Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- Terrence F. Ackerman (1984). Medical Ethics and the Two Dogmas of Liberalism. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 5 (1).Two dogmas of liberalism in the therapeutic setting are challenged: (1) that patients have a ready-made ability to act autonomously; and (2) that non-intervention by physicians is the best strategy for protecting the autonomy of patients. Recognition of the impact of illness upon autonomous behavior forms the basis of this challenge. It is suggested that autonomy is better conceived as a process of personal growth by which patients become better able to overcome the disruptive effects of illness. The physician is assigned an active role in the achievement of this therapeutic goal. The implications of this new liberal theory are illustrated by reference to the informed consent issue.
Similar books and articles
This essay explores some concerns about the quality of informed consent in patients whose autonomy is diminished by fatal illness. It argues that patients with diminished autonomy cannot give free and voluntary consent, and that recruitment of such patients as subjects in human experimentation exploits their vulnerability in a morally objectionable way. Two options are given to overcome this objection: (i) recruit only those patients who desire to contribute to medical knowledge, rather than gain access to experimental treatment, or (ii) provide prospective subjects the choice to participate in standard doubleblind study or receive the experimental treatment. Either option would guarantee that patients in desperate conditions are given a more meaningful choice and a richer freedom, and thus a higher quality of informed consent, than under standard randomized trials. Keywords: autonomy, double-blind trials, prerandomized and randomized trials, informed consent CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
The article examines the popular notion that liberalism, or liberal theory of contract, is committed to a particularly rigid conception of the freedom of contract. The article argues that this notion is mistaken, and seeks to identify its roots in certain misconceptions of modern liberalism and its implications, and in a certain misunderstanding concerning the nature of contract. Neutral political concern, the value of personal autonomy, and finally the belief that contracts are identical to promises in terms of their significance for personal autonomy, are analysed and rejected as bases for the association of liberalism with commitment to a minimally limited freedom of contract. Instead, it is shown that such considerations are compatible with, and in some cases directly recommend, various forms of intervention in the freedom of contract, and an active role for the state in shaping and regulating contractual activity.
Some authors have advanced a contractual model to protect patient autonomy within the therapeutic relationship. Such a conception of the physicianâpatient relationship is intended to serve both parties by respecting patients' choices and preserving physician integrity. I critique this contractual view and offer an alternative, feminist contextualized approach to autonomy within the therapeutic relationship. This approach places the physician-patient relationship within a larger social context, and indicates the many social inequalities that render insupportable the notion of physicians and patients as contracting equals.
Issues concerning patients' rights are at the center of bioethics, but the political basis for these rights has rarely been examined. In Bioethics in a Liberal Society: The Political Framework of Bioethics Decision Making , Thomas May offers a compelling analysis of how the political context of liberal constitutional democracy shapes the rights and obligations of both patients and health care professionals. May focuses on how a key feature of liberal society -- namely, an individual's right to make independent decisions -- has an impact on the most important relational facets of health care, such as patients' autonomy and professionals' rights of conscience. Although a liberal political framework protects individual judgments, May asserts that this right is based on the assumption of an individual's competency to make sound decisions. May uses case studies to examine society's approach to medical decision making when, for reasons ranging from age to severe mental disorder, a person lacks sufficient competency to make independent and fully informed choices. To protect the autonomy of these vulnerable patients, May emphasizes the need for health care ethics committees and ethics consultants to help guide the decision-making process in clinical settings. Bioethics in a Liberal Society is essential reading for all those interested in understanding how bioethics is practiced within our society.
Little attention has been given in medical ethics literature to issues relating to the truthfulness of patients. Beginning with an actual medical case, this paper first explores truth-telling by doctors and patients as related to two prominent models of the physician-patient relationship. Utilizing this discussion and the literature on the truthfulness and accuracy of the information patients convey to doctors, these models are then critically assessed. It is argued that the patient agency (patient autonomy or contractual) model is inherently and seriously flawed in numerous circumstances, even those involving informed and competent adult patients. Keywords: truth-telling, doctor-patient relationship, medical ethics, paternalism, autonomy, patient compliance, patients as agents, informed consent CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
In recent years the concepts of individual autonomy and political liberalism have been the subjects of intense debate, but these discussions have occurred largely within separate academic disciplines. Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism contains for the first time new essays devoted to foundational questions regarding both the notion of the autonomous self and the nature and justification of liberalism. Written by leading figures in moral, legal and political theory, the volume covers inter alia the following topics: the nature of the self and its relation to autonomy, the social dimensions of autonomy and the political dynamics of respect and recognition, and the concept of autonomy underlying the principles of liberalism.
In this article, I distinguish personal autonomy from heteronomy, and consider whether autonomy provides a suitable basis for liberalism. I argue that liberal government should not promote autonomy in all its citizens, on the grounds that not all members of liberal democracies require autonomy for a good life. I then outline an alternative option that I call a liberalism of conscience, describing how it better respects heteronomous citizens. I subsequently clarify how a liberalism of conscience is different than, and superior to, autonomy-based versions of liberalism.
Introduction: What is liberalism? -- Three conceptions of autonomy -- A theory of autonomy -- Autonomy and anti-perfectionism -- Autonomy-minded liberalism -- Multicultural liberalism.
From Hippocrates to paternalism to autonomy : the new hegemony -- From autonomy to consent -- Consent, autonomy, and the law -- Autonomy at the end of life -- Autonomy and pregnancy -- Autonomy and genetic information -- Autonomy and organ transplantation -- Autonomy, consent, and the law.
The pinnacle of the physician's clinical skills is his ability to develop the autonomy of his patients in the management of their health affairs. To do this requires the forging of a relationship in which patients' attitudes toward their health and illness are products of the doctor-patient relationship rather than unilateral behavior by either one. Modern medicine is beset with problems that make it difficult for physicians to develop and exercise the skills that lead to patient autonomy. An erosion of public confidence in physicians is being caused by several mojar forces that include: (1) the power of science over life; (2) medical technology's dehumanizing effect; (3) legalization of medical ethics; and (4) industrialization and commercialization of medical care. To restore the kind of confidence that makes the physician an effective proponent of his patient's autonomy will require a major emphasis upon all aspects of medical ethics in the medical curriculum and in medical practice. Clinical investigation of this subject is highly appropriate. Clinical faculties should be developed in greater numbers who are authorities in the humanities as well as in science. Our medical schools need also to develop and to utilize models of health care in which relations with patients are personalized, continuous, and comprehensive so that ethical ideals such as patient autonomy can be demonstrated by precept and example, and can also be researched.
Discussion of Terrence F. Ackerman, Medical ethics and the two dogmas of liberalism
|
|
There are no threads in this forum |
Nothing in this forum yet.

