The Function of Epistemic Justification

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492 (1986)
Abstract
Assume that epistemic justification has a cognitive function and that a belief's being justified is not just its being caused by the appropriate information (for this property of the belief may be cognitively impenetrable). What is the function of epistemic justification? it cannot be to actualize knowledge-The belief's being caused by appropriate information alone does that! so what is its function? I suggest it is to cause us to believe and/or take action
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00455091.1986.10717130
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,357
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
Frederick R. Adams (1979). A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):493 - 518.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

22 ( #178,006 of 1,911,386 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #45,108 of 1,911,386 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.