Online research in philosophy

The main problem that the thesis is concerned with is: in which contexts is the maintenance of inequalities in the distribution of social goods unjust, and why is it unjust in these contexts? The thesis has three main sections. In the first section I reject Thomas Nagel's argument that, even when applied to only the coercive institutions of the state, egalitarian principles could be reasonably rejected on the grounds that they would be overly demanding on those who could be better off in feasible non-egalitarian distributions. In rejecting Nagel's position, I argue that coercion involves a particular justificatory problem which rules out the considerations of partiality that Nagel appeals to from being grounds for reasonable rejection of principles of justice in this context. The focus of the second section is whether egalitarian principles of distributive justice might apply beyond the coercive institutions of the state - to, for example, the broader set of institutions which make up the 'basic structure' of a system of social cooperation. I argue against the recent work of Michael Blake and Thomas Nagel and conclude that institutional coercion, while sufficient to ground egalitarian principles of distributive justice, is not necessary. Non-coercive interactions in which one has no reasonable alternative but to comply with another's will may also raise the justificatory problems which lead us to egalitarianism. The third section discusses whether principles of egalitarian distributive justice apply beyond institutions, and to personal decisions, through what G.A. Cohen has called an 'egalitarian ethos'. I argue that while no compelling ground for the egalitarian ethos has yet been given, the arguments against it in the recent literature are also flawed. In particular, I argue that the objections that an egalitarian ethos would be overly 'demanding' or fail to meet a 'publicity constraint’ are not convincing.

In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice (in general) are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice (in particular). Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying both. The justification of interactional coercion requires principles regulating interstate interference; that of systemic coercion requires principles of global socioeconomic justice. I argue that the proposed view not only helps us make progress in the debate on global justice, but also offers an independently compelling and systematic account of the function and conditions of applicability of justice.

This senior honors thesis, submitted to the Department of Government at Harvard University on March 13, explores the conditions that dictate when distributive justice might apply. In the first chapter, the author challenges so-called "relational" approaches to global justice, represented by Michael Blake, Thomas Nagel, and Andrea Sangiovanni, who each argue that justice can only apply when individuals share an institutionally-mediated relationship. The second chapter explores the possibility of a "non-relational" approach. This particular approach seeks to find a political basis for justice that is nevertheless not institutionalized. Physical interdependence among individual persons, the author argues, is sufficient to ground concern for global justice. The third chapter weighs in on the agents of justice, emphasizing the role of the basic global structure in parsing out associative and general duties.

In his multi-faceted attack on Rawls’s account of justice, G.A. Cohen has argued that the notion of basic structure is necessarily insensitive to the importance of informal social norms to social justice. The paper argues that the most plausible account of the basic structure is not blind to informal social norms in any meaningful sense. Whereas informal, non-legally coercive institutions are not part of the basic structure as such, their careful consideration is necessary for the assessment of whether the basic structure itself is indeed just. This claim is based on an account of what it means for normative principle to apply to institutions, which I expound in detail throughout the paper. Principles apply to institutions, I argue, not in that they restrain their conduct, but in that they indicate which social conditions they should bring about.

In his recent book Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press, 2008), G. A. Cohen returns to the defense of his critique of the Rawlsian doctrine of the “basic structure as subject.” This doctrine provides the centerpiece of what Rawls has to say about the domain of distributive justice—that is, about the sorts of things judgments of distributive justice are about and about the ways in which these judgments are interconnected. From the extensiveness of Cohen’s critique of this doctrine, it seems clear that he wants to take a very different view of the boundaries and contours of this domain. However, despite the characteristic clarity and precision with which he describes the Rawlsian doctrine and despite the trenchancy of his criticisms, it is still a matter of some difficulty determining the respects in which he and Rawls are actually in disagreement.

Rawls’ appealing to free agreement in the original position cannot be understood as the source of real commitment to principles of social justice. According to the contextualistic interpretation, to establish and clarify the reasonableness of one context, one needs to appeal to the reasonableness of some higher-order contexts. Because the two meta-contexts of global basic structure and domestic basic structure can be seen as higher-order or lower-order context relative to each, depending on concrete cases, by excluding the consideration of global situation that must have effects on the realization of domestic justice, justice as fairness is blind both to the global context of domestic justice and to the domestic context of global justice.

Justice makes demands upon us. But these demands, important though they may be, are not the only moral demands that we face. Our lives ought to be responsive to other values too. However, some philosophers have identified an apparent tension between those values and norms, such as justice, that seem to transcend the arena of small-scale interpersonal relations and those that are most at home in precisely that arena. How, then, are we to engage with all of the values and norms that we take to apply to us? In this article, I discuss one way that we might hope to resolve the tension and its relation to John Rawls's `basic structure restriction'. The prospect of resolution is offered by the idea of a `division of moral labour', according to which the pursuit of certain values is assigned to institutions and not to individuals. According to Rawls's basic structure restriction, principles of justice are applicable only to the institutions of the basic structure of society. The possibility of a connection between the division of moral labour and the basic structure restriction readily suggests itself. Taking G.A. Cohen's well-known `incentives' critique of the basic structure restriction as a starting point, I consider five ways in which that restriction might be defended by appeal to the division of moral labour. I conclude that none of these defences succeeds, for none convinces that the conditions in which it makes sense to apply the division of moral labour idea obtain for Rawls's conception of distributive justice. Although the division of moral labour is an attractive proposal, it can do no work in a Rawlsian context. Key Words: Cohen • distributive justice • egalitarian ethos • equality • Rawls.

Gerald Cohen's critique of John Rawls's theory of justice is that it is concerned only with the justice of social institutions, and must thus arbitrarily draw a line between those inequalities excluded and those allowed by the basic structure. Cohen claims that a proper concern with the interests of the least advantaged would rule out 'incentives' for 'talented' individuals. I argue that Rawls's assumption that the subject of justice is the basic structure of society does not arbitrarily restrict the concerns of political justice, as Cohen claims. Further, I argue that it does not allow 'deep' inequalities within a just basic structure. When properly understood, Rawls's theory of justice is strongly egalitarian, taken as a theory of fairness in the way the burdens and benefits of social cooperation are distributed, even if it is not as egalitarian as Cohen wishes.

According to Rawls, the principles of justice are principles that determine a fair resolution of conflicts of interest among persons in a society. “A set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares” (p. 4). Different interpretations or conceptions of justice fill out this core concept; a theory of justice seeks a best conception. Justice takes priority over other normative claims—as Rawls states, justice is the “first virtue of social institutions.” The principles of justice are principles to regulate what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society,” that is, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (p. 6). Why focus on the basic structure? “The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start. The intuitive idea here is that this structure contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men’s initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or desert. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice must in the first instance apply” (p. 7).

In this article I revise and defend a core feature of political liberalism, namely, the idea that principles of political justice should be limited in their scope of application to what John Rawls calls the ‘basic structure of society.’ I refer to this feature as the ‘basic structure restriction’ of political liberalism. According to my account of the basic structure restriction, the basic structure includes all and only those institutions that have a profound effect on the lives of all citizens, and thus those institutions that citizens would want to organize as parts of a fair system of social cooperation. Moreover, maintaining the basic structure as a fair system of social cooperation vis-à-vis all citizens requires the exercise of coercive political power. This account of the basic structure, which I call the ‘legitimacy of coercion account,’ shows that limiting the basic structure to those institutions that are maintained by legally coercive means is not arbitrary, contrary to the claims of critics like G. A. Cohen. Furthermore, by recognizing explicitly that there exist certain institutions – and, in particular, the family – that ought to be regulated partially by coercively maintained principles, my formulation of the basic structure provides a more satisfactory account of the way in which principles of justice should apply to the family than does Rawls’s most considered account. Finally, I explain how my account of the basic structure can incorporate many of S. M. Okin’s proposed policies for promoting gender equality in society.