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Forthcoming articles
  1.  66
    James Andow (forthcoming). Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  2.  82
    James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (in press) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance, and are rather willing to attribute free will no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper we first argue that Feltz (...)
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  3. Matthew Braddock (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking: Can Moral Realists Explain the Reliability of Our Moral Judgments? Philosophical Psychology.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments, notably Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma (2006), allege that moral realists have some explaining to do: explain the reliability of our moral judgments, given their evolutionary sources. David Copp (2008) and David Enoch (2010) take up the challenge. We argue on empirical grounds that realists have not met the challenge and moreover cannot do so. First, we sketch Street’s Darwinian Dilemma and characterize its explanatory challenge. Second, we characterize the explanations of Copp and Enoch, which were designed to (...)
     
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  4. Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology? Philosophical Psychology.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...)
     
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  5. Michael J. Deem & Grant Ramsey (forthcoming). Guilt by Association? Philosophical Psychology.
  6.  13
    Mathieu Doucet (forthcoming). What is the Link Between Regret and Weakness of Will? Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    This paper argues (a) that most contemporary accounts of weakness of will either implicitly or explicitly assume that regret is a typical or even necessary element of standard cases of weakness of will and (b) that this assumption is mistaken. I draw on empirical and philosophical work on self-assessment to show that regret need not accompany typical weak-willed behavior, and that we should therefore revise the dominant account of the difference between weakness of will and (mere) changes of mind.
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  7. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  8. Stan Klein (forthcoming). Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism. Philosophical Psychology.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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  9.  42
    Shen-yi Liao (forthcoming). Are Philosophers Good Intuition Predictors? Philosophical Psychology.
    Some philosophers have criticized experimental philosophy for being superfluous. Jackson (1998) implies that experimental philosophy studies are unnecessary. More recently, Dunaway and colleagues (2013) empirically demonstrates that experimental studies do not deliver surprising results, which is a pro tanto reason for foregoing conducting such studies. -/- This paper gives theoretical and empirical considerations against the superfluity criticism. The questions concerning the surprisingness of experimental philosophy studies have not been properly disambiguated, and their metaphilosophical significance have not been properly assessed. Once (...)
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  10.  18
    Christopher Mole & Jiaying Zhao (forthcoming). Vision and Abstraction: An Empirical Refutation of Nico Orlandi’s Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This (...)
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  11.  18
    Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either to reduce (...)
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  12. Sara Protasi (forthcoming). Varieties of Envy. Philosophical Psychology.
    In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The (...)
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  13.  58
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting With Professed Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of (...)
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  14.  3
    Patrick Seniuk (forthcoming). Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  15.  87
    Ayoob Shahmoradi (forthcoming). Why Do We Need Perceptual Content? Philosophical Psychology.
    Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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  16.  34
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). "Conversation, Responsibility, and Autism Spectrum Disorder". Philosophical Psychology.
  17.  78
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). "Autism, Episodic Memory, and Moral Exemplars". Philosophical Psychology.
  18. Neil Van Leeuwen (forthcoming). Beyond Fakers and Fanatics: A Reply to Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne. Philosophical Psychology.
    Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne have written a piece, forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology, called “Disbelief in Belief,” in which they criticize my recent paper “Religious credence is not factual belief” (2014, Cognition 133). Here I respond to their criticisms, the thrust of which is that we shouldn’t distinguish religious credence from factual belief, contrary to what I say. I respond that their picture of religious psychology undermines our ability to distinguish common religious people from fanatics. My response will appear in (...)
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  19. David Barrett & Eric Funkhouser (forthcoming). Robust, Unconscious Self-Deception: Strategic and Flexible. Philosophical Psychology.
    In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of (...)
     
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  20. Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti (forthcoming). Instrumental Rationality in Psychopathy: Implications From Learning Tasks. Philosophical Psychology.
    The issue whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions on moral psychology and in those concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability for transferring the motivation by means-ends reasoning. In fact, we defend the different claim that these experiments (...)
     
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  21.  3
    Mariela Aguilera (forthcoming). Cartographic Systems and Non-Linguistic Inference. Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
    It is often assumed that the capability to make inferences requires language. Against this assumption, I claim that inferential abilities do not necessarily require a language. On the contrary, certain cartographic systems could be used to explain some forms of inferences, and they are capable of warranting rational relations between contents they represent. By arguing that certain maps, as well as sentences, are adequate for inferential processes, I do not mean to neglect that there are important differences between maps and (...)
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  22. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  23.  2
    Darragh Byrne (forthcoming). Do Phenomenal Concepts Misrepresent? Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate (...)
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  24.  8
    Matteo Colombo (forthcoming). The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn’s Systematicity Challenge. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  25.  1
    Gregory Johnson (forthcoming). Methodological Functionalism and the Description of Natural Systems. Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
    The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of chemical and (...)
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  26.  4
    Max Jones (forthcoming). Number Concepts for the Concept Empiricist. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Dove and Machery both argue that recent findings about the nature of numerical representation present problems for Concept Empiricism. I shall argue that, whilst this evidence does challenge certain versions of CE, such as Prinz, it needn’t be seen as problematic to the general CE approach. Recent research can arguably be seen to support a CE account of number concepts. Neurological and behavioral evidence suggests that systems involved in the perception of numerical properties are also implicated in numerical cognition. Furthermore, (...)
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  27.  5
    Muhammad Ali Khalidi (forthcoming). Innateness as a Natural Cognitive Kind. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Innate cognitive capacities are widely posited in cognitive science, yet both philosophers and scientists have criticized the concept of innateness as being hopelessly confused. Despite a number of recent attempts to define or characterize innateness, critics have charged that it is associated with a diverse set of properties and encourages unwarranted inferences among properties that are frequently unrelated. This criticism can be countered by showing that the properties associated with innateness cluster together in reliable ways, at least in the context (...)
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  28.  1
    Brian Leahy (forthcoming). Simplicity and Elegance in Millikan’s Account of Productivity: Reply to Martinez. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    This paper responds to a problem, raised by Martinez, for Millikan’s explanation of the interpretability of novel signs in terms of mapping functions. I argue that Martinez’s critique is a logically weakened version of Kripke’s skeptical argument about rule following. Responding to Martinez requires two things. First, we must correctly understand the role of simplicity and elegance in choosing the correct mapping function for a signaling system. Second, we need to understand that mapping functions are descriptions of the features that (...)
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  29.  16
    John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
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  30. Vishnu Sridharan (forthcoming). From Conscious Experience to a Conscious Self. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory, which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter (...)
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  31.  10
    P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
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