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Forthcoming articles
  1.  21
    Norman Melchert (forthcoming). Hume's Appendix on Personal Identity. Philosophy Research Archives.
    The reasons why hume expressed dissatisfaction concerning his own account of personal identity in the "treatise" are unclear. hume himself states them obscurely, and commentators have disagreed about what exactly it was that puzzled him. i offer reasons for thinking the sources of hume's retraction have not yet been understood, and propose a reading of the text of the appendix which explains why he was dissatisfied. the key to the proper understanding of this text lies in two insufficiently appreciated facts: (...)
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  2.  10
    Charles E. Jarrett (forthcoming). On Proper Names. Philosophy Research Archives.
    The main goal of this paper is to show that in "speech acts", john searle fails to establish his thesis that proper names have sense, or descriptive content. it is argued, by considering counterexamples, that searle's test for the analyticity of statements is inadequate, that the argument from the "principle of identification" is therefore mistaken, and that, because of lack of attention to the distinction between meaning and sense (descriptive content), the argument from identity statements fails to establish the conclusion. (...)
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  3.  15
    Philip Ostien (forthcoming). Beyond Truth and Reference. Philosophy Research Archives.
    Quine has moved toward "naturalism" in philosophy, which i applaud; at the same time his work has touched off a new round of pseudo-problems in philosophy, which i lament. i read the pseudo-problems as evidence that the shift toward naturalism has not been thorough-going enough. in this paper i undertake an extended discussion of some of the problems and prospects of a thorough-going shift to a naturalistic viewpoint in philosophy, making frequent reference to quine's work. i suggest, in particular, that (...)
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