Behaviorism and the philosophy of the act

Noûs 16 (3):399-420 (1982)
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Abstract

Behaviorism and the philosophy of the act are widely believed to be inconsistent with one another. I argue that both are true, Fulfilling the requirements of scientific psychology and the phenomenology of mind, Respectively. The key to understanding their mutual consistency lies in the idea of parallelism and its corresponding requirement that all descriptive features of mental states be analyzed as properties, None as relations (to anything physical). So the intentional link itself must be a 'logical' and not a descriptive connection. More broadly, It is required to free the act from its origins in the metaphysical notion of 'activity' and the substance ontology from which that motion derives

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Citations of this work

Dispositions, explanation, and behavior.Laird Addis - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):205 – 227.
Dispositional mental states: Chomsky and Freud.Laird Addis - 1988 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (1):1-17.
Intrinsic Reference and the New Theory.Laird Addis - 1989 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):241-257.
Ryle and Intentionality.Laird Addis - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (1):49-63.

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