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Forthcoming articles
  1. James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology.
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (in press) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance, and are rather willing to attribute free will no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper we first argue that Feltz (...)
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  2. Marcus Arvan (forthcoming). How to Rationally Approach Life's Transformative Experiences. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can’t expect when you’re expecting”, as well as in a forthcoming book, L.A. Paul uses the notion of transformative experience to challenge culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that if the problem Paul presents has no direct solution—if there is no way to defend the philosophically and culturally dominant approach to rational decision-making for (...)
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  3. Renatas Berniunas & Vilius Dranseika (forthcoming). Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: A Response to Nichols and Bruno. Philosophical Psychology.
    In a paper in Philosophical Psychology, Nichols & Bruno (2010) claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article we attempt to evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity but rely on different concepts of a person and of identity of an individual. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no (...)
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  4. Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke & Massimo Pigliucci (forthcoming). What Makes Weird Beliefs Thrive? The Epidemiology of Pseudoscience. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    What makes beliefs thrive? In this paper, we model the dissemination of bona fide science versus pseudoscience, making use of Dan Sperber's epidemiological model of representations. Drawing on cognitive research on the roots of irrational beliefs and the institutional arrangement of science, we explain the dissemination of beliefs in terms of their salience to human cognition and their ability to adapt to specific cultural ecologies. By contrasting the cultural development of science and pseudoscience along a number of dimensions , we (...)
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  5. J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Extended Emotion. Philosophical Psychology.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g. Clark 2011; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2000, 2004; Menary 2006) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas, and in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: i.e., the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
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  6. Sheldon J. Chow (forthcoming). Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor’s famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor’s analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor’s arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent (...)
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  7. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  8. Luis H. Favela (forthcoming). Discovering the Human Connectome. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  9. Anil Gomes, Matthew Parrott & Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). More Dead Than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman and Wegner (2011) present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott (2014), we provide evidence to show that participants’ responses in the initial experiments are an artefact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the (...)
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  10. Derek Jones (forthcoming). Mindlessness. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  11. Lukasz A. Kurowski (forthcoming). Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance: A Response to Rex Welshon's “Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon's position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon's definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon's proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I call the neuro-integrative account (...)
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  12. Eric Mandelbaum (forthcoming). The Automatic and the Ballistic: Modularity Beyond Perceptual Processes. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    Perceptual processes, in particular modular processes, have long been understood as being mandatory. But exactly what mandatoriness amounts to is left to intuition. This paper identifies a crucial ambiguity in the notion of mandatoriness. Discussions of mandatory processes have run together notions of automaticity and ballisticity. Teasing apart these notions creates an important tool for the modularist's toolbox. Different putatively modular processes appear to differ in their kinds of mandatoriness. Separating out the automatic from the ballistic can help the modularist (...)
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  13. Fritz J. McDonald (forthcoming). Cooperation and Its Evolution. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  14. Thaddeus Metz (forthcoming). How to Obtain Meaning in Life: The Roles of Self-Inflation, Self-Deception and World-Delusion. Philosophical Psychology.
    Part of a special Issue on Robert Trivers’ The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self‐Deception in Human Life, with some focus on the implication of self-deception and related mental states for meaning in life.
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  15. Peter L. Samuelson & Ian M. Church (forthcoming). When Cognition Turns Vicious: Heuristics and Biases in Light of Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)—as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, (...)
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  16. Jeffrey White (forthcoming). Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    Readers of Philosophical Psychology may be most familiar with Ron Sun by way of an article recently appearing in this journal on creative composition expressed within his own hybrid computational intelligence model, CLARION (Sun, 2013). That article represents nearly two decades’ work in situated agency stressing the importance of psychologically realistic architectures and processes in the articulation of both functional, and reflectively informative, AI and agent- level social-cultural simulations. Readers may be less familiar with Sun’s 2001 “prolegomena” to related multi-agent (...)
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  17. Yochai Ataria (forthcoming). Where Do We End and Where Does the World Begin? The Case of Insight Meditation. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    This paper examines the experience of where we end and the rest of the world begins, that is, the sense of boundaries. Since meditators are recognized for their ability to introspect about the bodily level of experience, and in particular about their sense of boundaries, 27 senior meditators were interviewed for this study. The main conclusions of this paper are that the boundaries of the so-called “physical body” are not equivalent to the individual's sense of boundaries; the sense of boundaries (...)
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  18. Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines , and develop (...)
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  19. Charles Lassiter (forthcoming). Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity, and Human Artifice. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  20. P. D. Magnus & Ron McClamrock (forthcoming). Friends with Benefits! Distributed Cognition Hooks Up Cognitive and Social Conceptions of Science. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    One approach to science treats science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals and defines a scientific community as an aggregate of individual inquirers. Another treats science as a fundamentally collective endeavor and defines a scientist as a member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, (...)
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  21. Philip Woodward (forthcoming). Introspection and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  22. Clare Batty (forthcoming). The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    In this essay, I review Matthew Fulkerson's The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch. In this first philosophical book on the sense of touch, Fulkerson provides an account of the nature and content of tactual experience. Central to Fulkerson's view is the claim that exploratory action plays a fundamental role in touch. In this review, I put pressure on two of his arguments: the argument that tactual experience is unisensory and the argument that tactual experience does (...)
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  23. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  24. Avner Baz (forthcoming). On Going Nowhere with Our Words: New Skepticism About the Philosophical Method of Cases. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by (...)
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  25. Bryan Chambliss (forthcoming). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  26. Heather Cipolletti, Steven McFarlane & Christine Weissglass (forthcoming). The Moral Foreign-Language Effect. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect is the activation of systematic reasoning processes (...)
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  27. A. Will Crescioni, Roy F. Baumeister, Sarah E. Ainsworth, Michael Ent & Nathaniel M. Lambert (forthcoming). Subjective Correlates and Consequences of Belief in Free Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    Four studies measured or manipulated beliefs in free will to illuminate how such beliefs are linked to other aspects of personality. Study 1 showed that stronger belief in free will was correlated with more gratitude, greater life satisfaction, lower levels of perceived life stress, a greater sense of self-efficacy, greater perceived meaning in life, higher commitment in relationships, and more willingness to forgive relationship partners. Study 2 showed that the belief in free will was a stronger predictor of life satisfaction, (...)
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  28. Joanna Demaree-Cotton (forthcoming). Do Framing Effects Make Moral Intuitions Unreliable? Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which (...)
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  29. Matthew Fulkerson (forthcoming). Response to Batty's Review. Philosophical Psychology:1-2.
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  30. John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
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  31. Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
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  32. Bradley Rives (forthcoming). The Rules of Thought. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
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  33. P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
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  34. Muk Yan Wong (forthcoming). Towards a Theory of Mood Function. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    In light of Laura Sizer's and Robert Thayer's models of mood, I propose a functional theory to explain in what sense moods are adaptive. I argue that mood involves a mechanism which monitors our physical and mental energy levels in relation to the perceived energy demands of our environment, and generates corresponding cognitive biases in our reasoning style, attention, memory, thought, and creativity. The function of this mechanism is to engage us in the right task with the right amount of (...)
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