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Forthcoming articles
  1. Matthew Kopec (forthcoming). Clines, Clusters, and Clades in the Race Debate. Philosophy of Science 81.
    Although there once was a general consensus among race scholars that applying race categories to humans is biologically illegitimate, this consensus has been erased over the past decade. This is largely due to advances in population genetics that allow biologists to pick out genetic population clusters that approximate some of our common sense racial categories. In this paper, I argue that this new ability really ought not undermine our confidence in the biological illegitimacy of the human races. Unfortunately, the claim (...)
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  2. Juha Saatsi & Mark Pexton (forthcoming). Reassessing Woodward's Account of Explanation: Regularities, Counterfactuals, and Noncausal Explanations. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):613-624.
    We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jettisoning the causal aspect as constitutive of explanatory power in connection with regularity (...)
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  3. D. Tulodziecki (forthcoming). Shattering the Myth of Semmelweis. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1065-1075.
    The case of Semmelweis has been well known since Hempel. More recently, it has been revived by Peter Lipton, Donald Gillies, Alexander Bird, Alex Broadbent, and Raphael Scholl. While these accounts differ on what exactly the case of Semmelweis shows, they all agree that Semmelweis was an excellent reasoner. This widespread agreement has also given rise to a puzzle: why Semmelweis’s views were rejected for so long. I aim to dissolve both this puzzle and the standard view of Semmelweis by (...)
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  4. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (forthcoming). Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles. Philosophy of Science.
    The Doomsday argument and anthropic arguments are illustrations of a paradox. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, the paradox constitutes a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of the paradox cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance (...)
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  5. Michael E. Cuffaro (forthcoming). How-Possibly Explanations in Quantum Computer Science. Philosophy of Science.
    A primary goal of quantum computer science is to find an explanation for the fact that quantum computers are more powerful than classical computers. In this paper I argue that to answer this question is to compare algorithmic processes of various kinds, and in so doing to describe the possibility spaces associated with these processes. By doing this we explain how it is possible for one process to outperform its rival. Further, in this and similar examples little is gained in (...)
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  6. Uljana Feest (forthcoming). Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. Philosophy of Science.
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical (...)
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  7. Jonathan Michael Kaplan & Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (forthcoming). Realism, Antirealism, and Conventionalism About Race. Philosophy of Science.
    This paper distinguishes three concepts of “race”: bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1962, A.W.F. Edwards’ 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by interrogating (...)
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  8. Ehud Lamm & Ohad Kammar (forthcoming). Inferring Co-Evolution. Philosophy of Science.
    We discuss two inference patterns for inferring the coevolution of two characters based on their properties at a single point in time and determine when developmental interactions can be used to deduce evolutionary order. We discuss the use of the inference patterns we present in the biological literature and assess the arguments’ validity, the degree of support they give to the evolutionary conclusion, how they can be corroborated with empirical evidence, and to what extent they suggest new empirically addressable questions. (...)
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  9. David Ludwig (forthcoming). Against the New Metaphysics of Race. Philosophy of Science.
    The aim of this article is to develop an argument against metaphysical debates about the existence of human races. I argue that the ontology of race is underdetermined by both empirical and non-empirical evidence due to a plurality of equally permissible candidate meanings of "race." Furthermore, I argue that this underdetermination leads to a deflationist diagnosis according to #hich disputes about the existence of human races are non-substantive verbal disputes. $hile this diagnosis resembles general deflationist strategies in contemporary metaphysics" I (...)
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  10. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Teleosemantics Without Etiology. Philosophy of Science.
    The aim of teleosemantics is to give a scientifically respectable, or ‘naturalistic’ theory of mental content. In the debates surrounding the scope and merits of teleosemantics a lot has been said about the concept of indication (or carrying information). The aim of this paper is to focus on the other key concept of teleosemantics: biological function. It has been universally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the account of biological function one should use to flesh out teleosemantics is that of (...)
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  11. Cailin O'Connor (forthcoming). Evolving Perceptual Categories. Philosophy of Science.
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  12. Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Why Is There Universal Macro-Behavior? Renormalization Group Explanation As Non-Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science.
    Renormalization group (RG) methods are an established strategy to explain how it is possible that microscopically different systems exhibit virtually the same macro behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. I argue – in agreement with Robert Batterman – that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. However, Batterman misidentifies the reason why RG explanations are non-causal: it is not the case that an explanation is non- causal if it ignores causal details. I propose an alternative argument, according to which RG explanations are non-causal explanations (...)
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  13. William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji (forthcoming). Dwindling Confirmation. Philosophy of Science.
    We show that as a chain of confirmation becomes longer, confirmation dwindles under screening-off. For example, if E confirms H1, H1 confirms H2, and H1 screens off E from H2, then the degree to which E confirms H2 is less than the degree to which E confirms H1. Although there are many measures of confirmation, our result holds on any measure that satisfies the Weak Law of Likelihood. We apply our result to testimony cases, relate it to the Data-Processing Inequality (...)
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  14. Nicholas Shea (forthcoming). Neural Signalling of Probabilistic Vectors. Philosophy of Science.
    Recent work combining cognitive neuroscience with computational modelling suggests that distributed patterns of neural firing may represent probability distributions. This paper asks: what makes it the case that distributed patterns of firing, as well as carrying information about (correlating with) probability distributions over worldly parameters, represent such distributions? In examples of probabilistic population coding, it is the way information is used in downstream processing so as to lead to successful behaviour. In these cases content depends on factors beyond bare information, (...)
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  15. Quayshawn Spencer (forthcoming). A Radical Solution to the Race Problem. Philosophy of Science.
    It has become customary among philosophers and biologists to claim that folk racial classification has no biological basis. This paper attempts to debunk that view. In this paper, I show that ‘race’, as used in current U.S. race talk, picks out a biologically real entity. I do this by, first, showing that ‘race’, in this use, is not a kind term, but a proper name for a set of human population groups. Next, using recent human genetic clustering results, I show (...)
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  16. Marcel Weber (forthcoming). Experimental Modeling in Biology: In Vivo Representation and Stand-Ins As Modeling Strategies. Philosophy of Science.
    Experimental modeling in biology involves the use of living organisms (not necessarily so-called "model organisms") in order to model or simulate biological processes. I argue here that experimental modeling is a bona fide form of scientific modeling that plays an epistemic role that is distinct from that of ordinary biological experiments. What distinguishes them from ordinary experiments is that they use what I call "in vivo representations" where one kind of causal process is used to stand in for a physically (...)
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  17. Thomas Anthony Ambriz (forthcoming). Okruhlik and Scientific Rationality. Philosophy of Science.
     
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  18. M. Curd & J. A. Cover (forthcoming). Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science.
     
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  19. G. Darvas (forthcoming). Ontological Levels and Symmetry Breaking, Paideia. Philosophy of Science.
     
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  20. Machery Edouard (forthcoming). Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science.
    In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings' higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning...). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the Natural Kind Assumption. This article challenges the Natural Kind Assumption. It is (...)
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  21. Alexandre Fonseca (forthcoming). A Game of Science. Philosophy of Science.
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  22. Malcolm R. Forster, I. A. Kieseppä, Dan Hausman, Alexei Krioukov, Stephen Leeds, Alan Macdonald & Larry Shapiro (forthcoming). The Conceptual Role of 'Temperature'in Statistical Mechanics: Or How Probabilistic Averages Maximize Predictive Accuracy. Philosophy of Science.
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  23. Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl (forthcoming). Explaining the Approach to Equilibrium in Terms of Epsilon-Ergodicity. Philosophy of Science.
     
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  24. K. Kelly & G. Glymour (forthcoming). On Converging to the Truth and Nothing but the Truth. Philosophy of Science.
     
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  25. V. S. Kharchenko, O. M. Tarasyuk & V. V. Sklyar (forthcoming). The Matrix-Graph Method Of Choice And Verification Of Software Reliability Models. Philosophy of Science.
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  26. Tonći Kokić (forthcoming). Non-Random Nature of Genetic Mutation. Philosophy of Science.
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  27. E. Machery (forthcoming). Forthcoming. Massive Modularity and Brain Evolution. Philosophy of Science.
     
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  28. John Andrew Michael & Francesca Fardo (forthcoming). What (If Anything) is Shared in Pain Empathy? Philosophy of Science.
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  29. H. P. Noyes, Mcgoveran Do & Observable Gravitational (forthcoming). BN8 5DH, UK.\ Bibitem {38} CW Kilmister,{\ It Eddington's Search for a Fundamental Theory: A Key to the Universe}, Cambridge, 1994.\ Bibitem {39}. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science.
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  30. Fabrice Pataut (forthcoming). Empiricism, Rational Belief and Objectivity. Philosophy of Science.
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  31. Bret Spears (forthcoming). December 8, 2004 Philosophy of Science Dr. Shanahan “Phil-Sci Suicide: The Deflation of a Debate and Silence For the Rest of It”. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science.
     
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  32. Ulrich E. Stegmann & Recensione di Daniele Romano (forthcoming). Il'PENSARIO'della Biblioteca filosofica. Philosophy of Science.
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