Akratic believing?

Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27 (2002)
Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
Keywords epistemic akrasia
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Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Eugene Chislenko (2014). Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.
Cristina Borgoni (2015). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.

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