Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  69
    Jared Warren (forthcoming). Sider on the Epistemology of Structure. Philosophical Studies (9):1-19.
    Theodore Sider’s recent book, “Writing the Book of the World”, employs a primitive notion of metaphysical structure in order to make sense of substantive metaphysics. But Sider and others who employ metaphysical primitives face serious epistemological challenges. In the first section I develop a specific form of this challenge for Sider’s own proposed epistemology for structure; the second section develops a general reliability challenge for Sider’s theory; and the third and final section argues for the rejection of Siderean structure in (...)
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  2.  20
    Chrisoula Andreou (forthcoming). Cashing Out the Money-Pump Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-5.
    The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption that it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as (...)
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  3.  21
    Avery Archer (forthcoming). Do Desires Provide Reasons? An Argument Against the Cognitivist Strategy. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to (...)
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  4.  28
    Eric Christian Barnes (forthcoming). Character Control and Historical Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Some proponents of compatibilist moral responsibility have proposed an historical theory which requires that agents deploy character control in order to be morally responsible. An important type of argument for the character control condition is the manipulation argument, such as Mele’s example of Beth and Chuck. In this paper I show that Beth can be exonerated on various conditions other than her failure to execute character control—I propose a new character, Patty, who meets these conditions and is, I argue, morally (...)
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  5.  17
    Amy Berg (forthcoming). Abortion and Miscarriage. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Opponents of abortion sometimes hold that it is impermissible because fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. But miscarriage, which ends up to 89 % of pregnancies, is much deadlier than abortion. That means that if opponents of abortion are right, then miscarriage is the biggest public-health crisis of our time. Yet they pay hardly any attention to miscarriage, especially very early miscarriage. Attempts to resolve this inconsistency by adverting to the distinction between killing and letting die or to (...)
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  6. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Omission Impossible. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    This paper gives a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, counterfactuals imbued with causal content whose antecedents appeal to metaphysically impossible worlds. Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to metaphysically impossible events, such as “If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2+2=5, the math textbooks would not have remained intact.” After providing an account of impossible omissions, the paper argues for three claims: (i) impossible omissions play a causal role in the actual world, (ii) causal (...)
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  7.  60
    Paul Boswell (forthcoming). Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every (...)
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  8.  24
    Thomas Byrne (forthcoming). Might Anything Be Plain Good? Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is not a predicative adjective, but only ever an attributive adjective: just like ‘big.’ And just as there is no such thing as plain bigness but only ever big for or as a so-and-so, there is also no such thing as plain goodness. They conclude that Moore’s goodness is thus a nonsense. However attention has been (...)
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  9.  54
    Elisabeth Camp (forthcoming). Why Metaphors Make Good Insults: Perspectives, Presupposition, and Pragmatics. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ‘framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ‘complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are rhetorically (...)
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  10.  9
    Justin A. Capes & Philip Swenson (forthcoming). Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Frankfurt cases are supposed to provide us with counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities. Among the most well known responses to these cases is what John Fischer has dubbed the flicker of freedom strategy. Here we revisit a version of this strategy, which we refer to as the fine-grained response. Although a number of philosophers, including some who are otherwise unsympathetic to Frankfurt’s argument, have dismissed the fine grained response, we believe there is a good deal to be said (...)
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  11.  11
    Amandine Catala (forthcoming). Secession and Distributive Justice. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    The philosophical debate on secession has hitherto revolved primarily around the question of self-determination rather than that of distributive justice. Normative theorists of secession have approached the question of secession mostly in terms of the right that the secessionist group has to secede. Much less attention has been paid to the extent and the nature of obligations or duties that the seceding group might have toward the group it is leaving behind. At best, secession theorists have introduced clauses to the (...)
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  12.  5
    Brendan Cline (forthcoming). Against Deliberative Indispensability as an Independent Guide to What There Is. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    David Enoch has recently proposed that the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative facts suffices to support their inclusion in our ontology, even if they are not necessary for the explanation of any observable phenomena. He challenges dissenters to point to a relevant asymmetry between explanation and deliberation that shows why explanatory indispensability, but not deliberative indispensability, is a legitimate guide to ontology. In this paper, I aim to do just that. Given that an entity figures in the actual explanation of (...)
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  13.  60
    David M. Cornell (forthcoming). Taking Monism Seriously. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Monism is the view that there is only a single material object in existence: the world. According to this view, therefore, the ordinary objects of common sense—cats and hats, cars and stars, and so on—do not actually exist; there is only the world. Because of this, monism is routinely dismissed in the contemporary literature as being absurd and obviously false. It is simply obvious that there is a plurality of material things, thus it is simply obvious that monism is false, (...)
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  14.  43
    Charles Côté-Bouchard (forthcoming). Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity? Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for (...)
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  15.  25
    Benjamin L. Curtis (forthcoming). Lewisian Quidditism, Humility, and Diffidence. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    In 'Ramseyan Humility' Lewis presents the Permutation Argument for quidditism. As he presents it the argument is simple enough, but once one digs beneath its surface, and attempts to understand it in strictly Lewisian terms, difficulties arise. The fundamental difficulty is that, as he presents it, the argument only seems to be sound if one rejects views that Lewis explicitly holds. One aim of this paper is to clarify the argument to show that one can make sense of it in (...)
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  16.  56
    Chris Daly & David Liggins (forthcoming). Dorr on the Language of Ontology. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    In the ‘ordinary business of life’, everyone makes claims about what there is. For instance, we say things like: ‘There are some beautiful chairs in my favourite furniture shop’. Within the context of philosophical debate, some philosophers also make claims about what there is. For instance, some ontologists claim that there are chairs; other ontologists claim that there are no chairs. What is the relation between ontologists’ philosophical claims about what there is and ordinary claims about what there is? According (...)
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  17.  25
    Alex Davies (forthcoming). Elaboration and Intuitions of Disagreement. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Mark Richard argues for truth-relativism about claims made using gradable adjectives. He argues that truth-relativism is the best explanation of two kinds of linguistic data, which I call: true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. Richard claims that such data are generated by an example that he discusses at length. However, the consensus is that these linguistic data are illusory because they vanish when elaborations are added to examples of the same kind as Richard's original. In this paper I (...)
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  18.  12
    Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias (forthcoming). Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    We use recent interventionist theories of causation to develop a compatibilist account of causal sourcehood, which provides a response to Manipulation Arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Our account explains the difference between manipulation and determinism, against the claim of Manipulation Arguments that there is no relevant difference. Interventionism allows us to see that causal determinism does not mean that variables outside of the agent causally explain her actions better than variables within the agent, whereas the causal (...)
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  19.  7
    Matt Duncan (forthcoming). Dualists Needn't Be Anti-Criterialists (nor Should They Be). Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who hold the first view (...)
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  20.  3
    Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). How to Undercut Radical Skepticism. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
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  21.  39
    Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Developing The Explanatory Dimensions of Part-Whole Realization. Philosophical Studies.
    I use Carl Gillett's much heralded dimensioned theory of realization as a platform to develop a plausible part-whole theory. I begin with some basic desiderata for a theory of realization that its key terms should be defined and that it should be explanatory. I then argue that Gillett's original theory violates these conditions because its explanatory force rests upon an unspecified "in virtue of" relation. I then examine Gillett's later version that appeals instead to theoretical terms tied to "mechanisms." Yet (...)
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  22.  22
    Rachel Elizabeth Fraser (forthcoming). Risk, Doubt, and Transmission. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Despite their substantial appeal, closure principles have fallen on hard times. Both anti-luck conditions on knowledge and the defeasibility of knowledge look to be in tension with natural ways of articulating single-premise closure principles. The project of this paper is to show that plausible theses in the epistemology of testimony face problems structurally identical to those faced by closure principles. First I show how Lasonen-Aarnio’s claim that there is a tension between single premise closure and anti-luck constraints on knowledge can (...)
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  23.  69
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). No Need to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  24.  45
    Harmen Ghijsen (forthcoming). The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has received a lot of attention in recent epistemology, as it seems to make perceptual justification too easy to come by for experientialist theories of justification. Some have tried to respond to this challenge by arguing that cognitive penetration downgrades the epistemic status of perceptual experience, thereby diminishing its justificatory power. I discuss two examples of this strategy, and argue that they fail on several grounds. Most importantly, they fail to realize that cognitive penetration is (...)
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  25. Cody Gilmore (forthcoming). The Metaphysics of Mortals: Death, Immortality, and Personal Time. Philosophical Studies:1-29.
    Personal time, as opposed to external time, has a certain role to play in the correct account of death and immortality. But saying exactly what that role is, and what role remains for external time, is not straightforward. I formulate and defend accounts of death and immortality that specify these roles precisely.
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  26.  6
    Camil Golub (forthcoming). Expressivism and Realist Explanations. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a (...)
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  27.  27
    Alex Gregory (forthcoming). Normative Reasons as Good Bases. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a (...)
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  28.  3
    Dominic Gregory (forthcoming). Counterfactual Reasoning and Knowledge of Possibilities. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Williamson has argued against scepticism concerning our metaphysically modal knowledge, by arguing that standard patterns of suppositional reasoning to counterfactual conclusions provide reliable sources of correct ascriptions of possibility and necessity. The paper argues that, while Williamson’s claims relating to necessity may well be right, he has not provided adequate reasons for thinking that the familiar modes of counterfactual reasoning to which he points generalise to provide a decent route to ascriptions of possibility. The paper also explores another path to (...)
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  29.  33
    Michael Hannon (forthcoming). A Solution to Knowledge's Threshold Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    This paper is about the ‘threshold problem’ for knowledge, namely, how do we determine what fixes the level of justification required for knowledge in a non-arbitrary way? One popular strategy for solving this problem is impurism, which is the view that the required level of justification is partly fixed by one’s practical reasoning situation. However, this strategy has been the target of several recent objections. My goal is to propose a new version of impurism that solves the threshold problem without (...)
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  30.  38
    Robert J. Hartman (forthcoming). Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Every account of moral responsibility has conditions that distinguish between the consequences, actions, or traits that warrant praise or blame and those that do not. One intuitive condition is that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors beyond the agent’s control. Several philosophers build their accounts of moral responsibility on this luck-free condition, and we may call their views Luck-Free Moral Responsibility (LFMR). I offer moral and metaphysical arguments against LFMR. First, I maintain that considerations (...)
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  31.  21
    Peter Hawke (forthcoming). Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...)
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  32.  26
    David Hills (forthcoming). The What and the How of Metaphorical Imagining, Part One. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    We humans are remarkably interested in and skilled at games of make believe, games whose rules make what we are called on to imagine depend on what’s actually perceivably true about things and people that have what it takes to assume various fictional roles and that thereby function in the games as props. For the most part we play these games on an improvised pickup basis, working out the rules we play by in the very act of playing by them. (...)
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  33.  20
    Ole Thomassen Hjortland (forthcoming). Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
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  34.  29
    Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann (forthcoming). Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers’ reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the intuitions of philosophical experts count—yet the bulk of experimental philosophy consists in studies with lay people. In this paper, we argue that direct strategies for assessing the expertise defense are preferable to indirect strategies. A direct argument in support of the expertise defense would have to show: first, that there is a significant difference between expert and lay (...)
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  35. Michael Huemer (forthcoming). A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
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  36.  22
    David Ingram (forthcoming). The Virtues of Thisness Presentism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can’t express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don’t exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent ‘common sense’ status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications. In this paper, I present and (...)
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  37.  10
    Jens Kipper (forthcoming). Propositional Apriority and the Nesting Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    According to the modal account of propositional apriority, a proposition is a priori if it is possible to know it with a priori justification. Assuming that modal truths are necessarily true and that there are contingent a priori truths, this account has the undesirable consequence that a proposition can be a priori in a world in which it is false. Epistemic two-dimensionalism faces the same problem, since on its standard interpretation, it also entails that a priori propositions are necessarily a (...)
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  38.  20
    Hallie Liberto & Fred Harrington (forthcoming). Evil, Wrongdoing, and Concept Distinctness. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Philosophers theorizing about ‘evil’ usually distinguish evil actions from acts of ordinary wrongdoing. They either attempt to isolate some quality or set of qualities shared by all evil actions that is not found in other wrongful actions, or they concede that their account of evil is only distinguished by capturing the very worst acts on the scale of moral wrongness. The idea that evil is qualitatively distinct from wrongdoing has recently been under contention. We explore the grounds for this contention, (...)
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  39.  5
    Kelly McCormick (forthcoming). Why We Should Be Discretionists About Free Will. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    One of the projects Shaun Nichols takes up in Bound is to provide a folk psychological diagnosis of the problem of free will. As part of this diagnosis, Nichols suggests that the dispute between eliminativists and preservationists depends to some extent on assumptions about the way ‘free will’ refers. In light of this, he argues that we might have good reason to accept a discretionary view of free will. Here, I will focus on teasing out some of the more fine-grained (...)
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  40.  21
    Neil Mehta & Todd Ganson (forthcoming). On the Generality of Experience: A Reply to French and Gomes. Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta criticizes this view, and French and Gomes :451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character.
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  41.  31
    Leonhard Menges (forthcoming). The Emotion Account of Blame. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...)
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  42.  32
    Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Partial Content and Expressions of Part and Whole. Discussion of Stephen Yablo: Aboutness. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    In 'Aboutness' (MIT Press 2014), Yablo argues for the importance of the notions of partial content and partial truth. This paper argues that they are involved in a much greater range of entities than acknowledged by Yablo. The paper also argues that some of those entities involve a notion of partial satisfaction as well as partial existence (validity).
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  43.  21
    Samuel Murray (forthcoming). Responsibility and Vigilance. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some (...)
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  44.  6
    Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). Replies to Kane, McCormick, and Vargas. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    This is a reply to discussions by Robert Kane, Kelly McCormick, and Manuel Vargas of Shaun Nichols, Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility.
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  45. Daniel Nolan (forthcoming). Conditionals and Curry. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Curry's paradox for "if.. then.." concerns the paradoxical features of sentences of the form "If this very sentence is true, then 2+2=5". Standard inference principles lead us to the conclusion that such conditionals have true consequents: so, for example, 2+2=5 after all. There has been a lot of technical work done on formal options for blocking Curry paradoxes while only compromising a little on the various central principles of logic and meaning that are under threat. -/- Once we have a (...)
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  46.  45
    Rik Peels (forthcoming). The Empirical Case Against Introspection. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between (...)
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  47.  17
    Ben Phillips (forthcoming). Contextualism About Object-Seeing. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing (...)
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  48.  9
    Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (forthcoming). Compound Figures: Priority and Speech-Act Structure. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Compound figures are a rich, and under-explored area for tackling fundamental issues in philosophy of language. This paper explores new ideas about how to explain some features of such figures. We start with an observation from Stern that in ironic-metaphor, metaphor is logically prior to irony in the structure of what is communicated. Call this thesis Logical-MPT. We argue that a speech-act-based explanation of Logical-MPT is to be preferred to a content-based explanation. To create this explanation we draw on Barker’s (...)
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  49.  59
    Luke Roelofs (forthcoming). The Unity of Consciousness, Within Subjects and Between Subjects. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such ‘between-subjects unity’. The first argument, based on the popular idea that unity implies subsumption by a composite experience, can be deflected by allowing for limited forms of ‘experience-sharing’, in which the same token experience belongs to more (...)
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  50.  13
    David Rose (forthcoming). Folk Intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-39.
    How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is an actual cause of some particular outcome? Many philosophers have wanted a view of actual causation which fits with folk intuitions of actual causation and those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and where the folk have gone wrong. In this paper, I provide a range of empirical evidence aimed at showing just (...)
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  51.  59
    Bradford Saad (forthcoming). How to Befriend Zombies: A Guide for Physicalists. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Though not myself a physicalist, I develop a new argument against antiphysicalist positions that are motivated by zombie arguments. I first identify four general features of phenomenal states that are candidates for non-physical types; these are used to generate different types of zombie. I distinguish two antiphysicalist positions: strict dualism, which posits exactly one general non-physical type, and pluralism, which posits more than one such type. It turns out that zombie arguments threaten strict dualism and some pluralist positions as much (...)
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  52.  14
    Andrea Sauchelli (forthcoming). The Animal, the Corpse, and the Remnant-Person. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal, it is still appealing to those (...)
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  53. Andrew Sepielli (forthcoming). Moral Uncertainty and Fetishistic Motivation. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want to address (...)
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  54.  18
    Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (forthcoming). Evidence and the Openness of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-37.
    The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of (...)
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  55.  11
    Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (forthcoming). Replies to Comesaña and Yablo. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    There are few indulgences academics can crave more than to have their work considered and addressed by leading researchers in their field. We have been fortunate to have two outstanding philosophers from whose work we have learned a great deal give ours their thoughtful attention. Grappling with Stephen Yablo’s, and Juan Comesaña’s comments and criticisms has helped us gain a better understanding of our ideas as well as their shortcomings. We are extremely grateful to them for the attentiveness and seriousness (...)
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  56.  57
    Eli Shupe (forthcoming). Transformative Experience and the Limits of Revelation. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    In her recent book, L. A. Paul presses a serious problem for normative decision theory. Normative decision theory seems to be inapplicable when the values of potential outcomes are unknown, or when our preferences may change as a result of our choice. Paul then offers a framework for overcoming these problems, known as the revelation approach. I argue that, contrary to what Paul suggests, this approach is unhelpful in the large class of cases where the decision at hand centrally concerns (...)
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  57.  86
    Neil Sinclair (forthcoming). Reasons, Inescapability and Persuasion. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how the reasons thus stated can be inescapable. The motivation for the theory is in part that it can explain this and other phenomena concerning moral reasons. The account also suggests a general recipe for explanations of conceptual features of moral reason statements. (Published with Open Access.).
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  58.  46
    Nicholas Smyth (forthcoming). The Function of Morality. Philosophical Studies.
    What is the function of morality? On this question, something approaching a consensus has recently emerged. Impressed by developments in evolutionary theory, many philosophers now tell us that the function of morality is to reduce social tensions, and to thereby enable a society to efficiently promote the well-being of its members. In this paper, I subject this consensus to rigorous scrutiny, arguing that the functional hypothesis in question is not well supported. In particular, I attack the supposed evidential relation between (...)
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  59.  23
    Nicholas Southwood (forthcoming). The Motivation Question. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    How does it happen that our beliefs about what we ought to do cause us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do? This is what John Broome calls the "motivation question." Broome’s answer to the motivation question is that we can bring ourselves, by our own efforts, to intend to do what we believe we ought to do by exercising a special agential capacity: the capacity to engage in what he calls enkratic reasoning. My aim is (...)
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  60.  63
    Nicholas Southwood & David Wiens (forthcoming). "Actual" Does Not Imply "Feasible". Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    The familiar complaint that some ambitious proposal is infeasible naturally invites the following response: Once upon a time, the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of women seemed infeasible, yet these things were actually achieved. Presumably, then, many of those things that seem infeasible in our own time may well be achieved too and, thus, turn out to have been perfectly feasible after all. The Appeal to History, as we call it, is a bad argument. It is not true that (...)
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  61.  76
    Maarten Steenhagen (forthcoming). False Reflections. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Philosophers and psychologists often assume that mirror reflections are optical illusions. According to many authors, what we see in a mirror appears to be behind it. I discuss two strategies to resist this piece of dogma. As I will show, the conviction that mirror reflections are illusions is rooted in a confused conception of the relations between location, direction, and visibility. This conception is unacceptable to those who take seriously the way in which mirrors contribute to our experience of the (...)
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  62.  14
    Chris Tucker (forthcoming). How to Think About Satisficing. Philosophical Studies.
    An agent submaximizes with motivation when she aims at the best but chooses a less good option because of a countervailing consideration. An agent (radically) satisfices when she rejects the better for the good enough, and does so because the mere good enough gets her what she really wants. Motivated submaximization and satisficing, so construed, are different ways of choosing a suboptimal option, but this difference is easily missed. Putative proponents of satisficing tend to argue only that motivated submaximization can (...)
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  63.  63
    Miles Tucker (forthcoming). The Pen, the Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread (...)
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  64.  7
    P. Roger Turner (forthcoming). Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, it follows that logical versions (...)
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  65.  57
    Barbara Vetter (forthcoming). Counterpossibles for Dispositionalists. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Dispositionalists try to provide an account of modality—possibility, necessity, and the counterfactual conditional—in terms of dispositions. But there may be a tension between dispositionalist accounts of possibility on the one hand, and of counterfactuals on the other. Dispositionalists about possibility must hold that there are no impossible dispositions, i.e., dispositions with metaphysically impossible stimulus and/or manifestation conditions; dispositionalist accounts of counterfactuals, if they allow for non-vacuous counterpossibles, require that there are such impossible dispositions. I argue, first, that there are in (...)
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  66.  16
    Jonas Waechter (forthcoming). Positive Truthmakers for Negative Truths: A Solution to Molnar’s Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    The present paper addresses Molnar’s problem :72–86, 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called, is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible variants of (...)
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  67. Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  68.  40
    Brian Weatherson (forthcoming). Reply to Eaton and Pickavance. Philosophical Studies:1-3.
    David Eaton and Timothy Pickvance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles must have.
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  69.  8
    Bill Wringe (forthcoming). Rethinking Expressive Theories of Punishment: Why Denunciation is A Better Bet Than Communication or Pure Expression. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Many philosophers hold that punishment has an expressive dimension.1 Some, but not all of them have argued that the expressive dimension of punishment is relevant to explaining how punishment can be justified, either in general, or in the particular context of a liberal state. Advocates of expressive theories have different views about what makes punishment expressive, what kinds of mental states and what kinds of claims are, or legitimately can be expressed in punishment, and to what kind of audience or (...)
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  70.  17
    Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (forthcoming). Perceptual Fundamentalism and a Priori Bootstrapping. Philosophical Studies.
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  71.  17
    Stephen Barker (forthcoming). Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds (...)
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  72.  25
    Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (forthcoming). Combining the Representational and the Relational View. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    This paper tries to meet the three basic constraints in the metaphysics of perception—that, following Schellenberg, I call here the particularity constraint, the indistinguishable constraint, and the phenomenological constraint—by putting forward a new combination of the two well-known contradictory views in this field: the relational view and the content view. Following other compatibilists, I do think that it is possible to reconcile the two views, recognizing that experience has both a relational and a representational dimension. However, in opposition to the (...)
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  73.  5
    Kalle Grill (forthcoming). Asymmetric Population Axiology: Deliberative Neutrality Delivered. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any (...)
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  74.  27
    Alfred R. Mele (forthcoming). Direct Control. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    This article’s aim is to shed light on direct control, especially as it pertains to free will. I sketch two ways of conceiving of such control. Both sketches extend to decision making. Issues addressed include the problem of present luck and the relationship between direct control and complete control.
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  75.  8
    Daniel Rothschild (forthcoming). Yablo’s Semantic Machinery. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Yablo’s Aboutness introduces powerful new set of tools for analyzing meaning. I compare his account of subject matter to the related ideas employed in the semantics literature on questions and focus. I then discuss two applications of subject matter: to presupposition triggering and to ascriptions of shared content.
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  76.  14
    Joseph Salerno (forthcoming). Epistemic Modals and Modus Tollens. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions behind familiar truth conditional theories of embedded modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, this sort of explanation goes too far. It fosters other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are none. It is argued that the solution is to drop the credo that modal claims are inherently relational in favor of (...)
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  77.  16
    Jonathan L. Shaheen (forthcoming). The Causal Metaphor Account of Metaphysical Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    This paper argues that the semantic facts about ‘because’ are best explained via a metaphorical treatment of metaphysical explanation that treats causal explanation as explanation par excellence. Along the way, it defends a commitment to a unified causal sense of ‘because’ and offers a proprietary explanation of grounding skepticism. With the causal metaphor account of metaphysical explanation on the table, an extended discussion of the relationship between conceptual structure and metaphysics ends with a suggestion that the semantic facts about ‘because’ (...)
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  78.  21
    Chandra Sripada (forthcoming). Free Will and the Construction of Options. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    What are the distinctive psychological features that explain why humans are free, but many other creatures, such as simple animals, are not? It is natural to think that the answer has something to do with unique human capacities for decision-making. Philosophical discussions of how decision-making works, however, are tellingly incomplete. In particular, these discussions invariably presuppose an agent who has a mentally represented set of options already fully in hand. The emphasis is largely on the selective processes that identify the (...)
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  79.  5
    Joachim Wündisch (forthcoming). Does Excusable Ignorance Absolve of Liability for Costs? Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Excusable ignorance not only undermines moral culpability but also agent-responsibility. Therefore, excusable ignorance absolves of liability for costs. Specifically, it defeats liability that is meant to be derived from causal responsibility wherever strict liability cannot be justified. To establish these claims this paper assesses the potential of arguments for liability of excusably ignorant agents and thereby demarcates the proper domain of strict liability and traces the intuition that seemingly supports strict liability accounts to more general principles. The paper concludes that (...)
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  80.  36
    Adam Zweber (forthcoming). Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
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  81.  8
    Aristidis Arageorgis (forthcoming). Relativism, Translation, and the Metaphysics of Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Thoroughgoing relativists typically dismiss the realist conviction that competing theories describe just one definite and mind-independent world-structure on the grounds that such theories fail to be relatively translatable even though they are equally correct. This line of argument allegedly brings relativism into direct conflict with the metaphysics of realism. I argue that this relativist line of reasoning is shaky by deriving a theorem about relativistic inquiry in formal epistemology—more specifically, in the approach Kevin Kelly has dubbed “logic of reliable inquiry”. (...)
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  82. D. M. Armstrong (forthcoming). The Causal Theory of Properties: Shoemaker, Ellis and Others. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  83.  1
    Jason Baehr (forthcoming). Responsibilist Virtues and the “Charmed Inner Circle” of Traditional Epistemology. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    In Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa takes “reliabilist” virtue epistemology deep into “responsibilist” territory, arguing that “a true epistemology” will assign “responsibilist-cum-reliabilist intellectual virtue the main role in addressing concerns at the center of the tradition.” However, Sosa stops short of granting this status to familiar responsibilist virtues like open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual humility. He cites three reasons for doing so: responsibilist virtues involve excessive motivational demands; they are quasi-ethical; and they are best understood, not as constituting knowledge, but (...)
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  84.  18
    Elizabeth Barnes (forthcoming). Realism and Social Structure. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Social constructionism is often considered a form of anti-realism. But in contemporary feminist philosophy, an increasing number of philosophers defend views that are well-described as both realist and social constructionist. In this paper, I use the work of Sally Haslanger as an example of realist social constructionism. I argue: that Haslanger is best interpreted as defending metaphysical realism about social structures; that this type of metaphysical realism about the social world presents challenges to some popular ways of understanding metaphysical realism.
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  85.  5
    Paul Bloomfield (forthcoming). Morality is Necessary for Happiness. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, the most basic of which is as follows: morality is necessary for self-respect; self-respect is necessary for happiness; therefore, morality is necessary for happiness. Some of the most obvious objections are entertained and rejected.
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  86.  14
    Paul Boghossian (forthcoming). Rationality, Reasoning and Rules: Reflections on Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    The paper provides a critical discussion of some key aspects of John Broome’s theories of rationality, reasoning and the relations between them.
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  87. Daniel Bonevac & Thomas Seung (forthcoming). Conflicts of Values. Philosophical Studies.
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  88.  7
    Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia and the Fallibility of Critical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain (...)
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  89. David Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming). Mastering Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  90.  6
    Rachael Briggs & Graeme A. Forbes (forthcoming). The Growing-Block: Just One Thing After Another? Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    In this article, we consider two independently appealing theories—the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience—and argue that at least one is false. The Growing-Block view is a theory about the nature of time. It says that past and present things exist, while future things do not, and the passage of time consists in new things coming into existence. Humean Supervenience is a theory about the nature of entities like laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, and chance. It says that none of (...)
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  91.  6
    Liam Kofi Bright (forthcoming). On Fraud. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Preferably scientific investigations would promote true rather than false beliefs. The phenomenon of fraud represents a standing challenge to this veritistic ideal. When scientists publish fraudulent results they knowingly enter falsehoods into the information stream of science. Recognition of this challenge has prompted calls for scientists to more consciously adopt the veritistic ideal in their own work. In this paper I argue against such promotion of the veritistic ideal. It turns out that a sincere desire on the part of scientists (...)
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  92.  16
    John Broome (forthcoming). Précis. Philosophical Studies:1-3.
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  93.  8
    Scott Brown (forthcoming). Against Instantiation as Identity. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Some people object to realism about universals because they think that instantiation, the connection between something and the universals that characterize it, is too mysterious. Baxter and Armstrong try to make instantiation less mysterious by taking it to be a kind of partial identity. However, I argue that their accounts of instantiation, and any similar ones, fail.
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  94.  15
    Otávio Bueno (forthcoming). An Anti-Realist Account of the Application of Mathematics. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the application (...)
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  95.  8
    Adam Bugeja (forthcoming). Forgetting Your Scruples. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    It can sound absurd to report that you have forgotten a moral truth. Described cases in which people who have lost moral beliefs exhibit the behavioural and phenomenological symptoms of forgetting can seem similarly absurd. I examine these phenomena, and evaluate a range of hypotheses that might be offered to explain them. These include the following proposals: that it is hard to forget moral truths because they are believed on the basis of intuition; that moral forgetting seems puzzling for the (...)
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  96.  8
    Juan Comesaña (forthcoming). On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument Against Closure. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
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  97.  15
    Earl Conee (forthcoming). Good to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. The knowing relation is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. This (...)
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  98.  6
    Garrett Cullity (forthcoming). Describing Rationality. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    This critical study of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning raises some questions about the various requirements of rationality Broome formulates, pointing out some apparent gaps and counterexamples; proposes a general description of rationality that is broadly consistent with Broome’s requirements while providing them with a unifying justification, filling the gaps, and removing the counterexamples; and presents two objections to the book’s broader argument concerning the nature and importance of reasoning.
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  99. Keith DeRose (forthcoming). Forthcoming,'Single Scoreboard Semantics'. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  100.  33
    Marguerite Deslauriers (forthcoming). Marinella and Her Interlocutors: Hot Blood, Hot Words, Hot Deeds. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    In the treatise called La nobiltà et l’eccellenza delle donne co’ diffetti et mancamenti de gli uomini Lucrezia Marinella claims that women are superior to men. She argues that men are excessively hot, and that heat in a high degree is detrimental to the intellectual and moral capacities of a person. The aim of this paper is to set out Marinella’s views on temperature differences in the bodies of men and women and the effects of bodily constitution on the capacities (...)
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  101.  7
    Imogen Dickie (forthcoming). Everybody Needs to Know? Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    I propose an amendment to Sosa’s virtue reliabilism. Sosa’s framework assigns a central role to sophisticated, conceptual, motivational states: ‘intentions to affirm aptly’. I argue that the suggestion that ordinary knowers in fact are motivated by such intentions in everyday belief-forming situations is at best problematic, and explore the possibility of an alternative virtue reliabilist framework. In this alternative framework, the role Sosa assigns to ‘intentions to affirm aptly’ is played instead by non-conceptual motivational states, which I call ‘needs’. The (...)
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  102.  4
    Justin Donhauser (forthcoming). Invisible Disagreement: An Inverted Qualia Argument for Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Scientific realists argue that a good track record of multi-agent, and multiple method, validation of empirical claims is itself evidence that those claims, at least partially and approximately, reflect ways nature actually is independent of the ways we conceptualize it. Constructivists contend that successes in validating empirical claims only suffice to establish that our ways of modelling the world, our “constructions,” are useful and adequate for beings like us. This essay presents a thought experiment in which beings like us intersubjectively (...)
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  103.  2
    By Matt Duncan (forthcoming). Dualists Needn’T Be Anti-Criterialists. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who hold the first view (...)
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  104.  6
    Matt Duncan (forthcoming). Erratum To: Dualists Needn’T Be Anti-Criterialists. Philosophical Studies:1-1.
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  105.  11
    Jessica Flanigan (forthcoming). Rethinking Freedom of Contract. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Many liberal egalitarians support laws that prevent people from making exploitative and unconscionable contracts. These contracts may include low-wage labor agreements or payday loans, for example. I argue that liberal egalitarians should rethink their support for laws that limit the freedom to make these illiberal contracts, as long as the contracts are voluntary and do not violate people’s other enforceable rights. Paternalistic considerations cannot justify limits on illiberal contracts because they are not only likely to misfire; they also express condescending (...)
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  106.  13
    Peter V. Forrest (forthcoming). Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought? Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    According to a number of popular intentionalist theories in philosophy of mind, phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically intentional: phenomenal properties are identical to intentional properties of a certain type, or at least, the phenomenal character of an experience necessarily fixes a type of intentional content. These views are attractive, but it is questionable whether the reasons for accepting them generalize from sensory-perceptual experience to other kinds of experience: for example, agentive, moral, aesthetic, or cognitive experience. Meanwhile, a number of philosophers (...)
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  107.  4
    David H. Glass (forthcoming). Science, God and Ockham’s Razor. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    In discussions about the existence of God, it is sometimes claimed that the progress of science has removed the need for God. This paper uses a Bayesian analysis of Ockham’s razor to formulate and evaluate this argument, which is referred to as the science explains away God argument. Four different strategies for responding to this argument are presented and evaluated. It is argued that one of these strategies highlights how difficult it is to show that the conditions for applying Ockham’s (...)
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  108.  13
    Alan H. Goldman (forthcoming). What Desires Are, and Are Not. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    This paper criticizes the account of desire defended by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder in their recent book, In Praise of Desire. It contrasts their account with one that I favor, a cluster analysis listing various criteria that are together sufficient for having paradigm desires, but none of which is necessary or sufficient for desiring. I argue that their account fails to state necessary or sufficient conditions, that it is explanatorily weaker than the cluster account, that it fails to provide (...)
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  109.  14
    Mitchell Green (forthcoming). Imagery, Expression, and Metaphor. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Metaphorical utterances are construed as falling into two broad categories, in one of which are cases amenable to analysis in terms of semantic content, speaker meaning, and satisfaction conditions, and where image-construction is permissible but not mandatory. I call these image-permitting metaphors, and contrast them with image-demanding metaphors comprising a second category and whose understanding mandates the construction of a mental image. This construction, I suggest, is spontaneous, is not restricted to visual imagery, and its result is typically somatically marked (...)
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  110.  19
    Christopher S. Hill (forthcoming). Deflationism: The Best Thing Since Pizza and Quite Possibly Better. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    I defend the deflationary theory of truth and reference I have proposed from the objections raised in Vann McGee’s “Thought, Thoughts, and Deflationism,” trying where possible to use arguments that other deflationists might find useful.
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  111.  6
    Laurence Horn (forthcoming). Lie-Toe-Tease: Double Negatives and Unexcluded Middles. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Litotes, “a figure of speech in which an affirmative is expressed by the negative of the contrary” has had some tough reviews. For Pope and Swift, litotes—stock examples include “no mean feat”, “no small problem”, and “not bad at all”—is “the peculiar talent of Ladies, Whisperers, and Backbiters”; for Orwell, it is a means to affect “an appearance of profundity” that we can deport from English “by memorizing this sentence: A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across (...)
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  112.  3
    Robert Kane (forthcoming). Free Will, Bound and Unbound: Reflections on Shaun Nichols’ Bound. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Nichols’ Bound presents interesting new angles on traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility, relating them to the latest empirical research in psychology, social sciences and experimental philosophy. In experimental philosophy, he cites numerous recent studies showing that there are strong incompatibilist strands in folk intuitions about free will and responsibility, taking issue with other recent studies claiming that folk intuitions are predominantly compatibilist. But he also argues that incompatibilist folk intuitions are based on faulty reasoning and cannot be (...)
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  113.  7
    T. J. Kasperbauer (forthcoming). Mentalizing Animals: Implications for Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Ethicists have tended to treat the psychology of attributing mental states to animals as an entirely separate issue from the moral importance of animals’ mental states. In this paper I bring these two issues together. I argue for two theses, one descriptive and one normative. The descriptive thesis holds that ordinary human agents use what are generally called phenomenal mental states to assign moral considerability to animals. I examine recent empirical research on the attribution of phenomenal states and agential states (...)
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  114.  10
    Hilary Kornblith (forthcoming). How Central Are Judgment and Agency to Epistemology? Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.
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  115.  15
    Stephan Krämer & Stefan Roski (forthcoming). Difference-Making Grounds. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    We define a notion of difference-making for partial grounds of a fact in rough analogy to existing notions of difference-making for causes of an event. Using orthodox assumptions about ground, we show that it induces a non-trivial division with examples of partial grounds on both sides. We then demonstrate the theoretical fruitfulness of the notion by applying it to the analysis of a certain kind of putative counter-example to the transitivity of ground recently described by Jonathan Schaffer. First, we show (...)
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  116.  6
    Neil C. Manson (forthcoming). Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    There is an ongoing debate about the “ontology” of consent. Some argue that it is a mental act, some that it is a “hybrid” of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act; others argue that consent is a performative, akin to promising or commanding. Here it is argued that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others. We begin with the question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind alone. Standard (...)
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  117.  7
    Kelly McCormick (forthcoming). A Dilemma for Morally Responsible Time Travelers. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    In this paper I argue that new attempts to undermine the principle of alternative possibilities via appeal to time travel fail. My argument targets a version of a Frankfurt-style counterexample to the principle recently developed by Spencer. I argue that in avoiding one prominent objection to standard Frankfurt-style counterexamples Spencer’s time travel case runs afoul of another. Furthermore, the very feature of the case which makes it initially appealing also makes it impossible to revise the case such that it can (...)
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  118.  25
    Vann McGee (forthcoming). Thought, Thoughts, and Deflationism. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Deflationists about truth embrace the positive thesis that the notion of truth is useful as a logical device, for such purposes as blanket endorsement, and the negative thesis that the notion doesn’t have any legitimate applications beyond its logical uses, so it cannot play a significant theoretical role in scientific inquiry or causal explanation. Focusing on Christopher Hill as exemplary deflationist, the present paper takes issue with the negative thesis, arguing that, without making use of the notion of truth conditions, (...)
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  119.  8
    Kelvin J. McQueen & René van Woudenberg (forthcoming). Tests for Intrinsicness Tested. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Various tests have been proposed as helps to identify intrinsic properties. This paper compares three prominent tests and shows that they fail to pass adequate verdicts on a set of three properties. The paper examines whether improved versions of the tests can reduce or remove these negative outcomes. We reach the sceptical conclusion that whereas some of the tests must be discarded as inadequate because they don’t yield definite results, the remaining tests depend for their application on the details of (...)
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  120.  7
    Christia Mercer (forthcoming). Descartes’ Debt to Teresa of Ávila, or Why We Should Work on Women in the History of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Despite what you have heard over the years, the famous evil deceiver argument in Meditation One is not original to Descartes. Early modern meditators often struggle with deceptive demons. The author of the Meditations is merely giving a new spin to a common rhetorical device. Equally surprising is the fact that Descartes’ epistemological rendering of the demon trope is probably inspired by a Spanish nun, Teresa of Ávila, whose works have been ignored by historians of philosophy, although they were a (...)
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  121.  8
    Mari Mikkola (forthcoming). On the Apparent Antagonism Between Feminist and Mainstream Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    The relationship between feminism and metaphysics has historically been strained. Metaphysics has until recently remained dismissive of feminist insights, and many feminist philosophers have been deeply skeptical about any value that metaphysics might have when thinking about advancing gender justice. Nevertheless, feminist philosophers have in recent years increasingly taken up explicitly metaphysical investigations. Such feminist investigations have expanded the scope of metaphysics in holding that metaphysical tools can help advance debates on topics outside of traditional metaphysical inquiry. Moreover, feminist philosophers (...)
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  122.  6
    Carl David Mildenberger (forthcoming). Virtual Killing. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Debates that revolve around the topic of morality and fiction rarely explicitly treat virtual worlds like, for example, Second Life. The reason for this disregard cannot be that all users of virtual worlds only do the right thing while online—for they sometimes even virtually kill each other. Is it wrong to kill other people in a virtual world? It depends. This essay analyzes on what it depends, why it is that killing people in a virtual world sometimes is wrong, and (...)
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  123.  8
    Jonathan Brink Morgan (forthcoming). Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    Many arguments against naïve realism are arguments against its corollary: disjunctivism. But there is a simpler argument—due to Mehta —that targets naïve realism directly. In broad strokes, the argument is the following. There are certain experiences that are, allegedly, in no way phenomenally similar. Nevertheless, naïve realism predicts that they are phenomenally similar. Hence, naïve realism is false. Mehta and Ganson successfully defend this argument from an objection raised by French and Gomes :451–460, 2016). However, all parties to this dispute (...)
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  124.  11
    Catarina Dutilh Novaes (forthcoming). Reductio Ad Absurdum From a Dialogical Perspective. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    It is well known that reductio ad absurdum arguments raise a number of interesting philosophical questions. What does it mean to assert something with the precise goal of then showing it to be false, i.e. because it leads to absurd conclusions? What kind of absurdity do we obtain? Moreover, in the mathematics education literature number of studies have shown that students find it difficult to truly comprehend the idea of reductio proofs, which indicates the cognitive complexity of these constructions. In (...)
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  125.  18
    Antonia Peacocke (forthcoming). Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...)
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  126.  13
    Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (forthcoming). A Nonconceptualist Reading of the B-Deduction. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...)
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  127.  12
    Philip Pettit (forthcoming). Broome on Reasoning and Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is a trail-blazing study of the nature of rationality, the nature of reasoning and the connection between the two. But it may be somewhat misleading in two respects. First, his theory of reasoning is consistent with the meta-propositional view that he rejects; it develops a broadly similar theory but in much greater detail. And while his discussion of rule-following helps to explain the role of rules in reasoning, it does not constitute a response to the (...)
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  128.  22
    Michael Price (forthcoming). Naming the Concept Horse. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument for this (...)
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  129.  39
    Graham Priest (forthcoming). Thinking the Impossible. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    The article looks at the structure of impossible worlds, and their deployment in the analysis of some intentional notions. In particular, it is argued that one can, in fact, conceive anything, whether or not it is impossible. Thus a semantics of conceivability requires impossible worlds.
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  130.  10
    Sarah Robins (forthcoming). Representing the Past: Memory Traces and the Causal Theory of Memory. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    According to the Causal Theory of Memory, remembering a particular past event requires a causal connection between that event and its subsequent representation in memory, specifically, a connection sustained by a memory trace. The CTM is the default view of memory in contemporary philosophy, but debates persist over what the involved memory traces must be like. Martin and Deutscher argued that the CTM required memory traces to be structural analogues of past events. Bernecker and Michaelian, contemporary CTM proponents, reject structural (...)
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  131.  28
    Jonathan Schaffer (forthcoming). Social Construction as Grounding; Or: Fundamentality for Feminists, a Reply to Barnes and Mikkola. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Feminist metaphysics is guided by the insight that gender is socially constructed, yet the metaphysics behind social construction remains obscure. Barnes and Mikkola charge that current metaphysical frameworks—including my grounding framework—are hostile to feminist metaphysics. I argue that not only is a grounding framework hospitable to feminist metaphysics, but also that a grounding framework can help shed light on the metaphysics behind social construction. By treating social construction claims as grounding claims, the feminist metaphysician and the social ontologist both gain (...)
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  132.  24
    Jeffrey Seidman (forthcoming). The Unity of Caring and the Rationality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Caring is a complex attitude. At first look, it appears very complex: it seems to involve a wide range of emotional and other dispositions, all focused on the object cared about. What ties these dispositions together, so that they jointly comprise a single attitude? I offer a theory of caring, the Attentional Theory, that answers this question. According to the Attentional Theory, caring consists of just two, logically distinct dispositions: a disposition to attend to an object and hence to considerations (...)
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  133.  6
    Theodore Sider (forthcoming). Substantivity in Feminist Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Elizabeth Barnes and Mari Mikkola raise the important question of whether certain recent approaches to metaphysics exclude feminist metaphysics. My own approach does not, or so I argue. I do define “substantive” questions in terms of fundamentality; and the concepts of feminist metaphysics are nonfundamental. But my definition does not count a question as being nonsubstantive simply because it involves nonfundamental concepts. Questions about the causal structure of the world, including the causal structure of the social world, are generally substantive (...)
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  134.  7
    Ernest Sosa (forthcoming). Replies to Comments on Judgment and Agency. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    This paper is part of a book symposium on my Judgment and Agency. Here I reply to the comments of three commentators: Jason Baehr, Imogen Dickie, and Hilary Kornblith.
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  135.  19
    Jeff Speaks (forthcoming). A Puzzle About Demonstratives and Semantic Competence. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    My aim in this paper is to lay out a number of theses which are very widely held in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and to argue that, given some extra theses for which I’ll argue, they are inconsistent. Some of this will involve going through some very well-trodden territory—my hope is that presenting this familiar ground in the way that I do will help to make plain the problem that I aim to identify.
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  136. Jason Stanley (forthcoming). Context, Interest-Relativity, and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
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  137.  4
    Andreas Stokke (forthcoming). Metaphors and Martinis: A Response to Jessica Keiser. Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both (...)
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  138.  1
    Kyle Swan (forthcoming). Legal Punishment of Immorality: Once More Into the Breach. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Gerald Dworkin’s overlooked defense of legal moralism attempts to undermine the traditional liberal case for a principled distinction between behavior that is immoral and criminal and behavior that is immoral but not criminal. According to Dworkin, his argument for legal moralism “depends upon a plausible idea of what making moral judgments involves.” The idea Dworkin has in mind here is a metaethical principle that many have connected to morality/reasons internalism. I agree with Dworkin that this is a plausible principle, but (...)
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  139.  5
    Zoltán Gendler Szabó (forthcoming). Finding the Question. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    Yablo gives us an account of subject-matter - a characterization of what declarative sentences are about. I argue that this account can be seen as a way of adjusting Frege’s theory of meaning, so as it no longer carries the implausible commitment that declarative sentences refer to their truth-values. I also point out that Yablo’s approach faces an unpleasant choice: give up a uniform compositional semantics for interrogative sentences or abandon the idea that ordinary characterizations of subject matter are literally (...)
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  140.  4
    Nicholas Tebben & John Philip Waterman (forthcoming). Counterfeit Testimony: Lies, Trust, and the Exchange of Information. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Most explanations of the rational authority of testimony provide little guidance when evaluating individual pieces of testimony. In practice, however, we are remarkably sensitive to the varying epistemic credentials of testimony: extending trust when it is deserved, and withholding it when it is not. A complete account of the epistemology of testimony should, then, have something to say about when it is that testimony is trustworthy. In the typical case, to judge someone trustworthy requires judging them to be competent and (...)
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  141.  17
    Hamid Vahid (forthcoming). A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    An important question in epistemology concerns how the two species of justification, propositional and doxastic justification, are related to one another. According to the received view, basing one’s belief p on the grounds that provide propositional justification to believe p is sufficient for the belief to be doxastically justified. In a recent paper, however, John Turri has suggested that we should reverse the direction of explanation. In this paper, I propose to see the debate in a new light by suggesting (...)
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  142. Johan van Benthem (forthcoming). Epistemic Logic and Epistemology. The State of Their Affairs', to Appear in V. Hendricks, Ed., Special Issue Of. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  143.  3
    Manuel R. Vargas (forthcoming). Contested Terms and Philosophical Debates. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    There are two standard theoretical responses to putative errors in ordinary thinking about some given target property: eliminativism or revisionism. Roughly, eliminativism is the denial that the target property exists, and revisionism is the view that the property exists, but that people tend to have false beliefs about it. Recently, Shaun Nichols has proposed a third option: discretionism. Discretionism is the idea that some terms have multiple reference conventions, so that it may be true to say with eliminativists that the (...)
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  144.  13
    Kai F. Wehmeier (forthcoming). Identity and Quantification. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    It is a philosophical commonplace that quantification involves, invokes, or presupposes, the relation of identity. There seem to be two major sources for this belief: the conviction that identity is implicated in the phenomenon of bound variable recurrence within the scope of a quantifier; memories of Quine’s insistence that quantification requires absolute identity for the values of variables. With respect to, I show that the only extant argument for a dependence of variable recurrence on identity, due to John Hawthorne, fails. (...)
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  145.  13
    Muk Yan Wong (forthcoming). The Mood-Emotion Loop. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    This paper aims to clarify and reformulate the conceptual relationship between emotions and moods in light of recent researches in philosophy and cognitive psychology. I argue that the mechanism of mood may produces cognitive biases that affect the appraisals involved in emotions, whereas the mechanism of emotion may produce physiological and behavioral responses that affect the energy level being monitored by mood. These two distinct mechanisms can affect each other repeatedly and continuously, which form the mood-emotion loop. I argue that (...)
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  146.  4
    Stephen Yablo (forthcoming). Open Knowledge and Changing the Subject. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Knowledge is closed under implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness”? This paper compares two styles of explanation: evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject (...)
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  147.  5
    Stephen Yablo (forthcoming). Precis of Aboutness. Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    A lightning fast summary of Yablo, Aboutness, cutting many corners in the interests of brevity. The emphasis is on “ways.” Substituting “ways for S to be true” in for “worlds in which S is true” improves a number of philosophical explanations. The subject matter of S is identified with S’s ways of holding in a world, or failing, as the case may be. S contains T iff T is implied by S, and T’s ways of being true are implied by (...)
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  148.  4
    Stephen Yablo (forthcoming). Replies to Commentators. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    I reply to three commentators—Friederike Moltmann, Daniel Rothschild, and Zoltán Szabó—on six topics—sense and reference, the unity of subject matter, questions, presupposition, partial truth, and content mereology.
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  149.  13
    Julia Zakkou (forthcoming). Jesus Loves You! Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    According to orthodox semantics, a given sentence as used at a given situation expresses at most one content. In the last decade, this view has been challenged with several objections. Many of them have been addressed in the literature. But one has gone almost unheeded. It stems from sentences that are used to address several people individually, like ‘Jesus loves you!’ as uttered by a priest at a sermon. Cappelen :23–46, 2008), Egan :251–279, 2009), López de Sa :241–253, 2014), and (...)
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