A logical formalization of the occ theory of emotions

Synthese 168 (2):201 - 248 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes, as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collins’s theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents’ mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory.
Keywords Modal logics  BDI agents  Emotions  OCC theory
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
John P. Burgess (1969). Probability Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (2):264-274.
Paul Ekman (1992). An Argument for Basic Emotions. Cognition and Emotion 6 (3):169-200.

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