|Abstract||The focus of this paper is to examine the problem of induction as a methodology for science. It also evaluates Karl Popper’s deductive approach as the suitable methodology for scientific research. Popper calls his theory ‘hypothetico-deductive methodology’. However, this paper argues the thesis that Popper’s theory of hypothetico-deductive methodology, which he claims is the only appropriate methodology of science is fraught with some theoretical difficulties, which makes it unacceptable. Popper’s logical asymmetry between verification and falsification, we argue, is philosophically untenable. We argue the thesis for the complementarity of both inductive and deductive methodology in scientific investigation. This study seeks to establish the resonance of accepting both deductive and inductive reasoning as the basic methodologies upon which scientific research and discoveries proceed.|
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