Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  34
    James Andow (forthcoming). Qualitative Tools & Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology.
    Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, freedom, etc. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide (...)
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  2. James Andow (forthcoming). Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  3. James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (in press) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance, and are rather willing to attribute free will no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper we first argue that Feltz (...)
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  4.  9
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent’s responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada, however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent’s “deep self,” thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada’s general methodological approach but presents data that strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, most (...)
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  5.  13
    Matthew Braddock (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking: Can Moral Realists Explain the Reliability of Our Moral Judgments? Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments, notably Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma (2006), allege that moral realists need to explain the reliability of our moral judgments, given their evolutionary sources. David Copp (2008) and David Enoch (2010) take up the challenge. I argue on empirical grounds that realists have not met the challenge and moreover cannot do so. The outcome is that there are empirically-motivated reasons for thinking moral realists cannot explain moral reliability, given our current empirical understanding.
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  6.  4
    Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology? Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to (...)
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  7.  1
    Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Gualtiero Piccinini: Physical Computation. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
    Physical Computation is the summation of Piccinini’s work on computation and mechanistic explanation over the past decade. It draws together material from papers published during that time, but also provides additional clarifications and restructuring that make this the definitive presentation of his mechanistic account of physical computation. This review will first give a brief summary of the account that Piccinini defends, followed by a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book, before finally discussing one aspect of the account in more critical detail.
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  8. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  9. Stan Klein (forthcoming). Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism. Philosophical Psychology.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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  10.  4
    Brian Leahy (forthcoming). Simplicity and Elegance in Millikan’s Account of Productivity: Reply to Martinez. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    This paper responds to a problem, raised by Martinez, for Millikan’s explanation of the interpretability of novel signs in terms of mapping functions. I argue that Martinez’s critique is a logically weakened version of Kripke’s skeptical argument about rule following. Responding to Martinez requires two things. First, we must correctly understand the role of simplicity and elegance in choosing the correct mapping function for a signaling system. Second, we need to understand that mapping functions are descriptions of the features that (...)
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  11.  95
    Shen-yi Liao (forthcoming). Are Philosophers Good Intuition Predictors? Philosophical Psychology.
    Some philosophers have criticized experimental philosophy for being superfluous. Jackson (1998) implies that experimental philosophy studies are unnecessary. More recently, Dunaway and colleagues (2013) empirically demonstrates that experimental studies do not deliver surprising results, which is a pro tanto reason for foregoing conducting such studies. -/- This paper gives theoretical and empirical considerations against the superfluity criticism. The questions concerning the surprisingness of experimental philosophy studies have not been properly disambiguated, and their metaphilosophical significance have not been properly assessed. Once (...)
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  12.  23
    Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either to reduce (...)
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  13. Sara Protasi (forthcoming). Varieties of Envy. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The (...)
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  14.  75
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting With Professed Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs (...)
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  15.  6
    Patrick Seniuk (forthcoming). Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  16.  61
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). "Conversation, Responsibility, and Autism Spectrum Disorder". Philosophical Psychology.
  17.  95
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). "Autism, Episodic Memory, and Moral Exemplars". Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    This paper presents a challenge for exemplar theories of moral concepts. Some have proposed that we acquire moral concepts by way of exemplars of actions that are prohibited as well as of actions that are required, and we classify newly encountered actions based on their similarity to these exemplars. Judgments of permissibility then follow from these exemplar-based classifications. However, if this were true, then we would expect that individuals who lacked, or were deficient in, the capacity to form or access (...)
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  18.  23
    David Barrett & Eric Funkhouser (forthcoming). Robust, Unconscious Self-Deception: Strategic and Flexible. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of (...)
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  19.  5
    Feraz Azhar (forthcoming). Polytopes as Vehicles of Informational Content in Feedforward Neural Networks. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Localizing content in neural networks provides a bridge to understanding the way in which the brain stores and processes information. In this paper, I propose the existence of polytopes in the state space of the hidden layer of feedforward neural networks as vehicles of content. I analyze these geometrical structures from an information-theoretic point of view, invoking mutual information to help define the content stored within them. I establish how this proposal addresses the problem of misclassification and provide a novel (...)
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  20. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  21. James R. Beebe & David Sackris (forthcoming). Moral Objectivism Across the Lifespan. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found (...)
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  22.  11
    Riana J. Betzler (forthcoming). Is Statistical Learning a Mechanism? Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Philosophers of science have offered several definitions of mechanism, most of which have biological or neuroscientific roots. In this paper, I consider whether these definitions apply equally well to cognitive science. I examine this question by looking at the case of statistical learning, which has been called a domain-general learning mechanism in the cognitive scientific literature. I argue that statistical learning does not constitute a mechanism in the philosophical sense of the term. This conclusion points to significant limitations in the (...)
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  23.  11
    Maarten Boudry & Jerry Coyne (forthcoming). Disbelief in Belief: On the Cognitive Status of Supernatural Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe”—in the ordinary sense of the word—what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van (...)
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  24.  9
    Maarten Boudry & Jerry Coyne (forthcoming). Fakers, Fanatics, and False Dilemmas: Reply to Van Leeuwen. Philosophical Psychology:1-6.
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  25.  4
    Christopher Burr (forthcoming). Unifying the Mind: Cognitive Representations as Graphical Models. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  26.  7
    Christopher Burr & Max Jones (forthcoming). The Body as Laboratory: Prediction-Error Minimization, Embodiment, and Representation. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    In his paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization, which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. (...)
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  27.  7
    Darragh Byrne (forthcoming). Do Phenomenal Concepts Misrepresent? Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate (...)
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  28.  20
    Tony Cheng (forthcoming). Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  29.  3
    Michael J. Deem & Grant Ramsey (forthcoming). Guilt by Association? Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
    Recent evolutionary perspectives on guilt tend to focus on how guilt functions as a means for the individual to self-regulate behavior and as a mechanism for reinforcing cooperative tendencies. While these accounts highlight important dimensions of guilt and provide important insights into its evolutionary emergence, they pay scant attention to the large empirical literature on its maladaptive effects on individuals. This paper considers the nature of guilt, explores its biological function, and provides an evolutionary perspective on whether it is an (...)
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  30.  2
    Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  31.  3
    James Elliott (forthcoming). Images. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  32.  3
    Silvia Felletti & Fabio Paglieri (forthcoming). The Illusionist and the Folk: On the Role of Conscious Planning in Intentionality Judgments. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Illusionism is a prominent hypothesis about action control, according to which acts that we consider voluntary are nevertheless caused by unconscious brain events, and thus our subjective experience of consciously willing them is ultimately illusory. Illusionism can be understood as either an ontological thesis or a phenomenological claim, but both versions are vulnerable to a line of attack based on the role of long-term planning in action control. According to this objection, the evidence upon which illusionism rests is confined to (...)
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  33.  4
    Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Brittany Nelson (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy Needs to Matter: Reply to Andow and Cova. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  34.  9
    Marcelo Fischborn (forthcoming). Libet-Style Experiments, Neuroscience, and Libertarian Free Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...)
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  35.  1
    Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti (forthcoming). Instrumental Rationality in Psychopathy: Implications From Learning Tasks. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions in moral psychology and in discussions concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability to transfer motivation by means-ends reasoning. We claim that these experiments appear to show that psychopaths in certain circumstances (...)
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  36.  6
    Stanley B. Klein (forthcoming). Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  37.  5
    Neil Levy (forthcoming). The Sweetness of Surrender: Glucose Enhances Self-Control by Signaling Environmental Richness. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    According to the ego-depletion account of loss of self-control, self-control is, or depends on, a depletable resource. Advocates of this account have argued that what is depleted is actually glucose. However, there is experimental evidence that indicates that glucose replenishment is not necessary for regaining self-control, as well as theoretical reasons for thinking that it is not depleted by exercises of self-control. I suggest that glucose restores self-control not because it is a resource on which it relies, but because it (...)
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  38.  6
    Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Response to Leahy. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  39.  17
    John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
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  40.  4
    Robert Noggle (forthcoming). Belief, Quasi-Belief, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Obsessive-compulsive disorder poses a puzzle about beliefs: Those with OCD experience anxiety and motivation suggesting that they believe something, even though they may profess not to believe that very thing. OCD also poses a puzzle about free will, since persons with OCD often describe their behavior as compelled, though it is unclear how it is compelled. This paper argues that at least some cases of OCD are best described as being driven by “quasi-beliefs” which have some, but not all, of (...)
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  41. Bradley Richards (forthcoming). Attention and Seeing Objects: The Identity-Crowding Debate. Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
    Can unattended objects by seen? Ned Block has claimed they can on the basis of “identity-crowding.” This paper summarizes the ensuing debate with particular emphasis on the role of unconscious perception. Although unconscious perception plays an important role, it cannot support conscious object-seeing in identity-crowding. Nevertheless, unconscious perception assists in making successful judgments about unseen objects. Further, compelling conceptual evidence against seeing unattended objects places the burden of proof on Block. I argue that countability is necessary for seeing objects and (...)
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  42.  8
    Rebecca Roache (forthcoming). Memory and Mineness in Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology:1-11.
    Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many (...)
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  43. Ayoob Shahmoradi (forthcoming). Why Do We Need Perceptual Content? Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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  44.  7
    Ryan Smith (forthcoming). The Relationship Between Consciousness, Understanding, and Rationality. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    The purpose of the present article is to explore the relationship between consciousness and understanding. To do so, I first briefly review recent work on the nature of both understanding and consciousness within philosophy and psychology. Building off of this work, I then defend the thesis that if one is conscious of a given content then one also understands that content. I argue that this conclusion can be drawn from the fact that understanding is associated with rational intention formation and (...)
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  45.  8
    James Tartaglia (forthcoming). Response to Darragh Byrne’s “Do Phenomenal Concepts Misrepresent?”. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
    I begin by summarizing my view of the progression that occurred from the 1950s to the 1990s on the topic of physicalism and, in terms of this, present an overview of the reconciliation I was attempting in “Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.” I then address Byrne’s two main arguments. In the case of the first, I show that his argument turns on a third-person conception of appearance which is not the one addressed in the debates in question, and argue that functionalism is (...)
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  46.  18
    P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
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  47.  1
    Benjamin D. Young (forthcoming). Smelling Matter. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    While the objects of olfaction are intuitively individuated by reference to the ordinary objects from which they arise, this intuition does not accurately capture the complex nature of smells. Smells are neither ordinary three-dimensional objects, nor Platonic vapors, nor odors. Rather, smells are the molecular structures of chemical compounds within odor plumes. Molecular Structure Theory is offered as an account of smells, which can explain the nature of the external object of olfactory perception, what we experience as olfactory objects, and (...)
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