Synthese 170 (1):97 - 114 (2009)
|Abstract||In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Daniele Sgaravatti & Elia Zardini (2008). Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):217-261.
John N. Williams (2008). Propositional Knowledge and Know-How. Synthese 165 (1):107 - 125.
William S. Boardman (1993). The Relativity of Perceptual Knowledge. Synthese 94 (2):145-169.
John Hyman (1999). How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):433-451.
Hilary Kornblith (2009). Sosa in Perspective. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):127--136.
Greg Sax (2010). Having Know-How: Intellect, Action, and Recent Work on Ryle's Distinction Between Knowledge-How and Knowledge-That. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):507-530.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads262 ( #679 of 556,803 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,489 of 556,803 )
How can I increase my downloads?