Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1. Bob Beddor (forthcoming). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    This paper explores what happens if we construe evidentialism as a thesis about the metaphysical grounds of justification. According to grounding evidentialism, facts about what a subject is justified in believing are grounded in facts about that subject’s evidence. At first blush, grounding evidentialism appears to enjoy advantages over a more traditional construal of evidentialism as a piece of conceptual analysis. However, appearances are deceiving. I argue that grounding evidentialists are unable to provide a satisfactory story about what grounds the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Karen Bennett (forthcoming). There is No Special Problem with Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    I argue for the claim in the title. Along the way, I also address an independently interesting question: what is metaphysics, anyway? I think that the typical characterizations of metaphysics are inadequate, that a better one is available, and that the better one helps explain why metaphysics is no more problematic than the rest of philosophy.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Omission Impossible. Philosophical Studies.
    This paper gives a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, statements in which a counterfactual imbued with causal content has an antecedent that appeals to a metaphysically impossible world. Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to metaphysically impossible events. I give an account of impossible omissions, and argue for two claims: (i) impossible omissions are causally relevant to the actual world, and (ii) the analysis of causal counterpossibles provides further evidence for the nonvacuity of counterpossibles more generally.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jochen Briesen (forthcoming). Perceptual Justification and Assertively Representing the World. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. Philosophical Studies.
    According to robust virtue epistemology (RVE), knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the (alleged) grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Eliminativism: Reference, Error, and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    Shaun Nichols has recently argued that while the folk notion of free will is associated with error, a question still remains whether the concept of free will should be eliminated or preserved. He maintains that like other eliminativist arguments in philosophy, arguments that free will is an illusion seem to depend on substantive assumptions about reference. According to free will eliminativists, people have deeply mistaken beliefs about free will and this entails that free will does not exist. However, an alternative (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Christopher Michael Cloos (forthcoming). Responsibilist Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition. This view overcomes a deficiency in a prominent theory of epistemic justification. As championed by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism is a theory subject to counterexamples at the hands of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Sam Coleman (forthcoming). Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory. Philosophical Studies:1-29.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Vincent Conitzer (forthcoming). A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    How should we update de dicto beliefs in the face of de se evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some disagreement among halfers about how their position should generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule, under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief article, I provide a simple (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Patrick J. Connolly (forthcoming). Locke and the Laws of Nature. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Many commentators have argued that Locke understood laws of nature as causally efficacious. On this view the laws are causally responsible for the production of natural phenomena. This paper argues that this interpretation faces serious difficulties. First, I argue that it will be very difficult to specify the ontological status of these laws. Proponents of the view suggest that these laws are divine volitions. But I argue that this will be difficult or impossible to square with Locke’s nominalism. Second, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Daniel Deasy (forthcoming). The Moving Spotlight Theory. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    The aim of this paper is to describe and defend the moving spotlight theory of time. I characterise the moving spotlight theory as the conjunction of two theses: permanentism, the thesis that everything exists forever, and the A-theory, the thesis that there is an absolute, objective present time. I begin in Sect. 2 by clearing up some common misconceptions about the moving spotlight theory, focusing on the discussion of the theory in Sider (Writing the book of the world, Oxford University (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. John M. Doris (forthcoming). Doing Without (Arguing About) Desert. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    This paper is a critical discussion of Manuel Vargas’ Building Better Beings, focusing on the treatment of desert therein. By means of an analogy between morality and sport, I examine some seemingly peculiar implications of Vargas’ teleological and revisionary account of desert. I also consider some general questions of philosophical methodology provoked by revisionary approaches.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jeff Dunn (forthcoming). Reliability for Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    We often evaluate belief-forming processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability. This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we’re considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider a natural answer to this question that focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue that this natural proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, high reliability leads to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance (forthcoming). Evidence Against Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that p only if one’s epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Kit Fine (forthcoming). Identity Criteria and Ground. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    I propose formulating identity criteria as generic statements of ground, thereby avoiding objections that have been made to the more usual formulations.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Rationally Held 'P, but I Fully Believe ~P and I Am Not Equivocating'. Philosophical Studies.
    One of Moore’s Paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding belief as well.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Christopher Evan Franklin (forthcoming). Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Seemingly one of the most prominent issues that divide theorists about free will and moral responsibility concerns whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. I defend two claims in this paper. First, that this appearance is illusory: everyone thinks an ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The central issue is not whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility but which abilities to do otherwise are necessary. Second, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Christopher Evan Franklin (forthcoming). Self-Determination, Self-Transformation, and the Case of Jean Valjean: A Problem for Velleman. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper I discuss J. David Velleman’s identification reductionist theory, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. J. Dmitri Gallow (forthcoming). A Theory of Structural Determination. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    While structural equations modeling is increasingly used in philosophical theorizing about causation, it remains unclear what it takes for a particular structural equations model to be correct. To the extent that this issue has been addressed, the consensus appears to be that it takes a certain family of causal counterfactuals being true. I argue that this account faces difficulties in securing the independent manipulability of the structural determination relations represented in a correct structural equations model. I then offer an alternate (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Daniel Giberman (forthcoming). A Topological Theory of Fundamental Concrete Particulars. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Fundamental concrete particulars are needed to explain facts about non-fundamental concrete particulars. However, the former can only play this explanatory role if they are properly discernible from the latter. Extant theories of how to discern fundamental concreta primarily concern mereological structure. Those according to which fundamental concreta can bear, but not be, proper parts are motivated by the possibilities that all concreta bear proper parts and that some properties of wholes are not fixed by the properties of their proper parts (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Nathan Hanna (forthcoming). Philosophical Success. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Peter van Inwagen proposes a criterion of philosophical success. He takes it to support an extremely pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, including the argument from evil. I’m more optimistic on both counts. I’ll identify problems with van Inwagen’s criterion and propose an alternative. I’ll then explore the differing implications of our criteria. On my view, philosophical arguments can succeed and the argument from evil isn’t obviously a failure.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Bryce Huebner (forthcoming). What is a Philosophical Effect? Models of Data in Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Papers in experimental philosophy rarely offer an account of what it would take to reveal a philosophically significant effect. In part, this is because experimental philosophers tend to pay insufficient attention to the hierarchy of models that would be required to justify interpretations of their data; as a result, some of their most exciting claims fail as explanations. But this does not impugn experimental philosophy. My aim is to show that experimental philosophy could be made more successful by developing, articulating, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Alexander Jackson (forthcoming). How You Know You Are Not a Brain in a Vat. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat ; but she doesn’t panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not inferentially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that ‘Moorean’ response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological literature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that’s plausibly responsible for a sensible (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Wouter Kalf (forthcoming). Are Moral Properties Impossible? Philosophical Studies.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Favoring. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    It has become common to take reasons to form a basic normative category that is not amenable to non-circular analysis. This paper offers a novel characterization of reasons in terms of how we ought or it would be good for us to think in response to our awareness of facts, and thus rejects such Reason Primitivism. It also responds to six potential challenges to the view and argues it has certain advantages over competing reductionist proposals.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Simon Kittle (forthcoming). Abilities to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    In this paper I outline a number of features of intrinsic dispositions and abilities and discuss how these features are relevant to free will when the latter is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. In the first section I will argue that dispositions and abilities are properly characterised or defined not simply by a set of stimulus conditions and a manifestation type, but in addition by a set of circumstances (against which that manifestation is to be expected, given (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Robert Knowles (forthcoming). What ‘the Number of Planets is Eight’ Means. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    ‘The following sentence is true only if numbers exist: The number of planets is eight. It is true; hence, numbers exist.’ So runs a familiar argument for realism about mathematical objects. But this argument relies on a controversial semantic thesis: that ‘The number of planets’ and ‘eight’ are singular terms standing for the number eight, and the copula expresses identity. This is the ‘Fregean analysis’.I show that the Fregean analysis is false by providing an analysis of sentences such as that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Kathrin Koslicki (forthcoming). Where Grounding and Causation Part Ways: Comments on Jonathan Schaffer. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Does the notion of ground, as it has recently been employed by metaphysicians, point to a single unified phenomenon ? Jonathan Schaffer holds that the phenomenon of grounding exhibits the unity characteristic of a single genus. In defense of this hypothesis, Schaffer proposes to take seriously the analogy between causation and grounding. More specifically, Schaffer argues that both grounding and causation are best approached through a single formalism, viz., that utilized by structural equation models of causation. In this paper, I (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Cognitivism About Emotion and the Alleged Hyperopacity of Emotional Content. Philosophical Studies.
    According to cognitivism about emotion, (all) emotions are reducible to some (combinations of) non-emotional states. In one version, they are reducible entirely to cognitive states, such as beliefs or judgments (Solomon 1976, Nussbaum 2001); in another, they are reducible to combinations of cognitive and conative states, such as desire or intention (Marks 1982, Gordon 1987). Cognitivism is plausibly regarded as the orthodoxy in the philosophy of emotion since the 1980s. In a recent paper, however, Montague (2009) develops a powerful argument (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Introspective Misidentification. Philosophical Studies.
    It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are “immune to error through misidentification” (IEM), relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Martin A. Lipman (forthcoming). On Fine’s Fragmentalism. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Fragmentalism is the view that reality is not a metaphysically unified place, but fragmented in a certain sense, and constituted by incompatible facts across such fragments. It was introduced by Kit Fine in a discussion of tense realist theories of time . Here I discuss the conceptual foundations of fragmentalism, identify several open questions in Fine’s characterization of the view, and propose an understanding of fragmentalism that addresses these open questions.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Experiential Evidence? Philosophical Studies.
    Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from running together two very difference conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, though not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a new and nonstandard reading of the Sellarsian dilemma.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Pains as Reasons. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Farid Masrour (forthcoming). The Geometry of Visual Space and the Nature of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    My concern in this paper is with the aspect of the phenomenal character of visual experience that pertains to its spatial dimension. I refer to this aspect as visual space. A number of contemporary theorists, explicitly hold, or are committed to the thesis that the natural properties of objects in the world are the source of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, and our perceptual access to these properties can be understood in a naturalistic framework. I shall henceforth call this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Tom McClelland (forthcoming). Affording Introspection: An Alternative Model of Inner Awareness. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    The ubiquity of inner awareness thesis states that all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very state. UIA-Backers support this thesis while UIA-Skeptics reject it. At the heart of their dispute is a recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement. UIA-Backers claim that phenomenological investigation reveals ‘peripheral inner awareness’ to be a constant presence in their non-introspective experiences. UIA-Skeptics deny that their non-introspective experiences are characterised by inner awareness, and maintain that inner awareness is only gained (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others' Minds. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Kristin Mickelson (forthcoming). The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What? Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Alfred Mele’s original Zygote Argument is invalid. At most, its premises entail the negative thesis that free action is incompossible with deterministic laws, but its conclusion asserts the positive thesis that deterministic laws preclude free action. The original, explanatory conclusion of the Zygote Argument can be defended only by supplementing it with a best-explanation argument that identifies deterministic laws as menacing. . Arguably, though, the best explanation for the manipulation victim’s lack of freedom and responsibility is his constitutive luck, which (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Lisa Miracchi (forthcoming). Competence to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    I argue against traditional virtue epistemology on which knowledge is a success due to a competence to believe truly, by revealing an in-principle problem with the traditional virtue epistemologist’s explanation of Gettier cases. The argument eliminates one of the last plausible explanation of Gettier cases, and so of knowledge, in terms of non-factive mental states and non-mental conditions. I then I develop and defend a different kind of virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is an exercise of a competence to know. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Leo Carton Mollica (forthcoming). Explanation and Nowness: An Objection to the A-Theory. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    This paper presents an argument against the A-Theory of time. Briefly, I shall contend that the A-Theorist has no explanation for why the present moment in particular has the metaphysical privilege she accords it, and that this puts the theory at a disadvantage. In what follows, I shall begin by presenting this argument. I will follow that with some potential explanations for why the present moment is privileged and reasons militating against them, in addition to some other possible objections to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Matthew Parrott (forthcoming). Expressing First-Person Authority. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a novel agency-based account (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Ángel Pinillos (forthcoming). Coreference and Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
    Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants. Consider, for example, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in ‘John went to the store and he bought some milk’. Let us call this ‘de jure’ coreference. Other times, coreference is ‘de facto’ as with ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ in a sincere use of ‘Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens’. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Tina Rulli & Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). IIA, Rationality, and the Individuation of Options. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is a popular and important axiom of decision theory. It states, roughly, that one’s choice from a set of options should not be influenced by the addition or removal of further, unchosen options. Over recent debates, a number of authors have given putative counterexamples to it, involving intuitively rational agents who violate IIA. Generally speaking, however, these counterexamples do not tend to move IIA’s proponents. Their strategy tends to be to individuate the options that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Noël B. Saenz (forthcoming). A Grounding Solution to the Grounding Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    The statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it fail to share all of their kind and modal properties. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, the statue is not the lump. Question: What grounds the kind and modal differences between the statue and the lump? In virtue of what is it that the lump of clay, but not the statue, can survive being smashed? This is the grounding problem. Now a number of solutions to the grounding problem require that we substantially (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Jonathan Schaffer (forthcoming). Grounding in the Image of Causation. Philosophical Studies:1-52.
    Grounding is often glossed as metaphysical causation, yet no current theory of grounding looks remotely like a plausible treatment of causation. I propose to take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Miguel Ángel Sebastián (forthcoming). What Panpsychists Should Reject: On the Incompatibility of Panpsychism and Organizational Invariantism. Philosophical Studies.
    Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed,the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same (sufficiently) fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Perception and the External World. Philosophical Studies.
    In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Alex Steinberg (forthcoming). Priority Monism and Part/Whole Dependence. Philosophical Studies.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Jonathan Tallant (forthcoming). Ontological Dependence in a Spacetime-World. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Priority Monism , as defined by Jonathan Schaffer , has a number of components. It is the view that: the cosmos exists; the cosmos is a maximal actual concrete object, of which all actual concrete objects are parts; the cosmos is basic—there is no object upon which the cosmos depends, ontologically; ontological dependence is a primitive and unanalysable relation. In a recent attack, Lowe has offered a series of arguments to show that Monism fails. He offers up four tranches of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). Explaining Causal Closure. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    The physical realm is causally closed, but why is it causally closed? In what follows I argue that reductive physicalists are committed to embracing one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of others, and that as a result they must give up on using a causal argument to attack mind-body dualism.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  51. Travis Timmerman (forthcoming). Does Scrupulous Securitism Stand-Up to Scrutiny? Two Problems for Moral Securitism and How We Might Fix Them. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    A relatively new debate in ethics concerns the relationship between one's present obligations and how one would act in the future. One popular view is actualism, which holds that what an agent would do in the future affects her present obligations. Agent's future behavior is held fixed and the agent's present obligations are determined by what would be best to do now in light of how the agent would act in the future. Doug Portmore defends a new view he calls (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. Tobias Wilsch (forthcoming). The Nomological Account of Ground. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    The article introduces and defends the Nomological Account of ground, a reductive account of the notion of metaphysical explanation in terms of the laws of metaphysics. The paper presents three desiderata that a theory of ground should meet: it should explain the modal force of ground, the generality of ground, and the interplay between ground and certain mereological notions. The bulk of the paper develops the Nomological Account and argues that it meets the three desiderata. The Nomological Account relies on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  53. Stephen Yablo (forthcoming). Parts and Differences. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Part/whole is said in many ways: the leg is part of the table, the subset is part of the set, rectangularity is part of squareness, and so on. Do the various flavors of part/whole have anything in common? They may be partial orders, but so are lots of non-mereological relations. I propose an “upward difference transmission” principle: x is part of y if and only if x cannot change in specified respects while y stays the same in those respects.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. Alfred Archer & Michael Ridge (forthcoming). The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox of Supererogation. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Philosophers are by now familiar with “the” paradox of supererogation. This paradox arises out of the idea that it can never be permissible to do something morally inferior to another available option, yet acts of supererogation seem to presuppose this. This paradox is not our topic in this paper. We mention it only to set it to one side and explain our subtitle. In this paper we introduce and explore another paradox of supererogation, one which also deserves serious philosophical attention. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  55. Marc Artiga (forthcoming). Rescuing Tracking Theories of Morality. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Street’s :109–166, 2006) Darwinian Dilemma purports to show that evolutionary considerations are in tension with realist theories of value, which include moral realism. According to this argument, moral realism can only be defended by assuming an implausible tracking relation between moral attitudes and moral facts. In this essay, I argue that this tracking relation is not as implausible as most people have assumed by showing that the three main objections against it are flawed. Since this is a key premise in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  56. Kenneth Boyd (forthcoming). Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    I argue here for a view I call epistemic separabilism (ES), which states that there are two different ways we can be evaluated epistemically when we assert a proposition or treat a proposition as a reason for acting: one in terms of whether we have adhered to or violated the relevant epistemic norm, and another in terms of how epistemically well-positioned we are towards the fact that we have either adhered to or violated said norm. ES has been appealed to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  57. Johan E. Gustafsson (forthcoming). Sequential Dominance and the Anti-Aggregation Principle. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    According to the widely held anti-aggregation principle, it is wrong to save a larger number of people from minor harms rather than a smaller number from much more serious harms. This principle is a central part of many influential and anti-utilitarian ethical theories. According to the sequential-dominance principle, one does something wrong if one knowingly performs a sequence of acts whose outcome would be worse for everyone than the outcome of an alternative sequence of acts. The intuitive appeal of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  58. Chad Kidd (forthcoming). The Idols of Inner-Sense. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Many philosophers hold one of two extreme views about our capacity to have phenomenally conscious experience (“inner-sense”): either (i) that inner-sense enables us to know our experience and its properties infallibly or (ii) the contrary conviction that inner-sense is utterly fallible and the evidence it provides completely defeasible. Both of these are in error. This paper presents an alternative conception of inner-sense, modeled on disjunctive conceptions of perceptual awareness, that avoids both erroneous extremes, but that builds on the commonsense intuitions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  59. Michael Robinson (forthcoming). Revisionism, Libertarianism, and Naturalistic Plausibility. Philosophical Studies.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  60. Johanna Thoma (forthcoming). Bargaining and the Impartiality of the Social Contract. Philosophical Studies.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. Peter D. Zuk (forthcoming). A Third Version of Constructivism: Rethinking Spinoza’s Metaethics. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    In this essay, I claim that certain passages in Book IV of Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics suggest a novel version of what is known as metaethical constructivism. The constructivist interpretation emerges in the course of attempting to resolve a tension between Spinoza’s apparent ethical egoism and some remarks he makes about the efficacy of collaborating with the right partners when attempting to promote our individual self-interest . Though Spinoza maintains that individuals necessarily aim to promote their self-interest, I argue that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. Solveig Aasen (forthcoming). Pictures, Presence and Visibility. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    This paper outlines a ‘perceptual account’ of depiction. It centrally contrasts with experiential accounts of depiction in that seeing something in a picture is understood as a visual experience of something present in the picture, rather than as a visual experience of something absent. The experience of a picture is in this respect akin to a veridical rather than hallucinatory perceptual experience on a perceptual account. Thus, the central selling-point of a perceptual account is that it allows taking at face (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. Mahrad Almotahari & Adam Hosein (forthcoming). Is Anything Just Plain Good? Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Geach (Analysis 17: 33–42, 1956) and Thomson (J Philos 94:273–298, 1997, Normativity, 2008) have argued that nothing is just plain good, because ‘good’ is, logically, an attributive adjective. The upshot, according to Geach and Thomson, is that consequentialism is unacceptable, since its very formulation requires a predicative (non-attributive) use of ‘good’. Reactions to the argument have, for the most part, been uniform. Authors have converged on two challenging objections (Ross, The right and the good, 1930; Pidgen, Philos Q 40:129–154, 1990; (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  64. D. M. Armstrong (forthcoming). The Causal Theory of Properties: Shoemaker, Ellis and Others. Philosophical Studies.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  65. Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (forthcoming). What is Temporal Error Theory? Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Much current debate in the metaphysics of time is between A-theorists and B-theorists. Central to this debate is the assumption that time exists and that the task of metaphysics is to catalogue time’s features. Relatively little consideration has been given to an error theory about time. Since there is very little extant work on temporal error theory the goal of this paper is simply to lay the groundwork to allow future discussion of the relative merits of such a view. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  66. Wolfgang Barz (forthcoming). Transparent Introspection of Wishes. Philosophical Studies:1-31.
    The aim of this paper is to lay the groundwork for extending the idea of transparent introspection to wishes. First, I elucidate the notion of transparent introspection and highlight its advantages over rival accounts of self-knowledge (Sect. 1). Then I pose several problems that seem to obstruct the extension of transparent introspection to wishes (Sect. 2). In order to overcome these problems, I call into question the standard propositional attitude analysis of non-doxastic attitudes (Sect. 3). My considerations lead to a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  67. Michael Beaney (forthcoming). Soames on Frege: Provoking Thoughts. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    In this symposium contribution I critically review the first two chapters, on Frege, in Volume 1 of The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy by Scott Soames.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  68. Daniel Bonevac & Thomas Seung (forthcoming). Conflicts of Values. Philosophical Studies.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  69. David Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming). Mastering Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  70. David Carr (forthcoming). Is Gratitude a Moral Virtue? Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    One matter upon which the already voluminous philosophical and psychological literature on the topic seems to be agreed is that gratitude is a psychologically and socially beneficial human quality of some moral significance. Further to this, gratitude seems to be widely regarded by positive psychologists and virtue ethicists as a moral virtue. This paper, however, sets out to show that such claims and assumptions about the moral character of gratitude are questionable and that its status as a moral virtue is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  71. Oisín Deery (forthcoming). Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Recent empirical evidence indicates that (1) people tend to believe that they possess indeterminist free will, and (2) people’s experience of choosing and deciding is that they possess such freedom. Some also maintain that (3) people’s belief in indeterminist free will has its source in their experience of choosing and deciding. Yet there seem to be good reasons to resist endorsing (3). Despite this, I maintain that belief in indeterminist free will really does have its source in experience. I explain (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  72. Keith DeRose (forthcoming). Forthcoming,'Single Scoreboard Semantics'. Philosophical Studies.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  73. Thomas Douglas (forthcoming). Parental Partiality and the Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Parents typically favour their own children over others’. For example, most parents invest more time and money in their own children than in other children. This parental partiality is usually regarded as morally permissible, or even obligatory, but it can have undesirable distributive effects. For example, it may create unfair or otherwise undesirable advantages for the favoured child. A number of authors have found it necessary to justify parental partiality in the face of these distributive concerns, and they have typically (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  74. Matt Duncan (forthcoming). We Are Acquainted with Ourselves. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    I am aware of the rain outside, but only in virtue of looking at a weather report. I am aware of my friend, but only because I hear her voice through my phone. Thus, there are some things that I’m aware of, but only indirectly. Many philosophers believe that there are also some things of which I am directly aware . The most plausible candidates are experiences such as pains, tickles, visual sensations, etc. In fact, the philosophical consensus seems to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  75. Daniel Eggers (forthcoming). The Motivation Argument and Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Much in contemporary metaethics revolves around the two positions known as ‘motivational internalism’ and the ‘Humean theory of motivation’. The importance of these positions is mostly due to their role in what is considered to be the most powerful argument for metaethical non-cognitivism: the so-called ‘motivation argument’ . In my paper, I want to argue that widely accepted renditions of the MA, such as the rendition recently forwarded by Russ Shafer-Landau, are flawed in two senses. First, they fail to sufficiently (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  76. David Faraci (forthcoming). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    This paper concerns what I take to be the primary epistemological motivation for defending moral perception. Offering a plausible account of how we gain moral knowledge is one of the central challenges of metaethics. It seems moral perception might help us meet this challenge. The possibility that we know about the instantiation of moral properties in something like the way we know that there is a bus passing in front of us raises the alluring prospect of subsuming moral epistemology under (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  77. Christopher Freiman & Adam Lerner (forthcoming). Self-Ownership and Disgust: Why Compulsory Body Part Redistribution Gets Under Our Skin. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    The self-ownership thesis asserts, roughly, that agents own their minds and bodies in the same way that they can own extra-personal property. One common strategy for defending the self-ownership thesis is to show that it accords with our intuitions about the wrongness of various acts involving the expropriation of body parts . We challenge this line of defense. We argue that disgust explains our resistance to these sorts of cases and present results from an original psychological experiment in support of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  78. Jeremy Goodman (forthcoming). Knowledge, Counterfactuals, and Determinism. Philosophical Studies:1-4.
    Deterministic physical theories are not beyond the reach of scientific discovery. From this fact I show that David Lewis was mistaken to think that small counterfactual perturbations from deterministic worlds involve violations of those world’s laws.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  79. Martin Grajner (forthcoming). Hybrid Expressivism and Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Epistemic expressivists maintain, to a first approximation, that epistemic assertions express non-cognitive mental states, like endorsements, valuations, or pro-attitudes, rather than cognitive mental states such as beliefs. Proponents of epistemic expressivism include Chrisman , Gibbard , Field , Kappel , and Ridge , among others. In this paper, I argue for an alternative view to epistemic expressivism. The view I seek to advocate is inspired by hybrid expressivist theories about moral judgments , Copp Oxford studies in metaethics, 2009), Finlay , (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  80. Daniel Greco (forthcoming). The Epistemology of ‘Just is’-Statements. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    Agustín Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space offers an exciting and ambitious defense of a broadly Carnapian approach to metaphysics. This essay will focus on one of the main differences between Rayo’s and Carnap’s approaches. Carnap distinguished between analytic, a priori “meaning postulates”, and empirical claims, which were both synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. Like meaning postulates, they determine the boundaries of logical space. But Rayo is skeptical that the a priori/a posteriori or analytic/synthetic distinctions can do the work (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  81. Steven D. Hales (forthcoming). A Problem for Moral Luck. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    The present paper poses a new problem for moral luck. Defenders of moral luck uncritically rely on a broader theory of luck known as the control theory or the lack of control theory. However, there are are two other analyses of luck in the literature that dominate discussion in epistemology, namely the probability and modal theories. However, moral luck is nonexistent under the probability and modal accounts, but the control theory cannot explain epistemic luck. While some have posited that “luck” (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  82. Sally Haslanger (forthcoming). What is a Structural Explanation? Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    A philosophically useful account of social structure must accommodate the fact that social structures play an important role in structural explanation. But what is a structural explanation? How do structural explanations function in the social sciences? This paper offers a way of thinking about structural explanation and sketches an account of social structure that connects social structures with structural explanation.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  83. Jussi Haukioja (forthcoming). On Deriving Essentialism From the Theory of Reference. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    Causal theories of reference for natural kind terms are widely agreed to play a central role in arguments for the claim that theoretical identity statements such as “Water is H2O” are necessary, if true. However, there is also fairly wide-spread agreement, due to the arguments of Nathan Salmon (in Reference and Essence), that causal theories of reference do not alone establish such essentialism about natural kinds: an independent, non-trivial essentialist premise is also needed. In this paper I will question this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  84. Remco Heesen (forthcoming). How Much Evidence Should One Collect? Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    A number of philosophers of science and statisticians have attempted to justify conclusions drawn from a finite sequence of evidence by appealing to results about what happens if the length of that sequence tends to infinity. If their justifications are to be successful, they need to rely on the finite sequence being either indefinitely increasing or of a large size. These assumptions are often not met in practice. This paper analyzes a simple model of collecting evidence and finds that the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  85. Michael R. Hicks (forthcoming). Pretense and Fiction-Directed Thought. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Thought about fictional characters is special, and needs to be distinguished from ordinary world-directed thought. On my interpretation, Kendall Walton and Gareth Evans have tried to show how this serious fiction-directed thought can arise from engagement with a kind of pretending. Many criticisms of their account have focused on the methodological presupposition, that fiction-directed thought is the appropriate explanandum. In the first part of this paper, I defend the methodological claim, and thus the existence of the problem to which pretense (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  86. Thomas Hofweber (forthcoming). How Metaphysics is Special: Comments on Bennett. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Karen Bennett argues that there is no distinct problem with metaphysics, and she proposes a disjunctive conception of the subject matter of metaphysics. This paper critically examines her arguments and positive view. I defend that metaphysics prima facie is distinctly problematic, and I raise some questions about Bennett’s disjunctive conception of the subject matter of metaphysics and the a priori aspect of its methodology.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  87. Robert J. Howell (forthcoming). Epistemic Internalism and Perceptual Content: How a Fear of Demons Leads to an Error Theory of Perception. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Despite the fact that many of our beliefs are justified by perceptual experience, there is relatively little exploration of the connections between epistemic justification and perceptual content. This is unfortunate since it seems likely that some views of justification will require particular views of content, and the package of the two might be quite a bit less attractive than either view considered alone. I will argue that this is the case for epistemic internalism. In particular, epistemic internalism requires a view (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  88. Ivan Hu (forthcoming). Epistemicism, Paradox, and Conditional Obligation. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  89. Masaki Ichinose (forthcoming). Remarks on Epistemology Musicalized., Vol. 25. Department. Philosophical Studies.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  90. Adam Kadlac (forthcoming). Does It Matter Whether We Do Wrong? Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    This paper examines the relationship between monadic and bipolar forms of normativity. As the distinction is usually drawn, monadic normativity concerns whether a given action is right or wrong while bipolar normativity concerns who, if anyone, is wronged in any putative instance of wrongdoing. My central thesis is that in the moral realm, we do well to discard the notion of monadic normativity altogether and focus instead on the contours and limits of bipolar normativity. For by placing greater weight on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  91. Nicky Kroll (forthcoming). Progressive Teleology. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    I argue for a teleological account of events in progress. Details aside, the proposal is that events in progress are teleological processes. It follows from this proposal that final causes are ubiquitous: anything happening at any time is an event with a telos.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  92. Victor Kumar (forthcoming). Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    In this essay I argue that moral judgment is a natural kind by developing an empirically grounded theory of the distinctive conceptual content of moral judgments. Psychological research on the moral/conventional distinction suggests that in moral judgments right and wrong, good and bad, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, etc. are conceptualized as serious, general, authority-independent, and objective. After laying out the theory and the empirical evidence that supports it, I address recent empirical and conceptual objections. Finally, I suggest that the theory uniquely (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  93. Samuel Lebens (forthcoming). Would This Paper Exist If I Hadn’T Written It? Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    This paper wants to know whether it would exist, or could exist, in worlds in which I didn't write it. Before we can answer this question, we first of all have to inquire as to what, exactly, this paper is. After exploring two forms of Platonism , and a theory that defines literary works in terms of events, I shall argue that the term ‘this paper’ is actually infected with ambiguity. Does this paper need me? It depends upon what you (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  94. Ron Mallon (forthcoming). Performance, Self-Explanation, and Agency. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Social constructionist explanations of human thought and behavior hold that our representations produce and regulate the categories, thoughts, and behaviors of those they represent. Performative versions of constructionist accounts explain these thoughts and behaviors as part of an intentional, strategic performance that is elicited and regulated by our representations of ourselves. This paper has four aims. First, I sketch a causal model of performative social constructionist claims. Second, I articulate a puzzling feature of performative claims that makes them seem especially (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  95. Peter J. Markie (forthcoming). The Special Ability View of Knowledge-How. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Propositionalism explains the nature of knowledge-how as follows: P: To know how to ϕ is to stand in a special propositional attitude relation to propositions about how to ϕ. To know how to ride a bike is to have the required propositional attitude to propositions about how to do so. Dispositionalism offers an alternative view.D: To know how to ϕ is to stand in a behavioral-dispositional relation, a being-able-to relation, to ϕ-ing. To know how to ride a bike is to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  96. Dan Marshall (forthcoming). Humean Laws and Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    A common objection to Humeanism about natural laws is that, given Humeanism, laws cannot help explain their instances, since, given the best Humean account of laws, facts about laws are explained by facts about their instances rather than vice versa. After rejecting a recent influential reply to this objection that appeals to the distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanation, I will argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of facts, only one of which Humeans should (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  97. Elinor Mason (forthcoming). Moral Ignorance and Blameworthiness. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    In this paper I discuss various hard cases that an account of moral ignorance should be able to deal with: ancient slave holders, Susan Wolf’s JoJo, psychopaths such as Robert Harris, and finally, moral outliers . All these agents are ignorant, but it is not at all clear that they are blameless on account of their ignorance. I argue that the discussion of this issue in recent literature has missed the complexities of these cases by focusing on the question of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  98. Victoria McGeer (forthcoming). Building a Better Theory of Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    In Building Better Beings, Vargas develops and defends a naturalistic account of responsibility, whereby responsible agents must possess a feasibly situated capacity to detect and respond to moral considerations. As a preliminary step, he also offers a substantive account of how we might justify our practices of holding responsible—viz., by appeal to their efficacy in fostering a ‘valuable form of agency’ across the community at large, a form of agency that precisely encompasses sensitivity to moral considerations. But how do these (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  99. Thomas J. McKay (forthcoming). Stuff and Coincidence. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Anyone who admits the existence of composite objects allows a certain kind of coincidence, coincidence of a thing with its parts. I argue here that a similar sort of coincidence, coincidence of a thing with the stuff that constitutes it, should be equally acceptable. Acknowledgement of this is enough to solve the traditional problem of the coincidence of a statue and the clay or bronze it is made of. In support of this, I offer some principles for the persistence of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  100. Jennifer McKitrick (forthcoming). A Dispositional Account of Gender. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    According to some philosophers, gender is a social role or pattern of behavior in a social context. I argue that these accounts have problematic implications for transgender. I suggest that gender is a complex behavioral disposition, or cluster of dispositions. Furthermore, since gender norms are culturally relative, one’s gender is partially constituted by extrinsic factors. I argue that this has advantages over thinking of gender as behavior, and has the added advantage of accommodating the possibility of an appearance/reality dissonance with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  101. Erik J. Olsson (forthcoming). Gettier and the Method of Explication: A 60 Year Old Solution to a 50 Year Old Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don’t know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap’s methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the further Carnapian desiderata of exactness, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  102. Jonathan Parry (forthcoming). Liability, Community, and Just Conduct in War. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Those of us who are not pacifists face an obvious challenge. Common-sense morality contains a stringent constraint on intentional killing, yet war involves homicide on a grand scale. If wars are to be morally justified, it needs be shown how this conflict can be reconciled. A major fault line running throughout the contemporary just war literature divides two approaches to attempting this reconciliation. On a ‘reductivist’ view, defended most prominently by Jeff McMahan, the conflict is largely illusory, since such killing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  103. Robert Pasnau (forthcoming). Disagreement and the Value of Self-Trust. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Controversy over the epistemology of disagreement endures because there is an unnoticed factor at work: the intrinsic value we give to self-trust. Even if there are many instances of disagreement where, from a strictly epistemic or rational point of view, we ought to suspend belief, there are other values at work that influence our all-things considered judgments about what we ought to believe. Hence those who would give equal-weight to both sides in many cases of disagreement may be right, from (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  104. Sarah K. Paul (forthcoming). The Transparency of Intention. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    The attitude of intention is not usually the primary focus in philosophical work on self-knowledge. A recent exception is the so-called “Transparency” theory of self-knowledge, which attempts to explain how we know our own minds by appeal to reflection on non-mental facts. Transparency theories are attractive in light of their relative psychological economy compared to views that must posit a dedicated mechanism of ‘inner sense’. However, it is argued here, focusing on proposals by Richard Moran and Alex Byrne, that the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  105. Christian Piller (forthcoming). Practical Philosophy and the Gettier Problem: Is Virtue Epistemology on the Right Track? Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives the significance of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  106. Joey Pollock (forthcoming). Social Externalism and the Problem of Communication. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Social externalism must allow that subjects can misunderstand the content of their own thoughts. I argue that we can exploit this commitment to create a dilemma for the view’s account of communication. To arrive at the first horn of the dilemma, I argue that, on social externalism, it is understanding which is the measure of communicative success. This would be a highly revisionary account of communication. The only way that the social externalist can salvage the claim that mental content is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  107. Alexander R. Pruss (forthcoming). Possibility is Not Consistency. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    We shall use Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem to show that consistency is not possibility, and then argue that the argument does serious damage to some theories of modality where consistency plays a major but not exclusive role.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  108. Joshua Rasmussen (forthcoming). Tenseless Times. Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    I develop a new theory of times. I show how to analyze times as tenselessly describable “abstract” entities. Some philosophers make use of ersatz times, which are abstract entities such as maximal states of affairs that bear earlier than and later than relations to one another. Although these times are normally thought to exemplify A-properties that cannot be expressed in a purely tenseless language, I explain how a tenseless theory can accommodate abstract times. I do this by defending Rasmussen’s tenseless (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  109. Agustin Rayo (forthcoming). Replies to Greco and Turner. Philosophical Studies:1-4.
    Dan Greco and Jason Turner wrote two fantastic critiques of my book, The Construction of Logical Space. Greco’s critique suggests that the book can be given a Kuhnian interpretation, with a Carnapian twist. Here I embrace that interpretation. Turner criticizes one of the views I develop in the book. Here I identify an avenue of resistance.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  110. Andrea Scarantino & Michael Nielsen (forthcoming). Voodoo Dolls and Angry Lions: How Emotions Explain Arational Actions. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Hursthouse :57–68, 1991) argues that arational actions—e.g. kicking a door out of anger—cannot be explained by belief–desire pairs. The Humean Response to Hursthouse :25–38, 2000b) defends the Humean model from Hursthouse’s challenge. We argue that the Humean Response fails because belief–desire pairs are neither necessary nor sufficient for causing emotional actions. The Emotionist Response is to embrace Hursthouse’s conclusion that emotions provide an independent source of explanation for intentional actions. We consider Döring’s :214–230, 2003) feeling-based Emotionist account and argue that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  111. Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming). If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    If you’re a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you’re a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different. And you ought to think that. After all, to deny it seems insupportable Earthly chauvinism. But a materialist who (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  112. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). Precis of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  113. Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz (forthcoming). Respecting All the Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  114. Jeroen Smid (forthcoming). The Ontological Parsimony of Mereology. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Lewis famously argued that mereology is ontologically innocent. Many who have considered this claim believe he was mistaken. Mereology is not innocent, because its acceptance entails the acceptance of sums, new objects that were not previously part of one’s ontology. This argument, the argument from ontological parsimony, has two versions: a qualitative and a quantitative one. I argue that the defender of mereology can neutralize both arguments by holding that, given mereology, a commitment to the parts of an object is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  115. Jason Stanley (forthcoming). Context, Interest-Relativity, and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  116. Rachel Katharine Sterken (forthcoming). Leslie on Generics. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    This paper offers three objections to Leslie’s recent and already influential theory of generics :375–403, 2007a, Philos Rev 117:1–47, 2008): her proposed metaphysical truth-conditions are subject to systematic counter-examples, the proposed disquotational semantics fails, and there is evidence that generics do not express cognitively primitive generalisations.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  117. Amie L. Thomasson (forthcoming). Structural Explanations and Norms: Comments on Haslanger. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    Sally Haslanger undertakes groundbreaking work in developing an account of structural explanations and the social structures that figure in them. A chief virtue of the account is that it can show the importance of structural explanations while also respecting the role of individual autonomy in explaining many decisions, by demonstrating the way in which social structures may set up a ‘choice architecture’ in which these choices are made. This paper gives an overview of this achievement, and goes on to consider (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  118. Robert Trueman (forthcoming). The Concept Horse with No Name. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  119. Jason Turner (forthcoming). The Construction of Logical Space and the Structure of Facts. Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    In The Construction of Logical Space, Agustín Rayo defends trivialism, according to which number-involving truths are trivially equivalent to other, non-number-involving truths; picturesquely, ‘I have five fingers on my hand’ and ‘the number of fingers on my hand is five’ express the same fact, but carved up in different ways. A single fact thus has multiple structures. I distinguish two ways this might go: on the deflationary picture, facts get their structures from our linguistic practices, while on an inflationary picture, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  120. Johan van Benthem (forthcoming). Epistemic Logic and Epistemology. The State of Their Affairs', to Appear in V. Hendricks, Ed., Special Issue Of. Philosophical Studies.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  121. Manuel R. Vargas (forthcoming). Précis of Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-3.
    The idea of moral responsibility is central to a wide range of our moral, social, and legal practices, and it underpins our basic notion of culpability. Yet the idea of moral responsibility is increasingly viewed with skepticism by researchers and scholars in psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and the law. Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility responds to these challenges, offering a new account of the justification of our practices and judgments of moral responsibility. Three distinctive ideas shape the account. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  122. Bénédicte Veillet (forthcoming). The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Knowledge of what it’s like to have perceptual experiences, e.g. of what it’s like to see red or taste Turkish coffee, is phenomenal knowledge; and it is knowledge the substantial or significant nature of which is widely assumed to pose a challenge for physicalism. Call this the New Challenge to physicalism. The goal of this paper is to take a closer look at the New Challenge. I show, first, that it is surprisingly difficult to spell out clearly and neutrally what (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  123. Mark Douglas Warren (forthcoming). Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the pragmatic role (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  124. Nathan Wildman (forthcoming). Load Bare-Ing Particulars. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Bare particularism is a constituent ontology according to which substances—concrete, particular objects like people, tables, and tomatoes—are complex entities constituted by their properties and their bare particulars. Yet, aside from this description, much about bare particularism is fundamentally unclear. In this paper, I attempt to clarify this muddle by elucidating the key metaphysical commitments underpinning any plausible formulation of the position. So the aim here is primarily catechismal rather than evangelical—I don’t intend to convert anyone to bare particularism, but, by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  125. Eric Yang (forthcoming). The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    Several philosophers have argued that property dualism and substance materialism are incompatible positions. Recently, Susan Schneider has provided a novel version of such an argument, claiming that the incompatibility will be evident once we examine some underlying metaphysical issues. She purports to show that on any account of substance and property-possession, substance materialism and property dualism turn out incompatible. In this paper, I argue that Schneider’s case for incompatibility between these two positions fails. After briefly laying out her case for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  126. Kevin J. S. Zollman (forthcoming). Modeling the Social Consequences of Testimonial Norms. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    This paper approaches the problem of testimony from a new direction. Rather than focusing on the epistemic grounds for testimony, it considers the problem from the perspective of an individual who must choose whom to trust from a population of many would-be testifiers. A computer simulation is presented which illustrates that in many plausible situations, those who trust without attempting to judge the reliability of testifiers outperform those who attempt to seek out the more reliable members of the community. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues