Contextualism and fallibility: pragmatic encroachment, possibility, and strength of epistemic position
Synthese 188 (2):247-272 (2012)
|Abstract||A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do not. Given the knowledge norm of assertion, if one recommendation is preferable to the other, the result favors the preferred recommendation's account of knowledge. In the final section, I offer a unification of these criticisms centering on the contextualist use of 'epistemic position'. Their use imposes on threshold notions of justification, warrant, or knowledge tests that are suitable only to unlimited comparative or scalar notions like confidence or certainty and places them at one with an important strand of sceptical reasoning|
|Keywords||Contextualism Invariantism Raised costs of errors Possibilities (counter-possibilities) Lewis Cohen DeRose Unger Pragmatics Fallibility|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jeremy Fantl & McGrath (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment: It's Not Just About Knowledge. [REVIEW] Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
J. E. Adler (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment, Methods and Contextualism. Analysis 72 (3):526-534.
B. Armour-Garb (2011). Contextualism Without Pragmatic Encroachment. Analysis 71 (4):667-676.
Michael Pace (2011). The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'. Noûs 45 (2):239-268.
Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.
Tim Black (2005). Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manœvres. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336.
Kent Bach (2008). Applying Pragmatics to Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.
Aaron Rizzieri (2011). Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Jessica Brown (2006). Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
Matthew Chrisman (2007). From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225 - 254.
Added to index2012-10-03
Total downloads6 ( #154,676 of 722,774 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,774 )
How can I increase my downloads?