- James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology.
- Renatas Berniunas & Vilius Dranseika (forthcoming). Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: A Response to Nichols and Bruno. Philosophical Psychology.
- J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Extended Emotion. Philosophical Psychology.
- Sheldon J. Chow (forthcoming). Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
- Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
- Luis H. Favela (forthcoming). Discovering the Human Connectome. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
- Anil Gomes, Matthew Parrott & Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). More Dead Than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
- Derek Jones (forthcoming). Mindlessness. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
- Lukasz A. Kurowski (forthcoming). Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance: A Response to Rex Welshon's “Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
- Clare Batty (forthcoming). The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
- Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
- Avner Baz (forthcoming). On Going Nowhere with Our Words: New Skepticism About the Philosophical Method of Cases. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
- Bryan Chambliss (forthcoming). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
- Heather Cipolletti, Steven McFarlane & Christine Weissglass (forthcoming). The Moral Foreign-Language Effect. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
- A. Will Crescioni, Roy F. Baumeister, Sarah E. Ainsworth, Michael Ent & Nathaniel M. Lambert (forthcoming). Subjective Correlates and Consequences of Belief in Free Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
- Joanna Demaree-Cotton (forthcoming). Do Framing Effects Make Moral Intuitions Unreliable? Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
- Matthew Fulkerson (forthcoming). Response to Batty's Review. Philosophical Psychology:1-2.
- John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
- Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
- Bradley Rives (forthcoming). The Rules of Thought. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
- P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
- Rex Welshon (forthcoming). Reply to Lukasz Kurowski's “Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
- Muk Yan Wong (forthcoming). Towards a Theory of Mood Function. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
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