Dispositions, explanation, and behavior

Inquiry 24 (2):205 – 227 (1981)
According to the theory of dispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non-dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account of dispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of 'reduction sentences'. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering-law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To construct a potential explanation of the covering-law type. The theory can also be applied fruitfully to human behavior, especially with respect to the issues of reasons and causes and of' rational' explanation. The success of the applicability of this theory of dispositions is further evidence of its adequacy.
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DOI 10.1080/00201748108601932
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References found in this work BETA
K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.

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Citations of this work BETA
Laird Addis (1988). Dispositional Mental States: Chomsky and Freud. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (1):1-17.

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