Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  20
    Adam Bales (forthcoming). The Pauper’s Problem: Chance, Foreknowledge and Causal Decision Theory. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In a letter to Wlodek Rabinowicz, David Lewis introduced a decision scenario that he described as “much more problematic for decision theory than the Newcomb Problems”. This scenario, which involves an agent with foreknowledge of the outcome of some chance process, has received little subsequent attention. However, in one of the small number of discussions of such cases, Huw Price's Causation, Chance and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence it has been argued that cases of this sort (...)
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  2.  12
    Eric Christian Barnes (forthcoming). Character Control and Historical Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Some proponents of compatibilist moral responsibility have proposed an historical theory which requires that agents deploy character control in order to be morally responsible. An important type of argument for the character control condition is the manipulation argument, such as Mele’s example of Beth and Chuck. In this paper I show that Beth can be exonerated on various conditions other than her failure to execute character control—I propose a new character, Patty, who meets these conditions and is, I argue, morally (...)
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  3. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Omission Impossible. Philosophical Studies.
    This paper gives a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, counterfactuals imbued with causal content whose antecedents appeal to metaphysically impossible worlds. Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to metaphysically impossible events. I provide a positive account of impossible omissions, and argue for two claims: (i) impossible omissions are causally relevant to the actual world, and (ii) a substantive analysis of causal counterpossibles provides further evidence for the nonvacuity of counterpossibles more generally.
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  4.  33
    Elisabeth Camp (forthcoming). Why Metaphors Make Good Insults: Perspectives, Presupposition, and Pragmatics. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ‘framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ‘complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are rhetorically (...)
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  5.  14
    Justin A. Capes (forthcoming). Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility. Philosophical Studies.
    Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other (...)
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  6.  17
    Mihnea D. I. Capraru (forthcoming). Objective Truth in Matters of Taste. Philosophical Studies.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic (...)
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  7. Christopher Clarke (forthcoming). The Explanatory Virtue of Abstracting Away From Idiosyncratic and Messy Detail. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Some explanations are relatively abstract: they abstract away from the idiosyncratic or messy details of the case in hand. The received wisdom in philosophy is that this is a virtue for any explanation to possess. I argue that the apparent consensus on this point is illusory. When philosophers make this claim, they differ on which of four alternative varieties of abstractness they have in mind. What’s more, for each variety of abstractness there are several alternative reasons to think that the (...)
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  8.  49
    Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath (forthcoming). Perceptual Reasons. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...)
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  9.  16
    David M. Cornell (forthcoming). Taking Monism Seriously. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Monism is the view that there is only a single material object in existence: the world. According to this view, therefore, the ordinary objects of common sense—cats and hats, cars and stars, and so on—do not actually exist; there is only the world. Because of this, monism is routinely dismissed in the contemporary literature as being absurd and obviously false. It is simply obvious that there is a plurality of material things, thus it is simply obvious that monism is false, (...)
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  10.  2
    Gabriel De Marco (forthcoming). Rescuing the Zygote Argument. Philosophical Studies.
    In a recent paper, Kristin Mickelson argues that Alfred Mele’s Zygote Argument, a popular argument for the claim that the truth of determinism would preclude free action or moral responsibility, is not valid. This sort of objection is meant to generalize to various manipulation arguments. According to Mickelson, the only way to make such arguments valid is to supplement them with an argument that is an inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I argue that there are two other (...)
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  11.  21
    Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Multiple Location Defended. Philosophical Studies.
  12.  15
    James Genone (forthcoming). Introduction: Perceptual Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-1.
  13.  23
    Harmen Ghijsen (forthcoming). The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has received a lot of attention in recent epistemology, as it seems to make perceptual justification too easy to come by for experientialist theories of justification. Some have tried to respond to this challenge by arguing that cognitive penetration downgrades the epistemic status of perceptual experience, thereby diminishing its justificatory power. I discuss two examples of this strategy, and argue that they fail on several grounds. Most importantly, they fail to realize that cognitive penetration is (...)
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  14.  8
    Alex Gregory (forthcoming). Normative Reasons as Good Bases. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a (...)
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  15. Bruno Guindon (forthcoming). Sources, Reasons, and Requirements. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I (...)
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  16.  12
    Peter Hawke (forthcoming). Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of (...)
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  17. John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre (forthcoming). Belief is Weak. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    It is tempting to posit an intimate relationship between belief and assertion. The speech act of assertion seems like a way of transferring the speaker’s belief to his or her audience. If this is right, then you might think that the evidential warrant required for asserting a proposition is just the same as the warrant for believing it. We call this thesis entitlement equality. We argue here that entitlement equality is false, because our everyday notion of belief is unambiguously a (...)
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  18.  29
    Jan Heylen (forthcoming). Counterfactual Theories of Knowledge and the Notion of Actuality. Philosophical Studies.
    The central question of this article is how to combine counterfactual theories of knowledge with the notion of actuality. It is argued that the straightforward combination of these two elements leads to problems, viz. the problem of collapsing knowledge and the problem of missing knowledge. In other words, there is overgeneration of knowledge and there is undergeneration of knowledge. The combination of these problems cannot be solved by appealing to methods by which beliefs are formed. An alternative solution is (...)
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  19.  10
    David Hills (forthcoming). The What and the How of Metaphorical Imagining, Part One. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    We humans are remarkably interested in and skilled at games of make believe, games whose rules make what we are called on to imagine depend on what’s actually perceivably true about things and people that have what it takes to assume various fictional roles and that thereby function in the games as props. For the most part we play these games on an improvised pickup basis, working out the rules we play by in the very act of playing by them. (...)
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  20. Michael Huemer (forthcoming). A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
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  21.  6
    Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (forthcoming). Perceptual Fundamentalism and a Priori Bootstrapping. Philosophical Studies.
    According to Perceptual Fundamentalism we can have justified perceptual beliefs solely in virtue of having perceptual experiences with corresponding contents. Recently, it has been argued that Perceptual Fundamentalism entails that it is possible to gain an a priori justified belief that perception is reliable by engaging in a suppositional reasoning process of a priori bootstrapping. But I will show that Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping being a rational reasoning process. On the most plausible versions of Perceptual (...)
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  22.  5
    Justin Klocksiem (forthcoming). How to Accept the Transitivity of Better Than. Philosophical Studies.
    Although the thesis that the moral better than relation is transitive seems obviously true, there is a growing literature according to which Parfit’s repugnant conclusion and related puzzles reveal that this thesis is false or problematic. This paper begins by presenting several such puzzles and explaining how they can be used in arguments for the intransitivity of better than. It then proposes and defends a plausible alternative picture of the behavior of better than that both resolves the repugnant conclusion and (...)
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  23. Baptiste Le Bihan (forthcoming). Super-Relationism: Combining Eliminativism About Objects and Relationism About Spacetime. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    I will introduce and motivate eliminativist super-relationism. This is the conjunction of relationism about spacetime and eliminativism about material objects. According to the view, the universe is a big collection of spatio-temporal relations and natural properties, and no substance (material or spatio-temporal) exists in it. The view is original since eliminativism about material objects, when understood as including not only ordinary objects like tables or chairs but also physical particles, is generally taken to imply substantivalism about spacetime: if properties are (...)
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  24.  12
    Hallie Liberto & Fred Harrington (forthcoming). Evil, Wrongdoing, and Concept Distinctness. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Philosophers theorizing about ‘evil’ usually distinguish evil actions from acts of ordinary wrongdoing. They either attempt to isolate some quality or set of qualities shared by all evil actions that is not found in other wrongful actions, or they concede that their account of evil is only distinguished by capturing the very worst acts on the scale of moral wrongness. The idea that evil is qualitatively distinct from wrongdoing has recently been under contention. We explore the grounds for this contention, (...)
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  25.  38
    Jon Erling Litland (forthcoming). An Infinitely Descending Chain of Ground Without a Lower Bound. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    Using only uncontentious principles from the logic of ground I construct an infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound. I then compare the construction to the constructions due to Dixon and Rabin and Rabern.
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  26.  89
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Experiential Evidence? Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from running together two very difference conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, though not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a new and nonstandard reading of the Sellarsian dilemma.
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  27.  29
    Benjamin Matheson (forthcoming). In Defence of the Four-Case Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument was once considered to be the most powerful of the manipulation arguments against compatibilism. However, because of Demetriou’s :595–617, 2010) response, Pereboom has significantly weakened his argument. Manipulation arguments in general have also been challenged by King : 65–83, 2013). In this paper, I argue that the Four-Case Argument resists both these challenges. One upshot is that Pereboom doesn’t need weaken his argument. Another is that compatibilists still need a response the Four-Case Argument. And another is that (...)
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  28.  78
    Neil McDonnell (forthcoming). Events and Their Counterparts. Philosophical Studies.
    This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactual theory of causation (call this combination CCT), can help resolve three puzzles from the causation literature. First, CCT traces the apparent contextual shifts in our causal attributions to shifts in the counterpart relation which obtains in those contexts. Second, being sensitive to shifts in the counterpart relation can help diagnose what goes wrong in certain prominent examples where the transitivity of causation appears to fail. Third, CCT (...)
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  29.  27
    Matthew McGrath (forthcoming). Schellenberg on the Epistemic Force of Experience. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we (...)
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  30.  1
    Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin & Michael Nelson (forthcoming). S5 for Aristotelian Actualists. Philosophical Studies.
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  31.  82
    Daniel Nolan (forthcoming). Conditionals and Curry. Philosophical Studies.
    Curry's paradox for "if.. then.." concerns the paradoxical features of sentences of the form "If this very sentence is true, then 2+2=5". Standard inference principles lead us to the conclusion that such conditionals have true consequents: so, for example, 2+2=5 after all. There has been a lot of technical work done on formal options for blocking Curry paradoxes while only compromising a little on the various central principles of logic and meaning that are under threat. -/- Once we (...)
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  32.  16
    Eileen S. Nutting (forthcoming). To Bridge Gödel’s Gap. Philosophical Studies.
    In ‘‘Mathematical Truth,’’ Paul Benacerraf raises an epistemic challenge for mathematical platonists. In this paper, I examine the assumptions that motivate Benacerraf’s original challenge, and use them to construct a new causal challenge for the epistemology of mathematics. This new challenge, which I call ‘Go¨del’s Gap’, appeals to intuitive insights into mathematical knowledge. Though it is a causal challenge, it does not rely on any obviously objectionable constraints on knowledge. As a result, it is more compelling than the original challenge. (...)
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  33.  29
    Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Objects for Multisensory Perception. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Object perception deploys a suite of perceptual capacities that constrains attention, guides reidentification, subserves recognition, and anchors demonstrative thought. Objects for perception—perceptual objects—are the targets of such capacities. Characterizing perceptual objects for multisensory perception faces two puzzles. First is the diversity of objects across sensory modalities. Second is the unity of multisensory perceptual objects. This paper resolves the puzzles. Objects for perception are structured mereologically complex individuals. Perceptual objects are items that bear perceptible features and have perceptible parts arranged to (...)
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  34.  31
    Luis R. G. Oliveira (forthcoming). Rossian Totalism About Intrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view (...)
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  35.  21
    Rik Peels (forthcoming). The Empirical Case Against Introspection. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between (...)
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  36.  9
    Ben Phillips (forthcoming). Contextualism About Object-Seeing. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing (...)
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  37.  5
    Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (forthcoming). Compound Figures: Priority and Speech-Act Structure. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Compound figures are a rich, and under-explored area for tackling fundamental issues in philosophy of language. This paper explores new ideas about how to explain some features of such figures. We start with an observation from Stern that in ironic-metaphor, metaphor is logically prior to irony in the structure of what is communicated. Call this thesis Logical-MPT. We argue that a speech-act-based explanation of Logical-MPT is to be preferred to a content-based explanation. To create this explanation we draw on Barker’s (...)
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  38. Bradley Rettler (forthcoming). The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the “General Truthmaker View”: when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something that makes true the proposition expressed by the sentence. This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that we are not (...)
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  39.  24
    Bradley Rettler (forthcoming). Erratum To: The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies:1-1.
    These are the acknowledgements omitted from the original article. "Thanks to Jon Jacobs, Dan Korman, Kate Ritchie, and audiences at the 2012 University of Texas, Biola, and Pacific APA conferences for providing comments on and objections to various early drafts, and to a referee for this journal whose excellent comments helped me improve the paper substantially. Special thanks to Tim Pawl, Mike Rea, Noel Saenz, and Alex Skiles for spending many hours talking through these ideas and commenting on early drafts. (...)
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  40.  26
    Richard Rowland (forthcoming). In Defence of Good Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Many including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, Richard Kraut, and Paul Ziff have argued for good simpliciter skepticism. According to good simpliciter skepticism, we should hold that there is no concept of being good simpliciter or that there is no property of being good simpliciter. I first show that prima facie we should not accept either form of good simpliciter skepticism. I then show that all of the arguments that good simpliciter skeptics have proposed for their view fail (...)
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  41.  31
    Bradford Saad (forthcoming). How to Befriend Zombies: A Guide for Physicalists. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Though not myself a physicalist, I develop a new argument against antiphysicalist positions that are motivated by zombie arguments. I first identify four general features of phenomenal states that are candidates for non-physical types; these are used to generate different types of zombie. I distinguish two antiphysicalist positions: strict dualism, which posits exactly one general non-physical type, and pluralism, which posits more than one such type. It turns out that zombie arguments threaten strict dualism and some pluralist positions as much (...)
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  42.  4
    Robert Schwartzkopff (forthcoming). Number Sentences and Specificational Sentences. Philosophical Studies.
    Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed (...)
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  43.  31
    Miles Tucker (forthcoming). The Pen, the Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread (...)
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  44.  10
    Jared Warren (forthcoming). Sider on the Epistemology of Structure. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Theodore Sider’s recent book, “Writing the Book of the World”, employs a primitive notion of metaphysical structure in order to make sense of substantive metaphysics. But Sider and others who employ metaphysical primitives face serious epistemological challenges. In the first section I develop a specific form of this <span class='Hi'>challenge</span> for Sider’s own proposed epistemology for structure; the second section develops a general <span class='Hi'>reliability</span> <span class='Hi'>challenge</span> for Sider’s theory; and the third and final section argues for the rejection of (...)
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  45.  99
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  46.  8
    Greg Ackerman (forthcoming). Securing Singular Thought About Merely Hypothetical Entities. Philosophical Studies.
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  47.  4
    Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (forthcoming). Perceptual Fundamentalism and a Priori Bootstrapping. Philosophical Studies.
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  48.  8
    Stephen Barker (forthcoming). Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds (...)
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  49.  4
    Hagit Benbaji (forthcoming). What Can We Not Do at Will and Why. Philosophical Studies.
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  50.  58
    Alex Byrne (forthcoming). The Epistemic Significance of Experience. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.
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  51.  1
    Albert Casullo (forthcoming). Response to My Critics: Chris Pincock, Lisa Warenski and Jonathan Weinberg. Philosophical Studies.
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  52.  39
    Erhan Demircioglu (forthcoming). Naïve Realism and Phenomenological Directness: Reply to Millar. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.
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  53.  65
    John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo (forthcoming). Matters of Ambiguity: Faultless Disagreement, Relativism and Realism. Philosophical Studies.
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  54. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab (forthcoming). The Sensory Basis of the Epistemic Gap: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies.
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  55.  25
    Kathrin Glüer (forthcoming). Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further (...)
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  56.  26
    Christopher Howard (forthcoming). Transparency and the Ethics of Belief. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    A central dispute in the ethics of belief concerns what kinds of considerations can be reasons for belief. Nishi Shah has recently argued that the correct explanation of transparency in doxastic deliberation—the psychological phenomenon that only considerations bearing on the truth of p can be deliberated from to conclude in believing that p—settles this debate in favor of strict evidentialism, the view that only evidence can be a reason for belief. I argue that Shah’s favored explanation of transparency fails to (...)
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  57.  1
    Noa Latham (forthcoming). Meditation and Self-Control. Philosophical Studies.
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  58.  35
    Adam Pautz (forthcoming). What is My Evidence That Here is a Cup? Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification.
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  59.  1
    Jason D. Runyan (forthcoming). Events, Agents, and Settling Whether and How One Intervenes. Philosophical Studies.
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  60.  2
    Joseph Sartorelli (forthcoming). Biological Process, Essential Origin, and Identity. Philosophical Studies.
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  61. Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, (...)
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  62. Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    This is part of a symposium on my paper “Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence ”.
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  63. Re’em Segev (forthcoming). Should We Prevent Deontological Wrongdoing? Philosophical Studies.
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  64. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Perception and the External World. Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.
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  65.  18
    Chandra Sripada (forthcoming). Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-30.
    According to Dewey, we are responsible for our conduct because it is “ourselves objectified in action”. This idea lies at the heart of an increasingly influential deep self approach to moral responsibility. Existing formulations of deep self views have two major problems: They are often underspecified, and they tend to understand the nature of the deep self in excessively rationalistic terms. Here I propose a new deep self theory of moral responsibility called the Self-Expression account that addresses these issues. The (...)
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  66.  12
    Julia Staffel (forthcoming). Beliefs, Buses and Lotteries: Why Rational Belief Can’T Be Stably High Credence. Philosophical Studies.
    Until recently, it seemed like no theory about the relationship between rational credence and rational outright belief could reconcile three independently plausible assumptions: that our beliefs should be logically consistent, that our degrees of belief should be probabilistic, and that a rational agent believes something just in case she is sufficiently confident in it. Recently a new formal framework has been proposed that can accommodate these three assumptions, which is known as “the stability theory of belief” or “high probability cores.” (...)
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  67.  4
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (forthcoming). What is the a Priori, That Thou Art Mindful of It?: A Comment on Albert Casullo, Essays on a Priori Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
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  68.  2
    Stephen Wright (forthcoming). Circular Testimony. Philosophical Studies.
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  69.  8
    Adam Zweber (forthcoming). Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
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  70.  9
    Chrisoula Andreou (forthcoming). Cashing Out the Money-Pump Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-5.
    The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption that it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as (...)
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  71.  13
    Avery Archer (forthcoming). Do Desires Provide Reasons? An Argument Against the Cognitivist Strategy. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to (...)
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  72. D. M. Armstrong (forthcoming). The Causal Theory of Properties: Shoemaker, Ellis and Others. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  73.  6
    Jeff Behrends & Joshua DiPaolo (forthcoming). Probabilistic Promotion Revisited. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Promotion is the relation between an act and a desire that obtains when the act advances or serves the desire. Under what conditions does an act promote a desire? Probabilistic accounts of promotion, the most prominent accounts, analyze promotion in terms of an increase in the probability of the desire’s satisfaction. In this paper, we clarify the promotion relation and explain why probabilistic accounts are attractive. Then we identify two questions probabilistic accounts must answer: the Baseline Question and the Interpretation (...)
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  74. Daniel Bonevac & Thomas Seung (forthcoming). Conflicts of Values. Philosophical Studies.
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  75.  10
    Thomas D. Bontly (forthcoming). Causes, Contrasts, and the Non-Identity Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Can an act harm someone—a future someone, someone who does not exist yet but will—if that person would never exist but for that very action? This is one question raised by the non-identity problem. Many would argue that the answer is No: an action harms someone only insofar as it is worse for her, and an action cannot be worse for someone if she would not exist without it. The first part of this paper contends that the plausibility of the (...)
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  76. David Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming). Mastering Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  77.  4
    Ben Caplan (forthcoming). Soames’s New Conception of Propositions. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    In this paper, I argue that, when it comes to explaining what can be described as “representational” properties of propositions, Soames’s new conception of propositions—on which the proposition that Seattle is sunny is the act of predicating the property being sunny of Seattle and to entertain that proposition is to perform that act—does not have an advantage over traditional ones.
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  78.  34
    J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this proposal can: accommodate our (...)
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  79.  12
    Nick Colgrove & Trent Dougherty (forthcoming). Hawthorne’s Might-y Failure: A Reply to “Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity”. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    In “Knowledge and epistemic necessity,” John Hawthorne gives a defense of what he rightly calls the “standard approach” to epistemic possibility against what he calls a new “competing idea” presented by Dougherty and Rysiew which he notes has been “endorsed and elaborated upon” by Fantl and McGrath. According to the standard approach, roughly, p is epistemically possible for S if S doesn’t know that not-p. The new approach has it that p is epistemically possible if p has a non-zero epistemic (...)
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  80. Keith DeRose (forthcoming). Forthcoming,'Single Scoreboard Semantics'. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  81.  26
    Christina H. Dietz (forthcoming). Are All Reasons Causes? Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    In this paper, I revisit the Davidsonian thesis that all reasons are causes. Drawing on a better taxonomy of reasons than the one Davidson provides, I argue that this thesis is either indefensible or uninteresting.
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  82.  5
    Rachel Elizabeth Fraser (forthcoming). Risk, Doubt, and Transmission. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Despite their substantial appeal, closure principles have fallen on hard times. Both anti-luck conditions on knowledge and the defeasibility of knowledge look to be in tension with natural ways of articulating single-premise closure principles. The project of this paper is to show that plausible theses in the epistemology of testimony face problems structurally identical to those faced by closure principles. First I show how Lasonen-Aarnio’s claim that there is a tension between single premise closure and anti-luck constraints on knowledge can (...)
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  83.  5
    Mitchell Green (forthcoming). Imagery, Expression, and Metaphor. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Metaphorical utterances are construed as falling into two broad categories, in one of which are cases amenable to analysis in terms of semantic content, speaker meaning, and satisfaction conditions, and where image-construction is permissible but not mandatory. I call these image-permitting metaphors, and contrast them with image-demanding metaphors comprising a second category and whose understanding mandates the construction of a mental image. This construction, I suggest, is spontaneous, is not restricted to visual imagery, and its result is typically somatically marked (...)
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  84.  4
    Laurence Horn (forthcoming). Lie-Toe-Tease: Double Negatives and Unexcluded Middles. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Litotes, “a figure of speech in which an affirmative is expressed by the negative of the contrary” has had some tough reviews. For Pope and Swift, litotes—stock examples include “no mean feat”, “no small problem”, and “not bad at all”—is “the peculiar talent of Ladies, Whisperers, and Backbiters”; for Orwell, it is a means to affect “an appearance of profundity” that we can deport from English “by memorizing this sentence: A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across (...)
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  85.  5
    Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann (forthcoming). Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers’ reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the intuitions of philosophical experts count—yet the bulk of experimental philosophy consists in studies with lay people. In this paper, we argue that direct strategies for assessing the expertise defense are preferable to indirect strategies. A direct argument in support of the expertise defense would have to show: first, that there is a significant difference between expert and lay (...)
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  86.  54
    Michael Huemer (forthcoming). Serious Theories and Skeptical Theories: Why You Are Probably Not a Brain in a Vat. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayesian grounds, the scenario is not well supported by the evidence. By contrast, serious theories make reasonably specific predictions about the evidence and are then well supported when these predictions are satisfied.
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  87.  5
    Jaemin Jung (forthcoming). Conservatism and Uniqueness. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Credal Conservatism says that an agent’s credal states should be conserved as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness says that for any given total evidence, there is a unique credal state that any agent with that total evidence should have. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that there are no significant differences between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements when determining what credal states one ought to have for purposes of epistemic evaluation. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a (...)
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  88.  1
    Aki Lehtinen (forthcoming). Allocating Confirmation with Derivational Robustness. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it is shown to depend on confirmed rather than disconfirmed assumptions. Although increasing the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it in such a case, robustness may also be irrelevant for confirmation, or may even disconfirm. Whether or not it confirms depends on the available data and on what other results have already been established.
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  89.  6
    Nick Leonard (forthcoming). Testimony, Evidence and Interpersonal Reasons. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    According to the Interpersonal View of Testimony, testimonial justification is non-evidential in nature. I begin by arguing that the IVT has the following problem: If the IVT is true, then young children and people with autism cannot participate in testimonial exchanges; but young children and people with autism can participate in testimonial exchanges; thus, the IVT should be rejected on the grounds that it has over-cognized what it takes to give and receive testimony. Afterwards, I consider what I take to (...)
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  90.  5
    Andrés Carlos Luco (forthcoming). Non-Negotiable: Why Moral Naturalism Cannot Do Away with Categorical Reasons. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then (...)
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  91.  12
    Yannig Luthra (forthcoming). Non-Rational Aspects of Skilled Agency. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    This paper criticizes two closely connected rationalist views about human agency. The first of these views, rationalism about agential control, claims that the capacities for agential control in normal adult human beings are rational capacities. The second view, rationalism about action, claims that the capacities for agential control in virtue of which the things we do count as our actions are rational capacities. The arguments of the paper focus on aspects of technical skills that control integral details of skillful action, (...)
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  92.  26
    Ofra Magidor (forthcoming). Category Mistakes and Figurative Language. Philosophical Studies.
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  93.  12
    Berislav Marušić (forthcoming). Asymmetry Arguments. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    In the First Meditation, the Cartesian meditator temporarily concludes that he cannot know anything, because he cannot discriminate dreaming from waking while he is dreaming. To resist the meditator’s conclusion, one could deploy an asymmetry argument. Following Bernard Williams, one could argue that even if the meditator cannot discriminate dreaming from waking while dreaming, it does not follow that he cannot do it while awake. In general, asymmetry arguments seek to identify an asymmetry between a bad case that is entertained (...)
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  94.  23
    Andreas L. Mogensen (forthcoming). Do Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rest on a Mistake About Evolutionary Explanations? Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Many moral philosophers accept the Debunking Thesis, according to which facts about natural selection provide debunking explanations for certain of our moral beliefs. I argue that philosophers who accept the Debunking Thesis beg important questions in the philosophy of biology. They assume that past selection can explain why you or I hold certain of the moral beliefs we do. A position advanced by many prominent philosophers of biology implies that this assumption is false. According to the Negative View, natural selection (...)
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  95.  17
    Ram Neta (forthcoming). Perceptual Evidence and the Capacity View. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    Susanna Schellenberg defends what she calls a "capacity view" concerning perceptual evidence. In this paper, I raise six challenges to Schellenberg's argument.
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  96.  30
    Thorben Petersen (forthcoming). The Grounding Problem for Eternalism. Philosophical Studies:1-34.
    In this paper, I develop an argument against eternalism, which is similar to the widely discussed grounding problem for presentism. It has recently been argued by many that presentism should be rejected on grounds that its sparse ontology is not suited to underwrite the healthy dose of realism we all share about the past. My aim basically is to add a new twist to the debate, by showing that actually eternalists are no better off than their rivals. In particular, I (...)
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  97.  3
    Christopher Pincock (forthcoming). Comments on A. Casullo’s Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
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  98.  10
    Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). Dynamic Permissivism. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    There has been considerable philosophical debate in recent years over a thesis called epistemic permissivism. According to the permissivist, it is possible for two agents to have the exact same total body of evidence and yet differ in their belief attitudes towards some proposition, without either being irrational. However, I argue, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between different ways in which permissivism might be true. In this paper, I present a taxonomy of forms of epistemic permissivism (...)
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  99.  8
    Michael Price (forthcoming). Naming the Concept Horse. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument (...)
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  100.  8
    Bernhard Salow (forthcoming). Lewis on Iterated Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    The status of the knowledge iteration principles in the account provided by Lewis in “Elusive Knowledge” is disputed. By distinguishing carefully between what in the account describes the contribution of the attributor’s context and what describes the contribution of the subject’s situation, we can resolve this dispute in favour of Holliday’s claim that the iteration principles are rendered invalid. However, that is not the end of the story. For Lewis’s account still predicts that counterexamples to the negative iteration principle ) (...)
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  101.  6
    Stephen Schiffer (forthcoming). Cognitive Propositions. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Soames's new theory of "cognitive propositions" is presented and several prima facie objections are presented to it.
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  102.  23
    Ian Schnee (forthcoming). Basic Factive Perceptual Reasons. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Many epistemologists have recently defended views on which all evidence is true or perceptual reasons are facts. On such views a common account of basic perceptual reasons is that the fact that one sees that _p_ is one’s reason for believing that _p_. I argue that that account is wrong; rather, in the basic case the fact that _p_ itself is one’s reason for believing that _p_. I show that my proposal is better motivated, solves a fundamental objection that the (...)
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  103.  7
    Jeffrey Seidman (forthcoming). The Unity of Caring and the Rationality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Caring is a complex attitude. At first look, it appears very complex: it seems to involve a wide range of emotional and other dispositions, all focused on the object cared about. What ties these dispositions together, so that they jointly comprise a single attitude? I offer a theory of caring, the Attentional Theory, that answers this question. According to the Attentional Theory, caring consists of just two, logically distinct dispositions: a disposition to attend to an object and hence to considerations (...)
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  104.  11
    Matthew Noah Smith (forthcoming). One Dogma of Philosophy of Action. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    An oft-rehearsed objection to the claim that an intention can give one reasons is that if an intention could give us reasons that would allow an agent to bootstrap herself into having a reason where she previously lacked one. Such bootstrapping is utterly implausible. So, intentions to φ cannot be reasons to φ. Call this the bootstrapping objection against intentions being reasons. This essay considers four separate interpretations of this argument and finds they all fail to establish that non-akratic, nonevil, (...)
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  105.  16
    Scott Soames (forthcoming). Yes, the Search for Explanation is All We Have. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
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  106.  4
    Scott Soames (forthcoming). Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning. Philosophical Studies:1-4.
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  107.  12
    Wolfgang Spohn (forthcoming). Three Kinds of Worlds and Two Kinds of Truth. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    This paper argues for three kinds of possible worlds: Wittgensteinian totalities of facts, Lewisian worlds or universes, concrete objects of maximal essence, and the world, a concrete object of minimal essence. It moreover explains that correspondence truth applies to Wittgensteinian totalities and pragmatic truth to Lewisian universes. And it finally argues that this conceptualization lays proper foundations to two-dimensional semantics.
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  108. Jason Stanley (forthcoming). Context, Interest-Relativity, and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
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  109.  1
    Christine Tiefensee (forthcoming). Inferentialist Metaethics, Bifurcations and Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    According to recent suggestions within the global pragmatism discussion, metaethical debate must be fundamentally re-framed. Instead of carving out metaethical differences in representational terms, it has been argued that metaethics should be given an inferentialist footing. In this paper, I put inferentialist metaethics to the test by subjecting it to the following two criteria for success: Inferentialist metaethicists must be able to save the metaethical differences between moral realism and expressivism, and do so in a way that employs understandings of (...)
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  110.  19
    Matthew Tugby (forthcoming). Universals, Laws, and Governance. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Proponents of the dispositional theory of properties typically claim that their view is not one that offers a realist, governing conception of laws. My first aim is to show that, contrary to this claim, if one commits to dispositionalism then one does not automatically give up on a robust, realist theory of laws. This is because dispositionalism can readily be developed within a Platonic framework of universals. Second, I argue that there are good reasons for realist dispositionalists to favour a (...)
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  111.  3
    P. Roger Turner (forthcoming). Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, it follows that logical versions (...)
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  112. Johan van Benthem (forthcoming). Epistemic Logic and Epistemology. The State of Their Affairs', to Appear in V. Hendricks, Ed., Special Issue Of. Philosophical Studies.
     
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