7 found

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  1.  49
    Claudio Calosi & Achille C. Varzi (2016). Back to Black. Ratio 29 (1):1-10.
    This is a brief sequel to Max Black 's classic dialogue on the Identity of Indiscernibles. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the view according to which Black 's world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bi-located sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing to A's original response to Black 's challenge. A (...)
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  2.  3
    George Englebretsen (2016). Critical Notice: Articulating Medieval Logic by Terence Parsons , Xiii+331 Pp., £48.95. [REVIEW] Ratio 29 (1).
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  3.  3
    Edward Feser (2016). David E. Alexander, Goodness, God, and Evil , 155 Pp., P/B, £17.96. [REVIEW] Ratio 29 (1):106-113.
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  4.  17
    Phillip Galligan (2016). Shame, Publicity, and Self‐Esteem. Ratio 29 (1):57-72.
    Shame is a puzzling emotion. On the one hand, to feel ashamed is to feel badly about oneself; but on the other hand, it also seems to be a response to the way the subject is perceived by other people. So whose standards is the subject worried about falling short of, his own or those of an audience? I begin by arguing that it is the audience's standards that matter, and then present a theory of shame according to which shame (...)
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  5.  86
    Peter Seipel (2016). Philosophy, Famine Relief, and the Skeptical Challenge From Disagreement. Ratio 29 (1):89-105.
    Disagreement has been grist to the mills of sceptics throughout the history of philosophy. Recently, though, some philosophers have argued that widespread philosophical disagreement supports a broad scepticism about philosophy itself. In this paper, I argue that the task for sceptics of philosophy is considerably more complex than commonly thought. The mere fact that philosophical methods fail to generate true majority views is not enough to support the sceptical challenge from disagreement. To avoid demanding something that human reasoning cannot supply, (...)
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  6.  3
    Markos Valaris (2016). Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects. Ratio 29 (1):n/a-n/a.
    This paper concerns the apparent fact — discussed by Sinan Dogramaci and Brian Weatherson — that inductive reasoning often interacts in disastrous ways with patterns of reasoning that seem perfectly fine in the deductive case. In contrast to Dogramaci's and Weatherson's own suggestions, I argue that these cases show that we cannot reason inductively about arbitrary objects. Moreover, as I argue, this prohibition is neatly explained by a certain hypothesis about the rational basis of inductive reasoning — namely, the hypothesis (...)
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  7.  5
    Alan T. Wilson (2016). Modesty as Kindness. Ratio 29 (1):73-88.
    The trait of modesty has received significant philosophical attention in recent years. This is due, in part, to Julia Driver's claim that modesty is able to act as a counter-example to intellectualist accounts of the nature of virtue. In this paper I engage with the debate about the nature of modesty by proposing a new account. ‘Modesty as kindness’ states that the trait of modesty ought to be considered as intimately connected with the more fundamental virtue of kindness. I set (...)
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