Graduate studies at Western
History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):195-217 (1984)
|Abstract||Papineau has suggested that the Principle of Non-Contradiction is a logical law that ?verificationists? are not entitled to claim as a prioritrue. The Principle, like that of Excluded Middle, is not sufficiently grounded in the ?miserly? epistemology of verificationism to be proven in ?verificationist logic?. We examine who might be challenged by this claim: who are the ?verificationists?? We defend our candidates against Papineau's criticisms and other attacks, but this leaves the verificationist open to a different criticism|
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