Subjective views of Kuhn

Perspectives on Science 9 (4):423-432 (2001)
: In response to a charge of subjectivism, Kuhn in his Postscript emphasizes the importance of "values" (accuracy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc) that are shared by scientists generally. However, Kuhn adds, these values are applied differently by different scientists. By employing a comparison with partially subjective views of Carnap on confirming evidence, this paper raises questions about Kuhn's position on values by considering ways it might be interpreted as subjective and ways it may not.
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DOI 10.1162/106361401760375811
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T. S. Kuhn (1980). The Essential Tension. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):359-375.

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