David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 7 (1-4):367-373 (1964)
An attempt is made to show that Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic is not the kind of conventionalism which is often ascribed to him. On the contrary, Wittgenstein gives expression to a “mixed” theory which is not only interesting but tends to resolve the perplexities usually associated with the question of the a priori character of logical truth. I try to show that Wittgenstein is better understood not as denying that there are such things as “logical rules” nor as denying that the results of applying such rules are “logically necessary,” but as trying to understand what it is to appeal to a logical rule and what it means to say that the results of applying such a rule are “necessary.” He is not so much overthrowing standard accounts of logical necessity as discovering the limits of the concept.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Michael Dummett (1959). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Review 68 (3):324-348.
Michael Dummett (1997). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Journal of Philosophy 94 (7):166--85.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922/1999). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Dover Publications.
P. M. S. Hacker (2003). Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American Wittgensteinians. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):01–23.
Shelley L. Trianosky-Stillwell (1983). 'Necessity' and 'Provability' in the Later Wittgenstein. History and Philosophy of Logic 4 (1-2):39-61.
Paul Tomassi (2001). Logic After Wittgenstein. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):43-70.
W. Hoering (1983). Zufall Und Notwendigkeit in Wittgensteins Tractatus. Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):217 - 223.
Oskari Kuusela (2008). The Struggle Against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
D. F. Gottlieb (1983). Wittgenstein's Critique of the "Tractatus" View of Rules. Synthese 56 (August):239-251.
Martin O'Neill (2001). Explaining 'the Hardness of the Logical Must': Wittgenstein on Grammar, Arbitrariness and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Investigations 24 (1):1–29.
Colin Johnston (2009). Tractarian Objects and Logical Categories. Synthese 167 (1):145 - 161.
Barry G. Stroud (1965). Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Review 74 (October):504-518.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads15 ( #109,614 of 1,102,739 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #61,837 of 1,102,739 )
How can I increase my downloads?