Is the generality problem too general?

Abstract
Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the “generality problem” is illusory
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Frank Hofmann (2013). Three Kinds of Reliabilism. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.

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