Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):157-165 (1995)
|Abstract||Some issues raised by the notion of surveyability and how it is represented mathematically are explored. Wright considers the sense in which the positive integers are surveyable and suggests that their structure will be a weakly finite, but weakly infinite, totality. One way to expose the incoherence of this account is by applying Wittgenstein's distinction between intensional and extensional to it. Criticism of the idea of a surveyable proof shows the notion's lack of clarity. It is suggested that this concept should be replaced by that of a feasible operation, as strict finitism aims to understand the boundaries of legitimate mathematical knowledge|
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