phenomena of varying degrees of optimality elicit adjustment. This leads to the dialectical co-emergence of milieu and aptitude that is both the product and the condition of life. What is present as a norm soliciting optimization is species-specific, but it also depends on the needs of the organism and its prior experience. Although a rich entry point into biological phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty’s work does not adequately describe (...)
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  17. Bernardo Ainbinder (forthcoming). John Haugeland: Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger. Edited by Joseph Rouse. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
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  18. Adrian Alsmith (forthcoming). Eric Schwitzgebel: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
  19. Ignacio Ávila (forthcoming). Perceiving the Intrinsic Properties of Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    In this paper, I discuss Noë’s enactive account of our perceptual encounter with the intrinsic properties of the surrounding objects. First, I argue that this view falls into a dilemma in which either we are left without a satisfactory explanation of this encounter or, in order to keep Noë’s view, we must abandon our ordinary intuitions about the ontological status of the intrinsic properties of objects. Then, I show that, strikingly, there is a suggestive unofficial strand running in Noë that (...)
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  20. Ciano Aydin (forthcoming). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the 'Inside–Outside' Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (...)
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  21. Lynne Rudder Baker (forthcoming). Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers (...)
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  22. Johan Blomberg & Jordan Zlatev (forthcoming). Actual and Non-Actual Motion: Why Experientialist Semantics Needs Phenomenology (and Vice Versa). [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological reanalysis (...)
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  23. Peer F. Bundgaard (forthcoming). Feeling, Meaning, and Intentionality—a Critique of the Neuroaesthetics of Beauty. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    This article addresses the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. It first, critically, considers one of the most influential approaches to the psychophysics of aesthetic perception, viz. neuroaesthetics. Hereafter, it outlines constitutive tenets of aesthetic perception in terms of a particular intentional relation to the object. The argument comes in three steps. First, I show the inadequacies of the neuroaesthetics of beauty in general and Semir Zeki’s and V.J. Ramachandran’s versions of it in particular. The neuroaesthetics of beauty falls short, because it (...)
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  24. Andrew Buskell (forthcoming). Joseph K. Schear (Ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
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  25. Silvano Zipoli Caiani (forthcoming). Extending the Notion of Affordance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
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  26. Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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  27. Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Time-Series of Ephemeral Impressions: The Abhidharma-Buddhist View of Conscious Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    In the absence of continuing selves or persons, Buddhist philosophers are under pressure to provide a systematic account of phenomenological and other features of conscious experience. Any such Buddhist account of experience, however, faces further problems because of another cardinal tenet of Buddhist revisionary metaphysics: the doctrine of impermanence, which during the Abhidharma period is transformed into the doctrine of momentariness. Setting aside the problems that plague the Buddhist Abhidharma theory of experience because of lack of persons, I shall focus (...)
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  28. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (forthcoming). Three Misconceptions Concerning Strong Embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended (...)
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  29. Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki: Mindshaping. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
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  30. Duilio Garofoli (forthcoming). Do Early Body Ornaments Prove Cognitive Modernity? A Critical Analysis From Situated Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The documented appearance of body ornaments in the archaeological record of early anatomically modern human and late Neanderthal populations has been claimed to be proof of symbolism and cognitive modernity. Recently, Henshilwood and Dubreuil (Current Anthropology 52:361–400, 2011) have supported this stance by arguing that the use of beads and body painting implies the presence of properties typical of modern cognition: high-level theory of mind and awareness of abstract social standards. In this paper I shall disagree with this position. For (...)
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  31. Simon Høffding (forthcoming). A Musical Exploration of Consciousness: Book Review of Clarke & Clarke (Eds)(2011) Music and Consciousness. Philosophical, Psychological, and Cultural Perspectiv Es. Oxford Univ Ersity Press. ISBN 978-0-19-955379-2. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
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  32. Gabrielle Benette Jackson (forthcoming). Skillful Action in Peripersonal Space. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    In this article, I link the empirical hypothesis that neural representations of sensory stimulation near the body involve a unique motor component to the idea that the perceptual field is structured by skillful bodily activity. The neurophenomenological view that emerges is illuminating in its own right, though it may also have practical consequences. I argue that recent experiments attempting to alter the scope of these near space sensorimotor representations are actually equivocal in what they show. I propose resolving this ambiguity (...)
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  33. Kristjan Laasik (forthcoming). Constitutive Strata and the Dorsal Stream. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    In his paper, “The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,” Michael Madary argues that “dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon” (Madary 2011, p. 424). Madary regards himself as thereby providing a theoretical framework “sensitive to basic Husserlian phenomenology” (Madary 2011). In particular, Madary draws connections between perceptual anticipations and the experience of the indeterminate spatial margins, on the one hand, and the Husserlian spatiotemporal visual (...)
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  34. Matthew MacKenzie (forthcoming). Buddhism Naturalized? Review of Owen Flanagan, the Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-4.
  35. Gareth S. Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen, Matthew Hotopf & Wayne Martin (forthcoming). Temporal Inabilities and Decision-Making Capacity in Depression. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    We report on an interview-based study of decision-making capacity in two classes of patients suffering from depression. Developing a method of second-person hermeneutic phenomenology, we articulate the distinctive combination of temporal agility and temporal inability characteristic of the experience of severely depressed patients. We argue that a cluster of decision-specific temporal abilities is a critical element of decision-making capacity, and we show that loss of these abilities is a risk factor distinguishing severely depressed patients from mildly/moderately depressed patients. We explore (...)
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  36. Anthony Rudd (forthcoming). “Strong” Narrativity—a Response to Hutto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
    This paper responds to Dan Hutto’s paper, ‘Narrative Self-Shaping: a Modest Proposal’. Hutto there attacks the “strong” narrativism defended in my recent book, ‘Self, Value and Narrative’ and in recent work by Marya Schechtman. I rebut Hutto’s argument that non-narrative forms of evaluative self-shaping can plausibly be conceived, and defend the notion of implicit narrative against his criticisms. I conclude by briefly indicating some difficulties that arise for the “modest” form of narrativism that Hutto defends.
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  37. Michela Summa (forthcoming). The Disoriented Self. Layers and Dynamics of Self-Experience in Dementia and Schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    This paper explores the question concerning the relationship between basic and higher layers of experience and self-experience. The latter distinction implicitly presupposes the idea of a univocal foundation. After explaining the formal ontological law of foundation, an attempt is made to clarify how the idea of foundation may be suitable to understand the relationship among moments, or layers, of self-experience. To this aim, the phenomenological descriptions of self- and world-experience in dementia and schizophrenia are compared. The comparison between these two, (...)
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  38. J. Jeremy Wisnewski (forthcoming). The Case for Moral Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    In this paper, I defend the view that we can literally perceive the morally right and wrong, or something near enough. In defending this claim, I will try to meet three primary objectives: (1) to clarify how an investigation into moral phenomenology should proceed, (2) to respond to a number of misconceptions and objections that are most frequently raised against the very idea of moral perception, and (3) to provide a model for how some moral perception can be seen as (...)
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  39. Karim Zahidi (forthcoming). Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that (...)
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