Extended cognition meets epistemology

Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119 (2012)
Abstract
This article examines the intersection of the theory of extended mind/cognition and theory of knowledge. In the minds of some, it matters to conditions for knowing whether the mind extends beyond the boundaries of body and brain. I examine these intuitions and find no support for this view from tracking theories of knowledge. I then argue that the apparent difference extended mind is supposed to have for ability or credit theories is also illusory
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    References found in this work BETA
    Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
    Frederick Adams (1986). The Function of Epistemic Justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492.

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