Mind 114 (453):31 - 59 (2005)
|Abstract||Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It is argued that such an identification would be a mistake. A living organism has a different part/whole relationship and persistence conditions than the alleged body. A case will be made that the concept ‘human body’ is a conceptual mess, vague in an unprincipled manner, and that an eliminativist stance towards dead bodies is the appropriate response. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?|
|Keywords||Biology Body Death Metaphysics Personal Identity|
Similar books and articles
William R. Carter (1999). Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167-171.
David B. Hershenov (2009). Organisms and Their Bodies: Response to LaPorte. Mind 118 (471):803-809.
David B. Hershenov (2005). Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms. Theoria 71 (1):29-37.
David Mackie (1999). Personal Identity and Dead People. Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-42.
Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Eric Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press.
Harold W. Noonan (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads103 ( #5,794 of 549,122 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,122 )
How can I increase my downloads?