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Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94 (2011)
Abstract
Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory
Keywords Sven Bernecker  Closure  Knowledge  Propositional memory  False memory  Dispositional belief  Gappy proposition
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.

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