20 found

Year:

  1.  19
    Sam Baron (2016). Mathematical Explanation and Epistemology: Please Mind the Gap. Ratio 29 (2):149-167.
    This paper draws together two strands in the debate over the existence of mathematical objects. The first strand concerns the notion of extra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts, in part, by facts about mathematical objects. The second strand concerns the access problem for platonism: the problem of how to account for knowledge of mathematical objects. I argue for the following conditional: if there are extra-mathematical explanations, then the core thesis of the access problem is false. This has implications for (...)
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  2.  1
    Anthony Bolos (2016). Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? Ratio 29 (2):184-201.
    This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not (...)
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  3.  4
    Andrew I. Cohen (2016). Vicarious Apologies as Moral Repair. Ratio 29 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Apologies are key components of moral repair. They can identify a wrong, express regret, and accept culpability for some transgression. Apologies can vindicate a victim's value as someone who was due different treatment. This paper explores whether acts with vicarious elements may serve as apologies. I offer a functionalist account of apologies: acts are apologies not so much by having correct ingredients but by serving certain apologetic functions. Those functions can be realized in multiple ways. Whether the offenders are individuals (...)
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  4.  23
    Daniel Cohnitz (2016). Moral Realism and Faultless Disagreement. Ratio 29 (2):202-212.
    Is moral realism compatible with the existence of moral disagreements? Since moral realism requires that if two persons are in disagreement over some moral question at least one must be objectively mistaken, it seems difficult to uphold that there can be moral disagreements without fault. Alison Hills argued that moral realism can accommodate such disagreements. Her strategy is to argue that moral reasoners can be faultless in making an objectively false moral judgement if they followed the relevant epistemic norm, i.e. (...)
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  5.  25
    Daniel Crow (2016). A Plantingian Pickle for a Darwinian Dilemma: Evolutionary Arguments Against Atheism and Normative Realism. Ratio 29 (2):130-148.
    Two of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments are Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism and Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Atheism. In the former, Street appeals to evolutionary considerations to debunk normative realism. In the latter, Plantinga appeals to similar considerations to debunk atheism. By a careful comparison of these two arguments, I develop a new strategy to help normative realists resist Street's debunking attempt. In her Darwinian Dilemma, Street makes epistemological commitments that ultimately support Plantinga's (...)
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  6.  43
    Finnur Dellsén (2016). Understanding Without Justification or Belief. Ratio 29 (2):n/a-n/a.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest among epistemologists in the nature of understanding, with some authors arguing that understanding should replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology. But what is understanding? According to what is often called the standard view, understanding is a species of knowledge. Although this view has recently been challenged in various ways, even the critics of the standard view have assumed that understanding requires justification and belief. I argue that it requires (...)
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  7.  5
    George Englebretsen (2016). Critical Notice: Articulating Medieval Logic by Terence Parsons , Xiii+331 Pp., £48.95. [REVIEW] Ratio 29 (2).
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  8.  2
    Adrian Heathcote (2016). Testimony and Gettier: A Reply to Vance. Ratio 29 (2):228-233.
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  9.  6
    Simon P. James (2016). Protecting Nature for the Sake of Human Beings. Ratio 29 (2):213-227.
    It is often assumed that to say that nature should be protected for the sake of human beings just is to say that it should be protected because it is a means to one or more anthropocentric ends. I argue that this assumption is false. In some contexts, claims that a particular natural X should be protected for our sakes mean that X should be protected, not because it is a means to anthropocentric ends, but because it is part of (...)
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  10.  21
    Harold W. Noonan (2016). Two Boxing is Not the Rational Option. Ratio 29 (2):168-183.
    In the standard Newcomb scenario two-boxing is not the rational act and, in general, in Newcomb-style cases the ‘two-boxing’ choice is not the rational act. Hence any decision theory which recommends two-boxing is unacceptable.
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  11.  2
    Alasdair M. Richmond (2016). Why Doomsday Arguments Are Better Than Simulation Arguments. Ratio 29 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully-conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior-probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti-simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti-simulation arguments herein use more robust reference classes than Bostrom's argument, require no (...)
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  12.  19
    Gregory Stoutenburg (2016). Vicious Regresses, Conceptual Analysis, and Strong Awareness Internalism. Ratio 29 (2):115-129.
    That a philosophical thesis entails a vicious regress is commonly taken to be decisive evidence that the thesis is false. In this paper, I argue that the existence of a vicious regress is insufficient to reject a proposed analysis provided that certain constraints on the analysis are met. When a vicious regress is present, some further consequence of the thesis must be established that, together with the presence of the vicious regress, shows the thesis to be false. The argument is (...)
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  13.  9
    Markos Valaris (2016). Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects. Ratio 29 (2).
    This paper concerns the apparent fact — discussed by Sinan Dogramaci and Brian Weatherson — that inductive reasoning often interacts in disastrous ways with patterns of reasoning that seem perfectly fine in the deductive case. In contrast to Dogramaci's and Weatherson's own suggestions, I argue that these cases show that we cannot reason inductively about arbitrary objects. Moreover, as I argue, this prohibition is neatly explained by a certain hypothesis about the rational basis of inductive reasoning — namely, the hypothesis (...)
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  14.  10
    Zach Weber (2016). Intrinsic Value and the Last Last Man. Ratio 29 (2).
    Even if you were the last person on Earth, you should not cut down all the trees—or so goes the Last Man thought experiment, which has been taken to show that nature has intrinsic value. But ‘Last Man’ is caught on a dilemma. If Last Man is too far inside the anthropocentric circle, so to speak, his actions cannot be indicative of intrinsic value. If Last Man is cast too far outside the anthropocentric circle, though, then value terms lose their (...)
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  15.  62
    Claudio Calosi & Achille C. Varzi (2016). Back to Black. Ratio 29 (1):1-10.
    This is a brief sequel to Max Black 's classic dialogue on the Identity of Indiscernibles. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the view according to which Black 's world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bi-located sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing to A's original response to Black 's challenge. A (...)
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  16.  6
    Edward Feser (2016). David E. Alexander, Goodness, God, and Evil , 155 Pp., P/B, £17.96. [REVIEW] Ratio 29 (1):106-113.
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  17.  20
    Phillip Galligan (2016). Shame, Publicity, and Self‐Esteem. Ratio 29 (1):57-72.
    Shame is a puzzling emotion. On the one hand, to feel ashamed is to feel badly about oneself; but on the other hand, it also seems to be a response to the way the subject is perceived by other people. So whose standards is the subject worried about falling short of, his own or those of an audience? I begin by arguing that it is the audience's standards that matter, and then present a theory of shame according to which shame (...)
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  18.  98
    Peter Seipel (2016). Philosophy, Famine Relief, and the Skeptical Challenge From Disagreement. Ratio 29 (1):89-105.
    Disagreement has been grist to the mills of sceptics throughout the history of philosophy. Recently, though, some philosophers have argued that widespread philosophical disagreement supports a broad scepticism about philosophy itself. In this paper, I argue that the task for sceptics of philosophy is considerably more complex than commonly thought. The mere fact that philosophical methods fail to generate true majority views is not enough to support the sceptical challenge from disagreement. To avoid demanding something that human reasoning cannot supply, (...)
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  19.  8
    Alan T. Wilson (2016). Modesty as Kindness. Ratio 29 (1):73-88.
    The trait of modesty has received significant philosophical attention in recent years. This is due, in part, to Julia Driver's claim that modesty is able to act as a counter-example to intellectualist accounts of the nature of virtue. In this paper I engage with the debate about the nature of modesty by proposing a new account. ‘Modesty as kindness’ states that the trait of modesty ought to be considered as intimately connected with the more fundamental virtue of kindness. I set (...)
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  20.  27
    Scott Stapleford (2016). Epistemic Value Monism and the Swamping Problem. Ratio (00).
    Many deontologists explain the epistemic value of justification in terms of its instrumental role in promoting truth – the original source of value in the epistemic domain. The swamping problem for truth monism appears to make this position indefensible, at least for those monists who maintain the superiority of knowledge to merely true belief. I propose a new solution to the swamping problem that allows monists to maintain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over merely true belief. My trick is (...)
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