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Forthcoming articles
  1. Joe Cunningham (forthcoming). Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
    This review provides an overview of Eva Schmidt's impressively thorough and detailed book on the Conceptualist/Nonconceptualist debate in the philosophy of perception, and briefly sketches two objections to Schmidt. First, I suggest that a certain dilemma for the Conceptualist Schmidt raises in the context of her discussion of the fineness of grain argument is surmountable. Second, I question whether Schmidt's response to the epistemological motivation for Conceptualism is sound.
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  2.  9
    Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Gualtiero Piccinini: Physical Computation. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
    Physical Computation is the summation of Piccinini’s work on computation and mechanistic explanation over the past decade. It draws together material from papers published during that time, but also provides additional clarifications and restructuring that make this the definitive presentation of his mechanistic account of physical computation. This review will first give a brief summary of the account that Piccinini defends, followed by a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book, before finally discussing one aspect of the account in more critical detail.
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  3. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  4.  4
    Rob Goldstone & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). The Multiple, Interacting Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) Perspective on Group Cognition. Philosophical Psychology.
    In approaching the question of whether groups of people can have cognitive capacities that are fundamentally different than the cognitive capacities of the individuals within the group, we lay out a Multiple, Interactive Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) framework. The goal of MILCS is to explain the kinds of cognitive processes typically studied by cognitive scientists, such as perception, attention, memory, categorization, decision making, problem solving, and judgment. Rather than focusing on high-level constructs such as modules in an information processing (...)
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  5.  9
    Brian Leahy (forthcoming). Simplicity and Elegance in Millikan’s Account of Productivity: Reply to Martinez. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    This paper responds to a problem, raised by Martinez, for Millikan’s explanation of the interpretability of novel signs in terms of mapping functions. I argue that Martinez’s critique is a logically weakened version of Kripke’s skeptical argument about rule following. Responding to Martinez requires two things. First, we must correctly understand the role of simplicity and elegance in choosing the correct mapping function for a signaling system. Second, we need to understand that mapping functions are descriptions of the features that (...)
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  6. Shen-yi Liao (forthcoming). Are Philosophers Good Intuition Predictors? Philosophical Psychology:1-11.
    Some philosophers have criticized experimental philosophy for being superfluous. Jackson (1998) implies that experimental philosophy studies are unnecessary. More recently, Dunaway and colleagues (2013) empirically demonstrates that experimental studies do not deliver surprising results, which is a pro tanto reason for foregoing conducting such studies. -/- This paper gives theoretical and empirical considerations against the superfluity criticism. The questions concerning the surprisingness of experimental philosophy studies have not been properly disambiguated, and their metaphilosophical significance have not been properly assessed. Once (...)
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  7.  23
    Kevin Lynch (forthcoming). The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, by Max Deutsch (MIT Press, 2015). [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
  8.  31
    Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either to reduce (...)
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  9.  5
    Bradley Richards (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability, Context, and Aesthetics: Nanay and Danto on the Gallery of Indiscernibles. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
    Nanay has recently argued, on the basis of the cognitive penetrability of experience, that the attribution of aesthetically relevant properties supervenes on perceptual experience. I argue that this claim is false as stated and cannot be salvaged. I provide a series of thought experiments as counterexamples, showing that the title of an artwork can influence its ARPs, its meaning or value, and the accurate attributions of ARPs while the character of the perceptual experience of the piece remains constant. I introduce (...)
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  10.  21
    Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). How We Think and Act Together. Philosophical Psychology.
    Individualistic accounts of social cognition primarily focus on individual subjects’ mental representations in thinking about and interacting with other people. These accounts implicitly sterilize the environments in which we think and act with other people. They presuppose that situational contexts are neutral and do not significantly influence social cognition and interaction. In contrast, collectivist accounts focus on these environments, sometimes to the exclusion of an individual subject’s mental representations. Although I reject the most radical collectivist claims, individualistic accounts can benefit (...)
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  11. Nathan Stout (forthcoming). "Conversation, Responsibility, and Autism Spectrum Disorder". Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays out (...)
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  12.  7
    Margot Wielgus (forthcoming). Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
  13.  1
    James Andow (forthcoming). Qualitative Tools and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, and freedom. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide (...)
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  14. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  15.  3
    Tommy C. Blanchard (forthcoming). Behavioral Methods in Consciousness Research. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  16.  3
    Ronald A. Goodrich (forthcoming). The Cambridge Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  17.  5
    Max Jones (forthcoming). After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  18.  4
    Miriam Kyselo (forthcoming). The Minimal Self Needs a Social Update. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
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  19.  6
    Jonny Lee (forthcoming). The Innocent Eye: Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  20. Piotr Tomasz Makowski (forthcoming). Intention Inertia and the Plasticity of Planning. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
    In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention. Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the (...)
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  21.  16
    William H. B. McAuliffe (forthcoming). What’s Wrong with Morality? Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  22.  20
    John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
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  23.  1
    Miranda Occhionero & Piercarla Cicogna (forthcoming). Phenomenal Consciousness in Dreams and in Mind Wandering. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during (...)
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  24.  3
    Jacek Olender (forthcoming). Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  25.  5
    Jack Shardlow (forthcoming). Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  26.  3
    Andrew Sims (forthcoming). A Problem of Scope for the Free Energy Principle as a Theory of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Those who endorse the free energy principle as a theory of cognition are committed to three propositions that are jointly incompatible but which will cohere if one of them is denied. The first of these is that the free energy principle gives us a self-sufficient explanation of what all cognitive systems consist in: a specific computational architecture. The second is that all adaptive behavior is driven by the free energy principle and the process of model-based inference it entails. The third (...)
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  27.  10
    Ryan Smith (forthcoming). The Relationship Between Consciousness, Understanding, and Rationality. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    The purpose of the present article is to explore the relationship between consciousness and understanding. To do so, I first briefly review recent work on the nature of both understanding and consciousness within philosophy and psychology. Building off of this work, I then defend the thesis that if one is conscious of a given content then one also understands that content. I argue that this conclusion can be drawn from the fact that understanding is associated with rational intention formation and (...)
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  28.  3
    Matthew Smithdeal (forthcoming). Belief in Free Will as an Adaptive, Ungrounded Belief. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
    False beliefs and delusions are usually regarded negatively, especially in psychology and evolutionary biology. Recently, McKay and Dennett have argued that there are ungrounded beliefs which confer benefits on individuals even if they are false. I propose to expand this class of beliefs to include the belief that one has free will, and I will defend the claim that this belief is advantageous, even if it is false. One derives one’s belief in control from one’s experience of control, which is (...)
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  29.  2
    Ludger van Dijk (forthcoming). Laying Down a Path in Talking. Philosophical Psychology:1-11.
    This paper aims to provide a starting point for a non-representational approach to language. It will do so by undoing some of the reifying tendencies that are at the heart of the ontology of scientific psychology. Although non-representational theories are beginning to emerge, they remain committed to giving explanations in terms of ontological structures that are independent of human activity. If they maintain this commitment it is unlikely that they will displace representationalism in domains such as language. By following some (...)
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  30.  20
    P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
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  31.  4
    Dan Zahavi (forthcoming). Openness Versus Interdependence: A Reply to Kyselo. Philosophical Psychology:1-2.
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