Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1. James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology.
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (in press) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance, and are rather willing to attribute free will no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper we first argue that Feltz (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Renatas Berniunas & Vilius Dranseika (forthcoming). Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: A Response to Nichols and Bruno. Philosophical Psychology.
    In a paper in Philosophical Psychology, Nichols & Bruno (2010) claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article we attempt to evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity but rely on different concepts of a person and of identity of an individual. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Extended Emotion. Philosophical Psychology.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g. Clark 2011; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2000, 2004; Menary 2006) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas, and in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: i.e., the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Sheldon J. Chow (forthcoming). Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor’s famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor’s analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor’s arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  6. Luis H. Favela (forthcoming). Discovering the Human Connectome. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Anil Gomes, Matthew Parrott & Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). More Dead Than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman and Wegner (2011) present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott (2014), we provide evidence to show that participants’ responses in the initial experiments are an artefact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Derek Jones (forthcoming). Mindlessness. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Lukasz A. Kurowski (forthcoming). Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance: A Response to Rex Welshon's “Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon's position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon's definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon's proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I call the neuro-integrative account (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Clare Batty (forthcoming). The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    In this essay, I review Matthew Fulkerson's The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch. In this first philosophical book on the sense of touch, Fulkerson provides an account of the nature and content of tactual experience. Central to Fulkerson's view is the claim that exploratory action plays a fundamental role in touch. In this review, I put pressure on two of his arguments: the argument that tactual experience is unisensory and the argument that tactual experience does (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Avner Baz (forthcoming). On Going Nowhere with Our Words: New Skepticism About the Philosophical Method of Cases. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Bryan Chambliss (forthcoming). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Heather Cipolletti, Steven McFarlane & Christine Weissglass (forthcoming). The Moral Foreign-Language Effect. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect is the activation of systematic reasoning processes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. A. Will Crescioni, Roy F. Baumeister, Sarah E. Ainsworth, Michael Ent & Nathaniel M. Lambert (forthcoming). Subjective Correlates and Consequences of Belief in Free Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    Four studies measured or manipulated beliefs in free will to illuminate how such beliefs are linked to other aspects of personality. Study 1 showed that stronger belief in free will was correlated with more gratitude, greater life satisfaction, lower levels of perceived life stress, a greater sense of self-efficacy, greater perceived meaning in life, higher commitment in relationships, and more willingness to forgive relationship partners. Study 2 showed that the belief in free will was a stronger predictor of life satisfaction, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Joanna Demaree-Cotton (forthcoming). Do Framing Effects Make Moral Intuitions Unreliable? Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Matthew Fulkerson (forthcoming). Response to Batty's Review. Philosophical Psychology:1-2.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Bradley Rives (forthcoming). The Rules of Thought. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Rex Welshon (forthcoming). Reply to Lukasz Kurowski's “Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Muk Yan Wong (forthcoming). Towards a Theory of Mood Function. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    In light of Laura Sizer's and Robert Thayer's models of mood, I propose a functional theory to explain in what sense moods are adaptive. I argue that mood involves a mechanism which monitors our physical and mental energy levels in relation to the perceived energy demands of our environment, and generates corresponding cognitive biases in our reasoning style, attention, memory, thought, and creativity. The function of this mechanism is to engage us in the right task with the right amount of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues