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  1. Rory Madden (2015). The Place of The Self in Contemporary Metaphysics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:77-95.
    I explain why the compositionalist conception of ordinary objects prevalent in contemporary metaphysics places the manifest image of the human self in a precarious position: the two theoretically simplest views of the existence of composites each jeopardize some central element of the manifest image. I present an alternative, nomological conception of ordinary objects, which secures the manifest image of the human self without the arbitrariness that afflicts compositionalist attempts to do the same. I close by sketching the consequences of the (...)
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  2. Eric T. Olson (2015). On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:39-56.
    Derek Parfit claims that we are not human beings. Rather, each of us is the part of a human being that thinks in the strictest sense. This is said to solve a number of difficult metaphysical problems. I argue that the view has metaphysical problems of its own, and is inconsistent with any psychological-continuity account of personal identity over time, including Parfit's own.
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2015). Selfless Persons: Goodness in an Impersonal World? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:143-159.
    Mark Johnston takes reality to be wholly objective or impersonal, and aims to show that the inevitability of death does not obliterate goodness in such a naturalistic world. Crucial to his argument is the claim that there are no persisting selves. After critically discussing Johnston's arguments, I set out a view of persons that shares Johnston's view that there are no selves, but disagrees about the prospects of goodness in a wholly impersonal world. On my view, a wholly objective world (...)
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  4. David Bakhurst (2015). Training, Transformation and Education. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:301-327.
    In Mind and World, John McDowell concludes that human beings and, principally by their initiation into language. Such of human development typically represent first-language learning as a movement from a non-rationally secured conformity with correct practice, through increasing understanding, to a state of rational mastery of correct practice. Accordingly, they tend to invoke something like Wittgenstein's concept of training to explain the first stage of this process. This essay considers the cogency of this view of learning and development. I agree (...)
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  5. Patricia S. Churchland (2015). The Neurobiological Platform for Moral Values. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:97-110.
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  6. Tim Crane (2015). The Mental States of Persons and Their Brains. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270.
    Cognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.
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  7. Barry Dainton (2015). From Phenomenal Selves to Hyperselves. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:161-197.
    The claim that we are subjects of experience, i.e. beings whose nature is intimately bound up with consciousness, is in many ways a plausible one. There is, however, more than one way of developing a metaphysical account of the nature of subjects. The view that subjects are essentially conscious has the unfortunate consequence that subjects cannot survive periods of unconsciousness. A more appealing alternative is to hold that subjects are beings with the capacity to be conscious, a capacity which need (...)
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  8. P. M. S. Hacker (2015). An Intellectual Entertainment: The Nature of the Mind. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:199-223.
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  9. Ted Honderich (2015). Actual Consciousness: Database, Physicalities, Theory, Criteria, No Unique Mystery. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:271-300.
    Is disagreement about consciousness largely owed to no adequate initial clarification of the subject, to people in fact answering different questions clarified as actual consciousness. Philosophical method like the scientific method includes transition from the figurative to literal theory or analysis. A new theory will also satisfy various criteria not satisfied by many existing theories. The objective physical world has specifiable general characteristics including spatiality, lawfulness, being in science, connections with perception, and so on. Actualism, the literal theory or analysis (...)
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  10. Lucy O'Brien (2015). Ambulo Ergo Sum. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:57-75.
    It is an extraordinary thing that Descartes' famous Cogito argument is still being puzzled over; this paper is another fragment in an untiring tradition of puzzlement. The paper will argue that, if I were to ask the question the Cogito could provide for a positive answer. In particular, my aim in this is to argue, in opposition to recent discussion by John Campbell, that there is a way of construing conscious thinking on which the Cogito can be seen to provide (...)
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  11. Thomas Pink (2015). Power, Scepticism and Ethical Theory. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:225-251.
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  12. Paul F. Snowdon (2015). Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:21-37.
    The thesis of the paper is that it is an illusion to think that the mind/body problem is one that philosophy can expect to solve. The basic reason is that the problem is one of determining the real nature of conscious states, and philosophy lacks the tools to work this out. It is argued that anti-materialist arguments in philosophy tend to rely on modal intuitions which lack any support. It is then argued that pro-materialist arguments, such as those of Smart (...)
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  13. Mark Sprevak & Statham (2015). Group Minds and Explanatory Simplicity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:3-19.
    This paper explores the claim that explanation of a group's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than group-level explanation. In this paper, we consider three different simplicity metrics. We argue that on none of those metrics does individual-level explanation achieve greater simplicity than a group-level alternative. We conclude that an argument (...)
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  14. Galen Strawson (2015). The Secrets of All Hearts’: Locke on Personal Identity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:111-141.
    Many think John Locke's account of personal identity is inconsistent and circular. It's neither of these things. The root causes of the misreading are [i] the mistake of thinking that Locke uses to mean memory, [ii] failure to appreciate the importance of the that always accompanies, on Locke's view, [iii] a tendency to take the term person, in Locke's text, as if it were some kind of fundamental sortal term like or, and to fail to take proper account of Locke's (...)
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