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  1.  22
    Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott‐Kakures (2015). How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.
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  2. Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton (2015). Defeatism Defeated. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
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  3.  5
    Jennifer Carr (2015). Chancy Accuracy and Imprecise Credence. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.
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  4.  11
    Juan Comesaña (2015). Falsehood and Entailment. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):82-94.
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  5.  31
    Julien Dutant (2015). The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
  6.  7
    Kenny Easwaran (2015). Rebutting and Undercutting in Mathematics. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):146-162.
    In my () I argued that a central component of mathematical practice is that published proofs must be “transferable” — that is, they must be such that the author's reasons for believing the conclusion are shared directly with the reader, rather than requiring the reader to essentially rely on testimony. The goal of this paper is to explain this requirement of transferability in terms of a more general norm on defeat in mathematical reasoning that I will call “convertibility”. I begin (...)
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  7.  20
    Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & John Hawthorne (2015). Cretan Deductions. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):163-178.
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  8.  9
    Daniel Greco (2015). How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
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  9.  12
    Rebecca Kukla (2015). Delimiting the Proper Scope of Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):202-216.
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  10. Clayton Littlejohn (2015). Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.
    This is a critical discussion of the accuracy-first approach to epistemic norms. If you think of accuracy (gradational or categorical) as the fundamental epistemic good and think of epistemic goods as things that call for promotion, you might think that we should use broadly consequentialist reasoning to determine which norms govern partial and full belief. After presenting consequentialist arguments for probabilism and the normative Lockean view, I shall argue that the consequentialist framework isn't nearly as promising as it might first (...)
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  11.  16
    Ofra Magidor (2015). The Myth of the De Se. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.
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  12.  8
    Ram Neta (2015). Coherence and Deontology. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):284-304.
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  13.  11
    Duncan Pritchard (2015). Epistemic Dependence. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):305-324.
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  14.  17
    Amia Srinivasan (2015). The Archimedean Urge. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):325-362.
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  15. Margot Strohminger (2015). Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):363-75.
    It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge of nonactual (metaphysical) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to know that a proposition p is necessary or that p is possible (if p is false) by sense perception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception is not so limited. It argues that we can know lots of modal facts by perception. While the most straightforward examples concern possibility and contingency, others concern necessity and (...)
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