21 found

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  1. Mahesh Ananth (2010). The Scientific Study of Consciousness: Searle’s Radical Request. Psyche 16 (2):59-89.
    John Searle offers what he thinks to be a reasonable scientific approach to the understanding of consciousness. I argue that Searle is demanding nothing less than a Kuhnian-type revolution with respect to how scientists should study consciousness given his rejection of the subject-object distinction and affirmation of mental causation. As part of my analysis, I reveal that Searle embraces a version of emergentism that is in tension, not only with his own account, but also with some of the theoretical tenets (...)
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  2. David Bennett & Patrick Foo (2010). Mid-Range Action-Driving Visual Information. Psyche 16 (2):98-116.
    Milner and Goodale have advanced a justly influential theory of the structure of the human visual system. In broad outline, Milner and Goodale hold that the ventral neural pathway is associated with recognition and experiential awareness, and with a kind of indirect control of action. And they hold that, by contrast, the dorsal neural stream is associated with the non-conscious, direct control of visually informed action. Most of the relevant empirical research has focused on the visual control of close-in, “personal (...)
     
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  3. Jamie Carnie (2010). Non-Reductive Objectivism – A Dual-Aspect Model of Causality. Psyche 16 (2):48-58.
    Non-reductive objectivist accounts of color have been the focus of a certain amount of discussion recently. The present paper examines what explanations would be needed in order for an extended version of the viewpoint encompassing most of the sensory qualities to achieve conceptual consistency with the scientific account of reality. Once the explanations required have been identified, a form of non-reductive objectivism that meets them and embodies a dual-aspect model of causality is put forward. It is shown that this sheds (...)
     
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  4. Huei-Ying Cheng (2010). Review of Shaun Gallagher’s and Dan Zahavi's: The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Psyche 16 (2):1-4.
    One might interpret the locution “the phenomenological mind” as a declaration of a philosophical thesis that the mind is in some sense essentially phenomenological. Authors Gallagher & Zahavi appear to have intended it, however, to refer more to the phenomenological tradition and its methods of analysis. From the subheading of this book, one gains an impression that readers will see how the resources and perspectives from the phenomenological tradition illuminate various issues in philosophy of mind and cognitive science in particular. (...)
     
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  5. Tony Cheng (2010). Review of Shaun Gallagher’s and Dan Zahavi’s The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Psyche 16 (2):01-04.
    One might interpret the locution “the phenomenological mind” as a declaration of a philosophical thesis that the mind is in some sense essentially phenomenological. Authors Gallagher & Zahavi appear to have intended it, however, to refer more to the phenomenological tradition and its methods of analysis. From the subheading of this book, one gains an impression that readers will see how the resources and perspectives from the phenomenological tradition illuminate various issues in philosophy of mind and cognitive science in particular. (...)
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  6. Anton Coenen (2010). Subconscious Stimulus Recognition and Processing During Sleep. Psyche 16 (2):90-97.
    During sleep, consciousness is reduced, associated with a diminished connection of the brain to the environment. This is due to the blocking of the thalamocortical pathway by inhibitory mechanisms. This “thalamic gating” during sleep, however, is not complete, but partial. The stream of information is considerably reduced, but the brain is not fully disconnected from the environment. An inspection of the environment takes place to optimize safety during sleep. Stimuli having a meaning for the individual, or signaling danger, are recognized, (...)
     
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  7. Alexander Heinzel, Sascha Moerth & Georg Northoff (2010). The Central Role of Anterior Cortical Midline Structures in Emotional Feeling and Consciousness. Psyche 16 (2):23-47.
    Current theories of emotion have often excluded emotional feeling from the core of emotion, thereby associating emotional feeling with high order processing. In contrast, we characterize emotional feeling as a basic process that is fundamentally involved in emotional processing. Emotional feeling is further described by the phenomenal features of unity and qualitativeness. Based on recent imaging data, we assume that neural activity in the anterior cortical midline structures is crucial for constituting emotional feeling. The phenomenal feature of unity could be (...)
     
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  8. Martin Kurthen (2010). Pushing Brains: Can Cognitive Neuroscience Provide Experimental Evidence for Brain-Mind Causation? Psyche 16 (2):5-22.
    What makes the issue of causal relations between mental and cerebral events so special? And is there experimental evidence from neuroscience for this sort of causation? To answer these questions, the issue of brain-mind causation is considered against the background of the mind-brain problem and the theory of causation in general. Then, one empirical study from cognitive neuroscience is discussed as an example of how the correlations of mental and cerebral events and processes are investigated in current research. From the (...)
     
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  9. Stephanie Ortigue & Gabriel Kreiman (2010). Past, Present, and Future of Scientific Research on Consciousness. Psyche 16 (2).
     
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  10. Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence (2010). Touch and the Body. Psyche 16 (1):30-67.
    This review addresses the role of early sensory areas in the awareness of tactile information in humans. The results of recent studies dealing with this important topic are critically discussed: In particular, we report on evidence from neuropsychology, neurophysiology, neuroimaging, and behavioral experiments that have highlighted the crucial role played by the primary somatosensory cortex in mediating our awareness of tactile information. Phenomena, such as tactile hallucinations, tactile illusions, the perception of supernumerary limbs, and synaesthesia are also discussed. The research (...)
     
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  11. Colin Hales (2010). The Scientific Evidence of Qualia Meets the Qualia That Are Scientific Evidence. Psyche 16 (1):24-29.
    The ASSC has challenged student members to encounter and respond to a number of questions, one of which is: “ What kind of experiences are qualia? Qualia are usually described as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain. While most people would agree that qualia refer to the quality of subjective experiences, it is often difficult to judge whether less sensory aspects of experiences should be taken to accompany specific qualia. In order for the concept to be useful (...)
     
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  12. Boris Kotchoubey (2010). Embodied Freedom and the Escape From Uncertainty. Psyche 16 (1):99-107.
    : Behavioral actions can attain their intended result either when all possible details and intervening factors are controlled in advance by the action plan, or when only the final outcome is taken into account while the rest is left for on-line correction. Both ways have numerous advantages and disadvantages. The former can be applied only in very simple instances and therefore, puts very strong limits on the complexity of behavior. The latter can be used for action plans of practically unlimited (...)
     
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  13. Parashkev Nachev (2010). Free Choice & Voluntary Action. Psyche 16 (1):87-98.
    A preliminary to any valid theory of voluntary action is a conceptual framework that permits it to be tested empirically. Where deficits in the conceptual framework make this impossible, the empirical data become uninterpretable. Here I show that “free choice” and “conflict” tasks exhibit such deficits, casting doubt on the testability of any theory that depends on them. I suggest that a revaluation of the tasks used to study voluntary action is necessary.
     
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  14. Stephanie Ortigue & Gabriel Kreiman (2010). From Inner Perception to Embodied Cognition: A Window to Consciousness. Psyche 16 (1).
     
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  15. Joel Pearson (2010). Inner Vision: Seeing the Minds Eye. Psyche 16 (1):1-8.
    Does imagining a visual pattern involve the same mechanisms as actually seeing that pattern? If so, what are the functional consequences of this overlap? A new study shows that the simple act of imagining a visual pattern can change subsequent visual perception in a manner specific to the low-level perceptual mechanisms. This work is strong evidence that imagery involves mechanisms closely resembling those of normal visual perception.
     
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  16. Hsueh Qu (2010). Does the Physicalist Have to Fold His Hand in Admitting That Mary Gains New Knowledge, or Can He Accommodate This Intuition and Still Maintain That All Facts Are Physical Facts? Psyche 16 (1):20-23.
    Does the physicalist have to fold his hand in admitting that Mary gains new knowledge, or can he accommodate this intuition and still maintain that all facts are physical facts?
     
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  17. Ronald Rensink (2010). Seeing Seeing. Psyche 16 (1):68-78.
    This paper discusses several key issues concerning consciousness and human vision. A brief overview is presented of recent developments in this area, including issues that have been resolved and issues that remain unsettled. Based on this, three Hilbert questions are proposed. These involve three related sets of issues: the kinds of visual experience that exist, the kinds of visual attention that exist, and the ways that these relate to each other.
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  18. Renee Smith (2010). Against Treating Introspection as Perception-Like. Psyche 16 (1):79-86.
    : A perceptual theory of introspection is one that treats introspection as a species of perception or as a special case of perception. Additionally, a perceptual theory of introspection is one for which introspection shares at least some of the essential features of perception. However, I will show that there are certain essential features of perception that introspection lacks. Moreover, those features common to perception and introspection are insufficient to distinguish perception from belief. Thus, there is good reason to deny (...)
     
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  19. Victoria Stone (2010). If We Accept That Mary the Colour Scientist Gains New Knowledge When She Sees the Colour Red for the First Time Must This Lead Us to a Non-Physicalist Theory of Consciousness? Psyche 16 (1):16-19.
    We experience the world as perceivers armed with many different sense modalities. These modalities include sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste, each giving an array of sensations and feelings to our phenomenology. How these sensations and feelings come to be is the central concern of the so-called “hard problem” of qualitative experience.
     
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  20. Sam Wilkinson (2010). If We Accept That Mary the Colour Scientist Gains New Knowledge When She Sees the Colour Red for the First Time Must This Lead Us to a Non-Physicalist Theory of Consciousness? Psyche 16 (1):12-15.
    A common and popular option in defending Physicalism against the Knowledge Argument is the “phenomenal concept strategy” . PCS claims that, although ex hypothesi Mary knows all the propositions pertaining to color and experiences of color, there is at least space for the claim that she acquires a new concept, and thereby accesses these propositions under different, phenomenal modes of presentation. In short, Mary acquires new concepts upon her release and that explains her “discovery.” Here I will show there is (...)
     
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  21. Sam Wilkinson (2010). Are There Auditory Objects in the Auditory Domain, Like Visual Objects in the Visual Domain? Psyche 16 (1):9-11.
    : One can understand the word “object” as a concrete physical object or as that which is on the receiving end of a subject-object relation, namely, that entity which a particular cognitive state or process is “of.” These latter objects are determined by the way our sensory systems exploit the ways elements of the world impinge upon our bodily surfaces. Our visual system exploits light reflected off the surfaces of objects; therefore, the objects of our visual experiences can be physical (...)
     
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