Philosophy of Science 34 (3):251-259 (1967)
|Abstract||Philosophers who hold that the correct ontological analysis of things includes both properties and particulars have often been pressed to "show" the particular. If we are not acquainted with them, it is argued, then we should not suppose that they exist. I argue that, while we do have good and sufficient reasons for supposing there to be particulars, we are not acquainted with them. To suppose that we are acquainted with them is to treat particulars as if they were properties and to fail to realize how radically different particulars are from properties. The relevance of these matters to some considerations of "simplicity" and the principles of empiricism is explored|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Adamson (2005). On Knowledge of Particulars. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):273–294.
Richard Brian Davis (2003). 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
Theodore Sider (2006). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
Larry Lee Blackman (1983). Russell on the Relations of Universals and Particulars. Philosophy Research Archives 9:265-278.
Kenneth C. Clatterbaugh (1965). General Ontology and the Principle of Acquaintance. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):272-276.
Noa Latham (2002). Spatiotemporal and Spatial Particulars. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-35.
Richard Davis (2004). The Brave New Bare Particularism. The Modern Schoolman 81 (4):267-273.
E. D. Klemke (1960). Universals and Particulars in a Phenomenalist Ontology. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):254-261.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #122,328 of 722,771 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,771 )
How can I increase my downloads?