Confirming Inexact Generalizations

I suppose that 'ravens are black' is an inexact generalization having a degree of truth measured by the proportion of ravens that are black, and a probability measured by its expected degree of truth in different 'possible worlds.' Given this, 'ravens are black' differs in truth, probability, and confirmation from 'non-black things are not ravens', and this suggests a new approach to Hempel's Paradox as well as to other aspects of confirmation. Basic concepts of a formal theory developing this approach are described, and some of its fundamental laws are given, together with sketches of applications.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/192963
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
John W. Carroll (1991). Property-Level Causation? Philosophical Studies 63 (3):245 - 270.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Robert J. Levy (1988). Regarding the Raven Paradox. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:17 - 23.
Florian F. Schiller (2012). Why Bayesians Needn't Be Afraid of Observing Many Non-Black Non-Ravens. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):77-88.
Herbert A. Simon (1991). Black Ravens and a White Shoe. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):339-342.
Mark Siebel (2004). Der Rabe Und der Bayesianist. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):313 - 329.
Fred Wilson (1995). Once More to Dissolve the Ravens. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):135 – 146.
Patrick Maher (2005). Qualitative Confirmation and the Ravens Paradox. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):89-108.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

8 ( #276,630 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.