Towards closure on closure

Synthese 188 (2):179-196 (2012)
Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories of knowledge
Keywords Contrastive statements  Closure  Equivalence  Distribution  Dretske  Nozick  Hawthorne  Vogel
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9922-8
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
Fred Adams (2011). Husker Du? Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94.

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