Kelly and McDowell on perceptual content
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract|| In a recent issue of _EJAP_, Sean Kelly  defended the position that perceptual content is non-conceptual. More specifically, he claimed that John McDowell's view that concepts involved in perception can be understood as expressible through the use of demonstratives is ultimately untenable. In what follows, I want to look more closely at Kelly's position, as well as suggest possible responses one could make on McDowell's behalf|
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Akeel Bilgrami (1994). On McDowell on the Content of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):206-13.
Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind. New York: Garland Publishing.
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Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
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Added to index2009-01-28
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