Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):113–127 (1997)
|Abstract||That inferences of the form "If M then S and possibly M, therefore possibly S" are invalid in possible worlds modal logics can be viewed as another fallacy of material implication. However, this paper argues that properly analyzing this and related inferences requires treating the possibility involved as a practical modality. Specifically, ordinary language propositions of the form "It is possible that M" must be understood to mean that there is a non-negligible probability of M being the case. But this entails reexamining the very idea of logical validity.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Stephen P. Engstrom (2009). The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Harvard University Press.
Heath White (2006). Desires in Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):197 - 221.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169 - 179.
Ernest W. Adams (1996). Four Probability-Preserving Properties of Inferences. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1):1 - 24.
Rachel McKinnon (2011). Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.
Georg Spielthenner (2007). A Logic of Practical Reasoning. Acta Analytica 22 (2):139-153.
Kai von Fintel & Anthony Gillies (2009). `Might' Made Right. In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
M. V. Dougherty (2004). The Comparative Set Fallacy. Argumentation 18 (2):213-222.
Allan Bäck (2009). Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident. Phronesis 54 (2):101-135.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #213,351 of 722,874 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,874 )
How can I increase my downloads?