David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 54 (3):409-434 (1987)
By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that he had no reason to believe true. In this paper I develop a position that explains why they were worth considering, and that rejects the retroductive position that a hypothesis is worth considering when, if true, it would explain the observed data
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Giora Hon & Bernard R. Goldstein (2012). Maxwell’s Contrived Analogy: An Early Version of the Methodology of Modeling. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (4):236-257.
Anya Plutynski (2011). Four Problems of Abduction: A Brief History. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-248.
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