The Role of Intention in Intentional Action

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531 (1989)
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Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2010). Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.
Frederick R. Adams (1993). Fodor's Modal Argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.

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