Sorting out the anti-doomsday arguments: A reply to Sowers

Mind 116 (462):269-273 (2007)
claim that his thought experiment shows that a currently living person is not a random sample is refuted. His thought experiment is reduced to a probability model, and is shown to be identical to one previously developed by Dieks. The status of the Doomsday Argument is left unresolved, since Dieks's refutation attempt is disputed in the literature.
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