Reply to Russow

Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65 (1993)
In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not exist.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089308573078
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,675
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Frederick R. Adams (1993). Fodor's Modal Argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
L. M. Russow (1993). Fodor, Adams, and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

17 ( #238,106 of 2,117,590 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #219,397 of 2,117,590 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.