Online research in philosophy

The structure-mapping theory has become the de-facto standard account of analogies in cognitive science and philosophy of science. In this paper I propose a distinction between two kinds of domains and I show how the account of analogies based on structure-preserving mappings fails in certain (object-rich) domains, which are very common in mathematics, and how the axiomatic approach to analogies, which is based on a common linguistic description of the analogs in terms of laws or axioms, can be used successfully to explicate analogies of this kind. Thus, the two accounts of analogies should be regarded as complementary, since each of them is adequate for explicating analogies that are drawn between different kinds of domains. In addition, I illustrate how the account of analogies based on axioms has also considerable practical advantages, e. g., for the discovery of new analogies.

I. Introduction. Philosophical discussions of models and modeling in the biological sciences have exploded in the last few decades. Given that there are three-dimensional models of DNA in molecular genetics, individual-based computer simulations in population ecology, statistical models in paleontology, diffusion models in population genetics, and remnant models in taxonomy, we clearly should have a philosophical account of such models and their relation to the world. In this essay, I provide a critical survey of the accounts of models provided by philosophers of science and philosophers of biology including models as analogies, relational structures, partially independent representations, and material objects. However, there is much, much more work to be done.

In my reply I focus on three topics: the usefulness of Searle's physical analogies for understanding the relationship between higher-level mental properties and lower-level physical properties, the question of overdetermination and the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that Searle's reply does not refute my arguments against his analogies, while concerns about overdetermination are only taken away because his reply shows that there is no genuine unconscious mental causation in his view. That makes it hard to understand how he can maintain at the same time that we follow rules unconsciously.

The word “model” is highly ambiguous, and there is no uniform terminology used by either scientists or philosophers. Here, a model is considered to be a representation of some object, behavior, or system that one wants to understand. This article presents the most common type of models found in science as well as the different relations—traditionally called “analogies”—between models and between a given model and its subject. Although once considered merely heuristic devices, they are now seen as indispensable to modern science. There are many different types of models used across the scientific disciplines, although there is no uniform terminology to classify them. The most familiar are physical models such as scale replicas of bridges or airplanes. These, like all models, are used because of their “analogies” to the subjects of the models. A scale model airplane has a structural similarity or “material analogy” to the full scale version. This correspondence allows engineers to infer dynamic properties of the airplane based on wind tunnel experiments on the replica. Physical models also include abstract representations which often include idealizations such as frictionless planes and point masses. Another, but completely different type of model, is constituted by sets of equations. These mathematical models were not always deemed legitimate models by philosophers. Model-to-subject and model-to-model relations are described using several different types of analogies: positive, negative, neutral, material, and formal.

Recent accounts of scientific method suggest that a model, or analogy, for an axiomatized theory is another theory, or postulate set, with an identical calculus. The present paper examines five central theses underlying this position. In the light of examples from physical science it seems necessary to distinguish between models and analogies and to recognize the need for important revisions in the position under study, especially in claims involving an emphasis on logical structure and similarity in form between theory and analogy. While formal considerations are often relevant in the employment of an analogy they are neither as extensive as proponents of this viewpoint suggest, nor are they in most cases sufficient for allowing analogies to fulfill the roles imputed to them. Of major importance, and what these authors generally fail to consider, are physical similarities between analogue and theoretical object. Such similarities, which are characteristic in varying degrees of most analogies actually employed, play an important role in affording a better understanding of concepts in the theory and also in the development of the theoretical assumptions.

This paper describes the purposes served by medical analogies (why they are used) and the different cognitive processes that support those purposes (how they are used). Historical and contemporary examples illustrate the theoretical, experimental, diagnostic, therapeutic, technological, and educational value of medical analogies. Four models of analogical transfer illuminate how analogies are used in these cases.

Mary Hesse's well-known work on models and analogies gives models a creative role to play in science, which rests on developing certain analogical properties considered neutral between the two fields. Case study material from Irving Fisher's work (The Purchasing Power of Money, 1911), in which he used analogies to construct models of monetary relations and the monetary system, highlights certain omissions in Hesse's account. The analysis points to the importance of taking account of the negative properties in the analogies and to certain differences between "ready-made" analogies (models of systems based on existing analogical structures) and "designed" analogies (models built up from separate analogical features).