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Forthcoming articles
  1. John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Understanding 'Practical Knowledge'. Philosophers' Imprint.
    The concept of practical knowledge is central to G.E.M. Anscombe's argument in Intention, yet its meaning is little understood. There are several reasons for this, including a lack of attention to Anscombe's ancient and medieval sources for the concept, and an emphasis on the (supposedly) more straightforward concept of knowledge "without observation" in the interpretation of Anscombe's position. This paper remedies the situation, first by appealing to the writings of Thomas Aquinas to develop an account of practical knowledge as a (...)
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  2. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Who's Afraid of Double Affection? Philosophers' Imprint.
    There is substantial textual evidence that Kant held the doctrine of double affection: subjects are causally affected both by things in themselves and by appearances. However, Kant commentators have been loath to attribute this view to him, for the doctrine of double affection is widely thought to face insuperable problems. I begin by explaining what I take to be the most serious problem faced by the doctrine of double affection: appearances cannot cause the very experience in virtue of which they (...)
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  3. Joshua Wilburn (forthcoming). Courage and the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato's Republic. Philosophers' Imprint.
    In this paper I argue that the Republic’s account of courage remains committed to the view that knowledge, or even true belief, about how it is best to act is sufficient for correct behavior. I thus defend continuity between the Republic’s account of courage and that found in the Protagoras. I suggest that in the Republic Plato attempts to identify a psychic source of stability for belief, the spirited part of the soul, whose function in the virtue of courage is (...)
     
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