Fodor's modal argument

Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56 (1993)
What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of this causal powers argument. I argue that Fodor's argument (in old or new dress) is a non sequitur. It neither establishes the existence of narrow content nor the need for a content other than broad content to explain intentional behavior
Keywords Behavior  Causation  Mental States  Modality  Psychology  Science  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1080/09515089308573076
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Frederick Adams (1993). Reply to Russow. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.

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