Implications of Use of Wright's for the Role of Probability and Causation in Evolution

Philosophy of Science 79 (5):596-608 (2012)
Abstract
Sewall Wright’s FST is a mathematical test widely used in empirical applications to characterize genetic and other differences between subpopulations, and to identify causes of those differences. Cockerham and Weir’s popular approach to statistical estimation of FST is based on an assumption sometimes formulated as a claim that actual populations tested are sampled from..
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    References found in this work BETA
    Marshall Abrams (2006). Infinite Populations and Counterfactual Frequencies in Evolutionary Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (2):256-268.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Marshall Abrams (2013). Populations and Pigeons: Prosaic Pluralism About Evolutionary Causes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (3):294-301.
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